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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the deep spatio-linguistic relationship between the Austrian born philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein's practices of philosophy and of architecture. Wittgenstein's philosophy of language is
notable for its sharply distinguished early and late work; with the early work most strongly associated with
his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922) and the later frequently designated by his posthumously
published Philosophical Investigations (1953). Following the completion of the early work Wittgenstein
abandoned philosophy for a period of ten years, spending the years from 1926 to 1929 engaged in the
design and construction of a house in Vienna for his sister Margarethe Stonborough. The thesis considers
the ways in which the intervening practice of architecture infiltrated, altered, influenced and manifested
itself in the later philosophy by focusing on the spatial, temporal, conceptual and cognitive gaps in the
philosophy.
The importance and the prevalence of the practice of architecture for Wittgenstein's later philosophy are
exhibited in a variety of ways that together broaden, reconceive and resituate the functioning of language
and philosophy. The thesis considers these developments in the philosophy as they are revealed in the
visual and spatial language, thinking and construction of the philosophical texts. This analysis reveals a
shift from the removed, idealized and flattened picture theory of the Tractatus to the production of the
spatially complex and ambiguous images of entanglement in the Investigations. The Stonborough house,
itself, is analyzed through its production of cognitive and spatial practices and problematics. Wittgenstein's
practice of architecture is shown to utilize, develop, challenge and reveal related spatial concepts found in
the philosophy. These include the ideas of limits, boundaries, inner/outer dichotomies, the relationship
between showing and saying, the idea of correspondence and the practices of representation, assembly,
resemblance, construction, building and rearrangement.
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Introduction : Acts of location and relocation
During a two and a half year period beginning in the autumn of 1926, the Austrian born
philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein( 1889-1951 ) designed and built a house in Vienna for his
sister Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein. The history of the house's production - designed as it
is by a philosopher who is nearly as known for his dramatic entry, departure and return to
philosophyl, as for his philosophical work - challenges the viewer to decipher within its walls
some affinity between Wittgenstein's architecture and his philosophy. Approaching the house
thus presents a unique set of questions that force the reconsideration of what the act of viewing
involves. In response to this situation, most of the discussions of the house attempt to define
some such link. The association, however, remains strained based in two largely separate
approaches: the discussion of the architecture on the one hand and the discussion of the
philosophy on the other. What seemingly demands interdisciplinarity ends up reinforcing a sort
of bidisciplinarity.
The reasons for this seem, at first, to be straightforward. The vast majority of the study of
Wittgenstein's work comes from within the discourse of philosophy, and, almost without
exception, does not deal seriously with Wittgenstein's architecture, even when given an ideal
opportunity to enter into this discussion. For example, when a philosophical journal of aesthetics
and art criticism reviewed Paul Wijdeveld's book : Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect, disciplinary
separation was enforced; philosophy and aesthetics were placed to one side, the house and
architecture to the other. After summarizing the book's discussion of the relation between
IDuring that period Wittgenstein had limited contact with other philosophers, with the exceptions of that needed to
get the Tractatus published. Beyond that his primary philosophical contacts were his talks with Frank Ramsey, and
his meetings with Schlick. There are almost no philosophical writing from this period.
Wittgenstein's philosophy and architecture, the reviewer concluded: "For the philosopher there
are two questions. Does [the author] correctly understand Wittgenstein's thinking about
aesthetics, and does that thinking help us resolve philosophical problems about aesthetics?
These, however, are questions for another day."2
The reviewer's concerns, posed in this way, divorce the interpretation of a Wittgensteinian
aesthetics from its architectural associations. Once disconnected from their origin, they are
displaced to within the 'secure' bounds of philosophy. These questions, had in effect, served to
relocate those concerns to a place where the house has no acknowledged role despite its being
the generator of the interpretation of Wittgenstein's aesthetics in question.
Unfortunately, the reviewer is not solely at fault, as Wijdeveld's book, itself, does not find a way to
fully bridge this gap, declaring at a critical point :
(I) t still remains difficult to compare the connections between architectural precision, consisting
in visual - spatial - tactile relationships and in a certain use of building elements, with
philosophical or linguistic precision, consisting in semantic relationships and in a certain use of
words and concepts.3
A logical site for this discussion between architecture and philosophy would seem to be that of
aesthetics itself. Aesthetics, however, is notoriously slippery territory within philosophy. (The
history of aesthetics provides clues to the dissolution of clear demarcations between disciplines.)
The reviewers position parallels the discipline of philosophy's reticence to acknowledge the
centrality of aesthetic thinking and practice, even as it often claims a foundational position
regarding aesthetic questions. What had been a major component of philosophy, along with
epistemology, metaphysics, logic and ethics; aesthetics as a part of philosophy has become a
diminished, deserted territory in the philosophy of the twentieth century, transforming and
refounding itself largely into the separate field of art theory. Its separation from philosophy is
2 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Volume 53, Number 4, Fall 1995, p. 451.
3Paul Wijdeveld, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Architect. (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1994), p.194.
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hardly clear, however as art theory has frequently relied on ideas from within philosophy as well
as from other discourses. The twentieth century linguistic turn fueled this process, with its
understanding of knowledge as linguistic, including aesthetic knowledge and practices, thereby
laying the ground for an interdisciplinary discourse that ultimately challenges the borders
between discourses and aesthetic objects.
From within the discipline of architecture, however, much of the interest in the Stonborough
house undoubtedly stems from Wittgenstein's stature as a philosopher rather than solely from the
building he designed. As such, the architectural concern often tries to identify aspects of the
philosophy within the house, replicating a common procedure from art/architecture theory that
tries to apply, relate or extend ideas or procedures developed within philosophy to aesthetic
practices, products and readings.
This split in approach from philosophy to architecture suggests the thinking whereby the mute
objects of architecture are too often considered the recipient of applied theories developed
elsewhere rather than as constructive constituents of theory formation. The resulting paradox
simultaneously denigrates and elevates the aesthetic objects seemingly at the core of theory:
displacing them at once to a secondary status where they are incapable of providing substantially
more than an example of an otherwise stated and formed thinking, while elevating them through
the implicit acknowledgment of their importance that the desire to theorize such 'objects'
suggests. Wittgenstein's early philosophy in its show-say distinction replicates this structural
paradox while the later philosophy's emphasis on practice dismantles it with Wittgenstein's
practice of architecture situated between early and late philosophies. This is to say that the
Stonborough house, in forcing the architecture/philosophy discussion, defines a unique, and
oddly both contentious and desolate place.
To move beyond this paradox and delve into the philosophy-architecture association in
Wittgenstein's work thus requires looking beyond ways in which the philosophy is legible within
the architecture. It necessitates a reciprocal spatial maneuver that shifts the site of study from
within the walls of the house to encompass the pages of the text. This shift accomplishes three
things: it reveals the primordial role of spatial and visual thinking in Wittgenstein's philosophy, it
allows the practice of architecture to be considered an integral component rather than an
isolated digression of his philosophical development, and most importantly, it acknowledges a
shared territory between philosophy and architecture.
Wittgenstein's two main texts, Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus published in 1922 and
Philosophical Investigations published in 1953 two years after his death, suggest very different
relations between philosophy and architecture. In both texts, Wittgenstein was concerned with
the scope and limits of language and philosophy, but what he believed language capable of
communicating sensibly changed drastically from one to the other. The Tractatus had attempted
to define the limits of "what cannot be thought by working outwards through what can be
thought."(4.114) Beyond these bounds of the thinkable or sayable was that which could only
be shown. Effectively, this thinking subdivided philosophy's traditional territory leaving
epistemology within the limits of the thinkable (if nonsensibly), while aesthetics and ethics were
cast out to the realm of showing and practice. Logic in the Tractatus held the privileged position
of connecting saying and showing and thereby allowing language to represent the world.
Wittgenstein's later philosophy of language provides a possible alternative to this dichotomy in
that it mediates between these two disciplines. In contrast to the belief that epistemology and
metaphysics should be the center of the philosopher's concern, Wittgenstein viewed philosophy as
lacking its own subject matter, a position that leaves epistemology and metaphysics both empty
and bankrupt. Against this, Wittgenstein has stated, though not developed, the idea that
aesthetics and ethics have content and therefore are productive areas of concern.
The Investigations removed the limits that the Tractatus had imposed on language and
philosophy by rejecting the Tractatus'view that language represents the world in accordance with
the rules of logic. Instead, Wittgenstein saw that the proper task of philosophy was to reconnect
the philosophical study of language with the everyday practice of language. As he stated in the
Investigations: "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use."
(91116) As a result, the representative function of logic lost its centrality and the every-day
practice of language replaced logic as the model for philosophical thinking. This
reconceptualization of both language and philosophy exposed the Tractatus' thinking as idealized
and problematic. Ethics and aesthetics, although still undiscussed, were no longer defined as
outside the realm of the sayable, rather, their realm of practice became the philosophical basis
for studying language.
While the subtitle of this study, Wittgensteinian spatial practices between architecture and
philosophy, speaks of a possible mediation between architecture and philosophy, the defining of
a shared territory, it needs to also be understood as an oscillation between the two disciplines. As
Wittgenstein's life and work were themselves structured by a series of breaks and shifts followed
by subsequent returns and re-engagements with people, places, ideas, practices and disciplines -
location and relocation came to lie at the very heart of Wittgenstein's attempts to position the
subject in relation to philosophy, and philosophy in relation to other disciplines and every-day life.
These practices also define the order of the Investigations which Wittgenstein described in the
preface to the book as : "remarks" or "short paragraphs, of which there is sometimes a fairly long
chain about the same subject" and sometimes sudden changes, "jumping from one topic to
another".
The 'object' of investigation in the Philosophical Investigations is language in its multitude guises,
some of which Wittgenstein lists in 923 :
923. But how many kinds of sentences are there? Say assertion, question, and command? -
There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words",
"sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of
language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete
and get forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of this from the changes in mathematics.)
Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the
speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life.
Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others:
Giving orders, and obeying them--
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements -
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) -
Reporting an event -
Speculating about an event --
Forming and testing a hypothesis --
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams --
Making up a story; and reading it --
Play-acting -
Singing catches --
Guessing riddles -
Making a joke; telling it --
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic --
Translating from one language into another --
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
--It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are
used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the
structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)
This list makes it clear that language in the Investigations includes far more than what may have
been expected: describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements and
constructing an object from a description (a drawing). What this makes clear is that these
investigations incorporate the aesthetic and the architectural, the spoken and the shown, that
Wittgenstein, rather than dividing the territory of language in accordance with logic, as in the
Tractatus - is investigating the shared territory of language as found in practice.
My goal here is to plot a series of courses through this shared territory that focus specifically on
the architecture - philosophy relation as it is manifested in Wittgenstein's philosophy. One set,
what I call transgressions and inhabitations, focus on a number of the more or less distinct
oscillations in Wittgenstein's life and work between : disciplines, views, positions, dichotomies,
places, practices, methods and so on. This series follows the breaks, gaps, and sudden changes in
topics in Wittgenstein's work by chronicling his conceptual, textual and historical movements,
including his architectural production.
This set of courses includes both the move from the early to the late philosophy and the focus on
a critical juncture in the Philosophical Investigations where that text enacts the move from
without to within, from transgression to inhabitation. Specifically focusing on sections 103-133,
where the overriding importance of space and a continually changing vision confronts and
dismantles the singularity and rigidity of vision and the resulting fixity of image in the Tractatus.
The second course of study takes its cue from the two related suggestions made by Wittgenstein
in the preface to the Investigations, the first proposes that the nature of the investigation of
language at hand becomes "crippled" when forced in any "single direction against their natural
inclination" and as a result "compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every
direction." The second tells the reader that this is not a vicarious journey, but one that must be
re-enacted in order to be understood, one that is already central to our lives, and concluding by
emphasizing the need for the reader to re-enact these and other journeys. "I should not like my
writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible to stimulate someone to
thoughts of his own".
The results of these travels "criss-cross in every direction" are a multitude of associations that
produce what I call "images of entanglement" and coalesce into sites in Wittgenstein's work -
both textural and architectural - where the enmeshment of these associations emerge through a
specific image. Examples of this include Wittgenstein's definition of language as a labyrinth of
paths, his discussion of the philosopher's involvement with philosophical problems as the attempt
to repair a torn spider's web with one's fingers, his description of meaning as akin to the
intertwining of characteristics that produce a family resemblance and, the ordering of the
Investigations itself, with its interwoven concepts and interrupting interlocutor.
The final course plots the development of these images of entanglement, which were first
suggested by certain aspects of the architecture as they emerged in Wittgenstein's 1929 lecture
on ethics and were developed in the Investigations It is in this development that the influence of
Wittgenstein's immersion in spatial practices and his development of the view from within
become fully apparent, as it is there where Wt's reconceived understanding of space produces a
new criterion of clarity, one that arises from entanglement.
These two approaches, the snapshot-like images of entanglement, and the journal-like chronicling
of the ins and outs of the transgressions and inhabitations that define the later work emerged
together from within the central space of the sole work of architecture Wittgenstein designed.
Section one : Transgressions and inhabitations
In 1914, Ludwig Wittgenstein had built a traditional wooden house on the edge of a cliff
overlooking a fjord outside of the small town of Skjolden in Norway. He lived there for over six
months working out ideas that would form the basis for the Tractatus Logico - Philosophicus.
What makes this picture of Wittgenstein perched in his house, looking down from above to the
fjord below, while defining the limits of language so alluring, is the temptation to compare the
view he would have had of the world below his window, with the view of language that he
constructed in the Tractatus. It is equally tempting to contrast this scene, to that of the scene of
much of his later work, the colleges of Cambridge University, that Wittgenstein had previously
abandoned in search of isolation.
If this house in Skjolden, Norway is not the image most associated with the Tractatus, then the
text of the Tractatus is. With its hierarchically ordered and numbered propositions calibrated to
the fifth decimal place, the Tractatus presents a unique image in the history of philosophical texts.
This structure, far more than an idiosyncratic gesture, is part of Wittgenstein's fundamental
attempt to control the meaning of the text through its form. In the only footnote of the Tractatus,
appearing on the first page of the text, Wittgenstein commented on this system:
17
The decimal numbers assigned to the individual propositions indicate the logical
importance of the propositions, the stress laid on them in my exposition. The propositions n.1,
n.2, n.3, etc. are comments on proposition no. n: the propositions n.ml, n.m2, etc. are comments
on proposition no. n.m: and so on.
The propositions of the Tractatus are organized around seven main propositions that occupy the
positions of the whole numbers 1-7. Between any two whole numbers, or main propositions, lie
anywhere from 6 (in between propositions 1.0 and 2.0) up to 149 (in between propositions
5.0 and 6.0 ) 4 additional propositions. These are organized so that any one proposition either
continues on to another proposition at the same decimal place (and thus degree of logical
importance) or has any number of increasingly subservient propositions organized between that
one and the next of equal or greater importance. This complex system both organizes and
constructs meaning by stressing which propositions are of greater or lesser "logical importance"
and by delineating which propositions any set of other propositions refers to or follows from.
The Tractatus'numbering system parallels the fundamental relationship the text defines between
word and meaning. That understanding of language was later summed up by Wittgenstein in the
opening paragraph of the Investigations : "In this picture of language we find the roots of the
following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the
object for which the word stands." The numbering system, with its with its hierarchical
construction and exacting association of elements, in effect, adds an additional correlate to that
between word and meaning, that of place by situating each proposition in a specific place in
relation to the others and to the whole of the Tractatus.
Locating propositions in this manner acts to fix a series of associations and meanings that are
offered as logically determined relations. The relations are not, however, just a given, but,
instead, their structure is an attempt, as with the Tractatus' focus on the inherent logical structure
4 There are no propositions following number 7, the final proposition of the text.
18
of language, to be the final arbiter of meaning. The numbering system thus initiates a logical-
structuring of meaning based on a spatial structuring of propositions, in effect creating a trio of
correspondence between word, meaning, and place.
Despite its attempt, however, the numbering system ultimately fails to fix meaning. Rather, it
ultimately contributes toward the unraveling of the Tractatus' conception of language that it was
instituted to safeguard. The introduction of this spatial component into the discussion of the
correspondence between words and meaning also makes explicit the spatial implications of the
concept of correspondence. The incorporation of spatial relations into the Tractatus, had created
an additional set of requirements that had to be fulfilled in order for the Tractatus' conception of
language to be maintained. Challenges to those spatial associations or to the Tractatus'
conception of space from which they arose equally became challenges to the series of
correspondences between word, meaning and place upon which the Tractatus relies.
These challenges are manifested in two ways. The first is through the spatial implications of the
numbering system itself that implies a unique order - the way the propositions of the Tractatus
should be taken. But, inherent within the system lies the possibility of other orders that equally
fulfill the duel purposes laid out in the footnote. Those possibilities suggests a conflict between
the spatial implications of the numbering system as a series of associations, stresses and
references, and the more linear idea of numbering as incremental counting. For example,
consider these sequences that occur in the Tractatus : 1, 1.1, 1.2, 1.12, 1.13, 1.2, 1.21 - 5.6,
5.61, 5.62, 5.621, 5.63, 5.631 - 3, 3.001, 3.01, 3.02, 3.03, 3.031, 3.032, 3.04, 3.05,3.1,
3.11.
Wittgenstein tells us in the footnote, that the decimal numbers indicate the logical importance or
stress laid on the propositions. Accordingly, the whole numbers are most important, followed
decreasingly by those with one decimal place and so on down to the fifth and final decimal place.
Equally he tells us that the propositions n.1, n.2, etc. are comments on propositions no. n and that
the propositions n.ml, n.m2, etc. are comments on n.m, and so on, again down to the final
decimal place. Given this, the first two examples - I to 1.21 and from 5.6 to 5.631 seem in
order. The third example, however, throws all that into question by suggesting other possibilities.
How is it, for example, that proposition 3.001 can precede proposition 3.01. Importantly, this is
not an isolated situation, but occurs throughout the text as in the sequence : 4, 4.001, 4.002,
4.003, 4.0031, 4.01. This is to ask how can a comment be made on an as yet unstated
proposition. Organized spatially in accordance with the rule of reference Wittgenstein outlines,
the order from 3 to 3.1 would seem to have other possibilities than the one Wittgenstein chose.
Following a different spatial organization, then the third example could be : 3, 3.1, 3.01, 3.01,
3.0 2, 3.03, 3.031, 3.03 2, 3.04, 3.05, 3.11. Or, perhaps : 3, 3.01, 3.001, and so on, ending as in
the Tractatus. It is not that these are necessarily any more correct, but that they seem equally
possible. What it seems to reveal is a conflict between Wittgenstein's desire for a given
proposition to be have a certain degree of stress and for it to occupy a particular location or
lace of reference.
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All this is to point to the fact that the numbering system is not completely fixed but could be re-
arranged or re-ordered. What happens then, seems to be, that Wittgenstein in an attempt to
balance the aim of numbering according to an assignment of logical importance or emphasis
with a strict ordering as counting or increasing numbers so that each successive number is,
throughout the text, higher than the previous one, but at the cost of sacrificing spatial association
and logical reference. Which is also to say that the flattened image of the Tractatus, which claims
or at least suggests that it is a unique logical order or structure, when spatially laid out has
multiple possibilities. The seeming exacting numbering of the propositions thus belies its
inherent and unexplored spatial conflicts.
The second 5 way in which the implication of space instituted by the numbering system begins to
unravel the series of correspondences defining the Tractatus is through the rethinking of spatial
associations that resulted from Wittgenstein's practice of architecture in his design and
construction of his sister's house. In many ways architecture is exactly what was missing from
Wittgenstein's early work. At first glance, the Tractatus seems more 'architectural' than the
Philosophical Investigations with its strictly ordered and structured sections. But it represents a
purely two-dimensional, visual order based in a one to one to one correlation of language,
meaning and place. The practice of architecture, however, challenged those strict associations by
introducing a new spatiality and the idea of practice which, combined, destroyed the singular
view of the Tractatus leaving in its place the realization that the absolute correlation of meaning
and place was not a given reality but a particular way of seeing, one dependent upon a fixed
viewer. The Investigations instead constructed other views of language that disrupted the fixity of
the view from above, revealing it to be an internal constraint, not an absolute limit of language.
The element of place that held meaning and word fixed in a specific relationship, once dislodged,
removed, the one to one series of correspondences replacing them with the more complex spatial
association of family resemblance in which word and meaning are inextricably interwoven
through practice, rather than directly correlated.
5 This topic is discussed at length in the discussion of the Stonborough House.
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Beyond explaining the numbering system, the footnote does two additional things : 1. It reiterates
the transgressive construction of meaning and view in the entirety of the Tractatus, and 2. It
points to the contingency of the logical structuring of the propositions of the Tractatus. In the
first instance, acknowledged in the second to last proposition of the text (916.54), transgression
of the limits of language and sense becomes a necessary part of Wittgenstein's defining of the
limits of language.
6.54 My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way; anyone who
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them -- as
steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he
has climbed up it.)
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.
The structure of the footnote, which allows Wittgenstein to explain the numbering system outside
of the propositions themselves, parallels the transgressive structure of the Tractatus with its need
to go beyond the limits of language to see those limits and thereby produce the text. In this way,
as the discussion of the ladder makes explicit, Wittgenstein's view of language is that from both
outside and above. The importance of this cannot be overstated as it is the organizing spatial,
visual and epistemological construct of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein's description of the
transgressive structure of the text, with the climbing up the ladder, substantiates this. Putting
aside the viability of Wittgenstein's claim, the ladder he uses to make it, provides a ready image
of those hierarchically organized propositions. This discrete image can be contrasted to a range
of images of entanglement that Wittgenstein develops in the Investigations and which serve to
give an image of the structure of the Investigations itself.
The moves beyond both language and text form a double transgression of the bounds of the
Tractatus. As moving beyond the limits of language is required (if impossible) in order to see
the whole of language, the graphic and conceptual constructions of the view from above become
necessary participants in the claims of the Tractatus. At the same time, the numbering system,
with its footnoted explanation, by making inseparable meaning, logical place and spatial location
employs literal and metaphorical understandings of spatial relations in order to enforce a given
reading of the Tractatus.
Even if the Tractatus' numbering system performed ideally, however, it does not insure the
reading that Wittgenstein intended. That is, despite Wittgenstein's extreme efforts to impart the
logical ordering of these propositions, the propositions remain in ordinary language, with all its
ambiguities, that still may elude the logical form embedded within them and the logical
scaffolding of the numbering system that structures them. And although Wittgenstein deals
extensively with problems of logic in the Tractatus, the focus of the book is on language, its limits,
its role in the formation of philosophical problems and its relation to logic, values, facts, meaning,
the written page, the world and so on. The numbering system's instituting of a spatial order
becomes ultimately more than a way of structuring the propositions on a page, it defines how we
approach the surface of language. The footnote, thus, rather than removing all doubt or
ambiguity and securing the order, points, simultaneously, to the fragility and contingency of
meaning by exaggerating the method of controlling it.
Ric abou ce was f d i t a p by
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Reliance upon absolute correspondence was further dismantled in the later philosophy by
replacing the strictly structured ordering of the Tractatus and instituting an otherwise
undifferentiated and open-ended seriality. The Investigations replaces the hierarchical ordering
of the Tractatus, with 693 sequentially ordered and numbered paragraphs ranging in length
from one line to over one page,6 and from a single paragraph to a complex of several short or
long paragraphs, lists and diagrams. The complex sections are a development from the more
isolated propositions of the Tractatus. The preface of the Investigations acknowledges the
importance of the structure of the text by proceeding immediately from a discussion of the topics
in the text to a discussion of the form of the text itself - described as remarks or short
paragraphs. The composition of the text as a series of numbered remarks, rather than the more
traditional chapters and sections, allows for the ordering of the topics to follow in Wittgenstein's
words "sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject" while also allowing for "a sudden
change, jumping from one topic to another." Because of the structuring and focus of the text, the
spaces between the paragraphs become as important to the process of reading the text as the
paragraphs themselves. The remarks themselves, remain undisturbed by these jumps, as they no
more belie shifts in topic than they do continuity. The apparent unity of form then succeeds
where Wittgenstein though he had failed - in welding the results of investigation into a whole that
proceeds in a natural order and without breaks.
Of course, taken another way, the Investigations' structure necessarily institutes as least as many
breaks as it does continuity by disrupting any unbroken unity that a "long chain about the same
subject" may try to impose. The breaks are myriad, occurring both between and within the
paragraphs where they erupt as the voice of another - the interlocutor ( s) presented in quotation
marks or as Wittgenstein's own series of questions about the topic and his recurring doubts about
philosophy. Not only do these various breaks interrupt a given discussion - shifting on to another
topic and returning to the original one only later - they interrupt even the closest of examinations
of a particular concept either by shifting the focus or frame of reference in the rephrasing of a
question, or by stubbornly refusing to give up a preoccupation, returning to it just as the text
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seemed to finally have moved on. This patterning is very different than the Tractatus which
groups concerns and topics together as in the development of the picture theory between 2 and
3.
The text of the Investigations itself ends without interruption of this pattern of paragraph and
space between, allowing closure and continuity to merge in the ambiguity over whether the text
ends with the final numbered paragraph or with the space following it. All this Wittgenstein tells
us is connected with the very nature of the investigation. That is, the subject of study - language -
produces such a structure or method.
Wittgenstein focuses the frame of view of the Investigations onto the surface of our language, its
materiality, where he wants us to see it as much as marks on paper as it is language and as it is
practice. Writing in the Investigations is not a graphic interpretation or representation of
language, but is itself language. Philosophy, Wittgenstein stresses, is no exception to this but
needs to be treated as any other word.
In 1933, Wittgenstein dictated a description of his philosophical methods of working to his
student Alice Ambrose. The description also serves to give a picture of how the Investigations
functions and what it produces.
... One difficulty with philosophy is that we lack a synoptic view. We encounter the kind of
difficulty we should have with the geography of a country for which we have no map, or else a
map of isolated bits. The country we are talking about is language, and the geography its
grammar. We can walk about the country quite well, but forced to make a map, we go wrong. A
map will show different roads through the same country, any one of which we can take, though
not two, just as in philosophy we must take up problems one by one though in fact each problem
leads to a multitude of others. We must wait until we come round to the starting point before we
can proceed to another section, that is, before we can either treat of the problem we first
attacked or proceed to another. In philosophy matters are not simple enough for us to say 'Let's
get a rough idea', for we do not know the country except by knowing the connections between
the roads. So I suggest repetition as a means of surveying the connections.7
7Alice Ambrose, Wittgenstein's Lectures, Oxford 1979, quoted in Michael Nedo, ed., Introduction, Wittgenstein:
Wiener Ausgabe. (Vienna and New York: Springer-Verlag, 1993), p. 53.
In the Investigations the reader no longer is asked to transcend its propositions, but is instead
forced to stay within the elliptical structuring of the surface of language, vision and the text that
results from the view from within.
The view from the ladder
The Tractatus'understanding of language and philosophy is dependent upon the positioning of
the viewer as if above and outside of language, looking downward so as to clearly discern a
particular relation between language, logic and philosophy. From that viewpoint, all three seem
to share a coincident series of boundaries. The Tractatus defined these as a series of spatial limits
with particular emphasis on the limits of thought and language.
Philosophy in the Tractatus is a severely constrained activity which aims to define the limits to
thought and language. Central to this goal is the ability to distinguish between what language is
capable of saying and what it is capable of showing, the so-called show-say distinction. In
discussing this distinction between showing and saying, it is important to keep in mind that this is
a distinction within language. As such, the distinction is not the distinction between the visual and
the verbal, but between what Wittgenstein will call sense and nonsense, so that in the Tractatus,
the ability to say something, is, more specifically, the ability to say something sensible or
meaningful. The Tractatus, as such, offers a series of rules of sense, of what language can sensibly
or meaningful say compared to what it can only show. Attempting to say something that can only
be shown produces nonsense which importantly, usually appears as grammatically correct
ordinary language. This is the place Wittgenstein sees problems beginning for philosophy : how
to distinguish between what only appears in to be meaningful and what actually is meaningful.
From the start , language is a visual problem of language.
In order to distinguish between sense and nonsense the Tractatus relies on the understanding that
logic is the necessary a priori structure of thought. This binding together of language and logic
provides precise criteria for the determination of sense and thought by adopting logic's
requirement that sense be determinate. That initial association is part of an entire chain of
associations dispersed throughout the Tractatus beginning with its opening lines that define a
series of limits of the world, of logic, of the self, of the sayable, and ultimately of silence, each
coincident with the limits of language.
I The world is all that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things.
5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
5.61 Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say
in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that.'
5.632 The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world.
7 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.
In this view, sensible propositions are those propositions about the world, such as Wittgenstein's
example of the propositions from the natural sciences, which he strongly distinguishes from those
of philosophy. The realm of thought and sense thus becomes tied to the ability to make (true)
statements about the world. Much of language, including all of aesthetics and ethics cannot in
this view be put into words as they do not, strictly speaking, define 'facts' about the world but
deal with 'values'. What is beyond the world of the knowable and the sayable is the realm of
value which can only be shown. This, however, does not mean that what lies beyond the sayable
is unimportant. Instead Wittgenstein tells us it is of the utmost importance in our lives.
With the Tractatus' definition of the limits of the 'sayable' as the limits within which the use of
language remains sensible, it was in part continuing the work of G E. Moore and Bertrand Russell
who also were working to define a completely clarified form of expression in which the laws of
logic and of language coincide. Wittgenstein used this method of the logical clarification of
language as a way of tackling not just specific philosophical problems in epistemology,
metaphysics and logic, but to expose the underlying cause all of philosophical problems.
Wittgenstein's analysis revealed that philosophical problems are produced by misunderstandings
in the ordinary language in which those problems were formulated. Clarifying the language by
identifying through analysis, the logical form underlying the propositions was thought to resolve
those misunderstandings, dissolving the problem in the process. Once the seemingly 'ordinary' use
of language in the forming of philosophical problems was completely clarified, those problems
were shown to be illusory, the result of the inability, when looking at the surface of language, to
see the properly analyzed form of the proposition embedded beneath the surface.
Equally, analysis is meant to yield philosophy's vacuity as defining the proper logical form of a
philosophical problem does not facilitate solving that problem, but in dissolving the problem,
yielding an ultimately transparent but empty philosophy. Analysis in the Tractatus, in revealing the
logical structure of a proposition in symbolic logic, acted to dissolve rather than to solve
philosophical problems. What appeared to be problems in epistemology or metaphysics,
problems somehow in and of the world, were shown to be produced by our inability to
completely understand our own language or more specifically, to see the logical structure
contained within that language. This misunderstanding was seen to arise from within the gap
between a proposition and the logical form underlying it. In understanding philosophical
problems to arise from an inability to see the correct logical form beneath the language,
Wittgenstein had defined a specified spatial relation between language, logic and vision.
The propositions of philosophy are largely what Wittgenstein calls pseudo-propositions or
nonsense that result from misuses of language. The proper task of philosophy then becomes the
activity of logical clarification of its own propositions and their resultant misunderstandings and
confusions which masquerade as important problems. To achieve this the Tractatus offers one
"strictly correct" method made clear at the end of the text :
6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following : to say nothing except
what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science -- i.e. something that has nothing to
do with philosophy -- and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something
metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs
in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person -- he would
not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy - this method would be the
only strictly correct one.
Philosophy for Wittgenstein in the Tractatus thus is a sort of self correcting mechanism through
the activity of logical analysis in response to the ambiguity and opacity of the language used in
the formation of traditional philosophical problems. Logical clarification becomes the
appropriate method due to its ability to rid language of its ambiguity, rendering it and
philosophical problems transparent. The result aims at a fully clarified form of expression that
reveals philosophical problems to be pseudo-problems that seem to be saying something about
the world but in effect are only the result of language confusion and misuse. As such when the
language is clarified the problems are dissolved in the process.
The philosophical method of the Tractatus was however an extremely limited activity involved
with defining the limits of sense and thought. This limit was important as Wittgenstein thought
that many philosophical problems arose from confusion over this boundary leaving philosophy
attempting to say what can only be shown and thereby creating pseudo-problems. Logical
clarification, by dissolving these problems, rids philosophy of a useless activity. This achievement,
however, has limited value. As Wittgenstein writes in the preface :
... the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive.
I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems.
And if I am not mistaken in this belief, then the second thing in which the value of this work
consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved.8
8Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D.F. Pears and B. McGuinness, (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1961. preface), p. 4.
Importantly, the propositions of the Tractatus violate the very rules that it posits, producing what
is often referred to as illuminating nonsense. If the primary aim of the Tractatus is to set limits to
what can be thought by a clear presentation of what can be said, the Tractatus violates this
dictum by trying to say what can only be shown, the limits of language and the world. It does this
by taking a position outside of language and the world (in its view from above) in order to
describe the relation between the two, instead of doing what he claims is the only possible thing -
using language to describe states of affairs, or facts, within the world. As a result, the statements
of the Tractatus are, themselves, nonsense. Wittgenstein's belief, however, as declared at the end
of the Tractatus is that these propositions are, even as admitted nonsense, useful in that they help
the reader to understand how language functions and thereby how to avoid misusing it.
Given all of that, the rules that Wittgenstein lays out in the Tractatus for distinguishing between
showing and saying are not absolutely clear. Consider the following (incomplete) list of rules
that the Tractatus presents :
4.022 A proposition shows its sense.
A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so
stand.
4.114 [Philosophy] must set limits to what can be thought; and, in doing so, to what cannot
be thought.
It must set limits to what cannot be thought by working outwards through what
can be thought.
4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form : it is mirrored in them.
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
What expresses itself in language, I cannot express by means of language.
Propositions show the logical form of reality.
They display it.
4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said.
4.461 Propositions show what they say: tautologies and contradictions show that they say
nothing.
A tautology has no truth conditions, since it is unconditionally true : and a
contradiction is true on no condition.
Tautologies and contradictions lack sense.
(Like a point from which two arrows go out in opposite directions to one
another.)
(For example, I know nothing about the weather when I know that it is either
raining or not raining.)
5.61 Logic pervades the world : the limits of the world are also its limits.
So we cannot say in logic, 'The world has this in it, and this, but not that.'
For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities,
and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits
of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.
We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say
either.
5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in
solipsism.
For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself
manifest.
The world is my world : this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that
language which I alone understand) mean the limits of myworld.
6.36 If there were a law of causality, it might be put in the following way: There are
laws of nature.
But of course that cannot be said " it makes itself manifest.
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
( Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)
The show-say distinction has several important implications for philosophy and for Wittgenstein's
study of philosophy. Metaphysics and epistemology are shown to be empty categories, composed
entirely of pseudo-problems, dissolved in the transformation of language into logic. Logic holds
the unique and privileged position of belonging equally to the realm of the nonfactual and the
transcendental, allowing it to form the connection between the world and language. Logic itself,
however, can only be shown - but unlike aesthetics and ethics that are viewed as complementary
to 'the world', logic is understood to be inextricably bound to it sharing the same limits.
Aesthetics and ethics by virtue of occupying the realm beyond the sayable, are expelled from the
world, jettisoned into silence, only entering into the work of the Tractatus by way of exclusion.
Yet they can, given the method of the Tractatus, be understood as its subject - defined from the
outside, by what and where they are not. Because they are defined in the Tractatus from beyond
their limits they are entirely dependent upon the Tractatus'understanding of (spatial) limits and
boundaries.
The show-say distinction is dismantled by Wittgenstein in two ways. The first occurs as much in
the Tractatus as in the Investigations. Although the Tractatus relies on the sharp distinction
between showing and saying for its coherence, it knowingly transcends or defies that distinction in
order to make its claims. The Tractatus, in necessarily having to transgress the bounds of
language, produces a series of paradoxes or illusions. The first of these maintains the necessity of
distinguishing between showing and saying in order for the clarity required by the method of
philosophy. In the end the Tractatus necessarily acknowledges that it has transgressed into the
realm of showing by trying to say what (it claims) can only be shown (the limits of language)
on the one hand, and by trying to construct the view from the ladder (from outside and above)
on the other. The inability of the Tractatus to maintain the very distinction at hand, leaves the
Investigations with the choice of either accepting that paradox, remaking the Tractatus'so as to
maintain that distinction, or trying to understand and describe language's shared territory of
showing and saying.
The Investigations embraces that shared territory of showing and saying with the realization that
the view of language in the Tractatus, the view from the ladder, is just that, a view. As such the
traits attributed to language and philosophy are the result of this particular visual framework
which exhibits a series of specific characteristics : it lies below, it is framed, it is presented as a
horizontal surface and it is dependent upon a fixed viewer. The view from the ladder is the view
looking down upon the world. When the reader climbs up the ladder to "see the world aright,"
the view is from above and outside, looking down, where language and the world are reduced to
a flat, horizontal, bounded image. This reinforces the position of the Tractatus of having
transgressed a boundary. This position also locates the place of viewing at the limits of the
subject, tying together the limits of the subject and language and therefore of vision as well. But
fixed to that limit, the subject is immobilized and the view is fixed. By positioning the
reader/viewer in the ideal position outside of language from which all of language is visible.
Wittgenstein has effectively worked him and us outside of the sayable and into the realm of
supposed silence, the realm of showing.
The realization of a view works backward to the realization of a viewer and to the understanding
that a viewer needs to be located both in space and in history. Although the subject shares
(nominally) these limits, the philosophy of the Tractatus in making no room for the subject,
finds instead that: the subject "must", according to the text, "transcend these propositions, and
then he will see the world aright." "(He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has
climbed up it.)"(6.54) That is, the subject had to move beyond what the philosophy of the
Tractatus defined as thinkable. I take this transgression as an initial and incomplete act, one that
literally leaves the reader suspended in mid air. Having climbed up the ladder the subject is
stranded, incapable of movement, left solely with vision as the way of perceiving or interacting
with the world. By revealing the viewer, the idealized viewpoint of the Tractatus is also revealed.
At the same time the Investigations confirms that the Tractatus is as much about visuality,
showing and the realm of aesthetics and ethics, as it is about the sayable. This is the case even as
the text continues to maintain that philosophy cannot talk about that realm, but can only show it.
Understanding the position of the viewer is vital to this issue as it is the ideal position of the
viewer constructed by the Tractatus that allows for the distinction between showing and saying.
The move from the Tractatus to the Investigations, thus, allows for the understanding via the
realization of the flatness of the implied space of the Tractatus, that space and vision are neither
wholly interchangeable nor entirely separable.
The concepts of boundary, limit, transgression, and so on, fundamental to Wittgenstein's work
cannot, however, be conceived of without committing to certain conceptions of space. The
Tractatus in attempting to define the limits of the thinkable is itself unthinkable outside of the
severely restricted understanding of space which I have characterized as the view from above.
The practice of architecture challenged the earlier understanding of space by disrupting the fixed
point of view and forcing Wittgenstein to confront a series of complex spatial constructs
irreducible to a single view or representation. The resulting reconceptualized space required the
development of a new understanding of philosophy and language.
The Investigations responded to the Tractatus' act(s) of transgression by reconceptualizing
philosophy as inhabitation. Wittgenstein accomplished this in two main ways: by displacing the
exiled viewpoint back to within language and by reconceiving philosophy as constructive with the
invention of "the builders". The effects of these two force a series of shifts in the make up of
philosophy that allow the later work to incorporate the realm of ethics and aesthetics, practice
and the subject within the limits of language. From the vantage point of the Investigations, then,
the transgression of philosophy enacted by the Tractatus was a necessary stage of development.
That transgression beyond the restrictions of the Tractatus (as defined by the view from above)
allowed for a more inclusive practice of philosophy and understanding of language, a move that
allowed for the inhabitation of both language and philosophy. What initially seemed to be
Wittgenstein's movement outside of philosophy both beyond the bounds of the Tractatus and into
other practices such as architecture ultimately served to form the basis for both his re-
engagement with and re-conceptualization of the discipline.
2. Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language
is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and his assistant B. A is building with
building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stone, and that in the
order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words
"block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls them out: -B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring
at such-and-such a call.-Conceive this as a complete primitive language.
The building of inhabitation
One of Wittgenstein's later criticisms of philosophy was that it was closed from the outside or
larger culture from which it presumably arose. While the early philosophy began with those
same limitations it had moved inward to rework and redefine the basis of philosophical
problems in epistemology and metaphysics as problems of language and logic, dissolving the
original problems in the process. The later philosophy of the Investigations instead moves
outward from those self-imposed disciplinary limits to construct a space of inhabitation arising
from the realm of every-day practices.
The creation of habitable space allowed for the construction of the view from within the space of
language. This view differs dramatically from the view from without in the way it positions the
subject in relation to language and to the study of language. The view from within is incapable
of offering the clarity of that from above with its implication that everything is available to vision.
As a result, vision is no longer privileged, but becomes one of the many possible ways of
interacting with the world. Another way of understanding this distinction is to see the aerial view
of the Tractatus as having been replaced by the view from the streets, a view that would later
form the every-day of Lefebvre and de Certeau.
The Investigations has a dual beginning. It begins, literally, with the words and memory of
another, Augustine. It begins secondly, and metaphorically with the act of building in
Wittgenstein's language-game of the builders. The "builders" are offered variously as: the first
language-game, the first of his examples, as a primitive language, a language more primitive than
ours, and as an origin or example of the learning of language. Putting these last together we get
the idea of learning language through the act of building, not just as a given practice of building,
but through the acquisition of that practice.
At the core of he construction of the space of inhabitation are the figures of "the builders". The
work of the Investigations begins with the scene of the builders. Their simple language is based
on a series of four words: "block", "pillar", "slab", and "beam" with an associated series of actions.
The builders' language is the first model for the use of language the Investigations offers. It
forms the basis for the rejection of a Tractatus-like conception of language. By defining the
realm of practice as within philosophy, the builders allow for the simultaneous construction and
inhabitation of the space of language.
Philosophical Investigations opens with a passage from the Confessions wherein Augustine
describes his memory of his acquisition of language as the learning to apply names to objects.
91, 'When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I
saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to
point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural
language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other
parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having,
rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in
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various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had
trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires." (Augustine,
Confessions, I. 8.)
Immediately following, in 92, Wittgenstein introduces the builders and their language in what is
offered as an example of Augustine's description of language. But, the scene of the builders does
more than that: it simultaneously illustrates both Augustine's description of language and the
failure of that description to characterize all of language. The builders' language conforms to
Augustine's picture of language in two ways. First, it manifests the notion that words in language
name objects in that each of the builders' four words name a particular type of building stone:
"block", "pillar", "slab" and "beam" refer respectively to blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. This use
of words by the builders upholds the idea that the meaning of a word is the object to which it
refers, and as all of the words are used in this way, it upholds Augustine's description that all of
language acts in this way, as all of the builders' language seems to. Secondly, this way of using
words exhibits a particular exercise or training by which words may be learned, "A calls them out:
B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call" Stanley Cavell
understands both the builders' language and Augustine's description of language to be not so
much the description or example of a language, but of the learning of a language, 9 and thus
Wittgenstein to be revealing that our idea of what a language is, is bound up with our ideas
about acquiring that language.
This association of language with its acquisition serves to initiate its redefinition from an object to
a practice, a shift that begins to undermine Augustine's description of language by requiring and
allowing words to do more than just label objects. The builders use of "slab", which had
seemingly conformed to Augustine's description by referring to a particular kind of building
stone, needed also to function as what Wittgenstein calls the command "Slab!" in order for the
builders to communicate. This transforms "slab" from its role as label to something more like the
9 Stanley Cavell, "The opening of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations", unpublished manuscript.
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phrase "Bring me a slab," and highlights language's need to be understood as extending beyond
the labeling of an object to allow for language to function and to explain why B bringing the
stone is a fulfillment of A's call.
The example of the builders is offered in direct comparison to Augustine's memory. With the
example, Wittgenstein offers his own memory of learning (about) language through the practice
of building and through learning to build, so that the act of entering into building that forms
Wittgenstein's opening words in the Investigations as his response to Augustine's characterization
of language. The language of the builders, with its mechanical and repetitive nature is initially
less akin to the understanding of language Wittgenstein develops in the Philosophical
Investigations than to the Tractatus'. But, simultaneously the builders' language offers itself as a
vehicle by which to develop a new understanding of language through the practice of building.
As such, the builders' language is at once a simulation of what Augustine's words describe and a
move away from them, 'That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea
of the way language functions. But one can also say that it is the idea of a language more
primitive than ours." (1 2) The practice of building with its inherent implication of progress
allows for a development impossible in memory. Equally, building by associating a public and
external practice with the acquisition of language enacts a shift in the Philosophical Investigations
from the individual learning of language to the social construction of language through practice.
The duality of this opening forms the starting point of Wittgenstein's re-entry into philosophy and
his simultaneous redefining of philosophy's scope and practice. The example of the builders
trace Wittgenstein's way back to philosophy. Whereas the quote from Augustine represents pre-
existing philosophical problems with which Wittgenstein had engaged in the Tractatus, it also
recalls an individual memory of the acquisition of language. That individual memory in that it is
a commonly held view of language is also a shared memory that Wittgenstein understands must
be addressed. However, Wittgenstein separates himself from that memory by offering it in
another's word and contrasting it or added it to Wittgenstein's, not memory, but construction or
restaging of an early or primitive use/acquisition of language in the example of the builders
which involve not a child, but (presumably) two adults. The 'memory' or example employed to
counter Augustine is of the use of language, its construction, made visible as practice. and
relocated to the practice of building thus emphasizing how the memory of acquiring language is
of the acquiring of a practice, like building. I see this act of constructed memory as
Wittgenstein's acquiring of not language, but a new understanding of language.
The building process and the builders, while metaphors of Wittgenstein's view of language and its
acquisition, are equally real, a shorthand memory for Wittgenstein's experience as an architect.
Wittgenstein's work as an architect thus became the site and process by which he came to see
among other things, language's complexity and multiplicity. Wittgenstein thus adds his own
memory to Augustine's.
The duality of the opening of the Investigations (Augustine and the builders) brings with it also
an understanding of the Investigations' relation to the Tractatus. Augustine's description of
language, although not exactly that of the Tractatus shares with it a narrowness of conception
that the practice of building challenges. Immediately following the example of the builders,
Wittgenstein finds that Augustine's words describe "a system of communication; only not
everything that we call language is that system." The limitations of the description make it
"appropriate but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what it is
claiming to describe." (913) spatially insinuating itself into the discussion and providing another
image for consideration, the builders, and by further extension the practice of architecture make
apparent the narrowness of the Augustinian picture of language. The introduction of the builders
and their (primitive) language forms an initial commonality or compatibility with Augustine's
description. Each word - "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam" - names a specified object - blocks,
pillars, slabs, beams. At the same time, however, each word corresponds to a given practice to act
as a command, becoming what Wittgenstein later refers to as the elliptical sentence "Bring me a
slab!" or "Bring me a block!". As the scene of the builders is described by Wittgenstein, the words
name objects as much as they describe actions, and in that way introduce a fundamental
ambiguity or complexity of language, ultimately combining words, objects, practices, commands
and so on.
The builders' act of construction (of whatever it may be) serves to metaphorically suggest the
ongoing development or construction of language by introducing a language inseparable from a
given set of actions or what Wittgenstein later calls "forms of life". What I want to suggest, is that
embedded in the beginning of the Investigations is both the development of - through the
practice of architecture - a new understanding of language and philosophy - and, an
understanding of the relation between the Tractatus and the Investigations. That relation is
equally poised between commonality and opposition, beginning with the shared concerns of the
Tractatus, but also with the challenge to the Tractatus, posed by Wittgenstein's practice of
architecture, which effectually broadened the limits of philosophy for Wittgenstein, extending
them beyond those thinkable by the Tractatus.
Wittgenstein makes explicit the association between communication and building towards the
later part of the Investigations. In 1491 he writes: "Not: 'without language we could not
communicate with one another' -- but for sure: without language we cannot influence other
people in such-and-such ways cannot build roads and machines, etc." The next section further
associates language with "inventing" practice and building.
(c9492) "To invent a language could mean to invent an instrument for a particular purpose on
the basis of the laws of nature (or consistently with them): but it also has the other sense,
analogous to that in which we speak of the invention of a game.
Here I am stating something about the grammar of the word "language , by connecting it with the
grammar of the word "invent".
Architecture suggests itself in yet another way with the builders. In 16 Wittgenstein raises the
issue of what it is to understand the call "Slab!". The question arises from his discussion of the
establishing of an "association between the word and the thing" and the "ostensive teaching" of
words. Rather than basing the association on mental (essentially private) images, Wittgenstein
claims, "[I]n the language of 912 it is not the purpose of the words to evoke images." Instead
Wittgenstein looks to the calls, actions and responses between the builders, to their outward,
visible practice to gauge understanding. "Don't you understand the call 'Slab!' if you act upon it in
such and such a way?" This shifts understanding from the association of word and thing to the
association of word and action or practice. The object of the word, its referent, becomes poised
between the thing - a slab - and the command or action of bringing a slab. 10
Cavell finds the builder's language's unmediated directness between word and action too
mechanical, in that the use of their words affords the builders no alternatives to the actions they
perform. He sees this lack of possibilities in their lives extending to their language a lack which
threatens to leave the builders short both of using language and of being human.
The need for language to allow for alternative possibilities is also central to Rush Rhees'
understanding of the builders' language. In his Wittgenstein's Builders, Rhees also finds the
builders' calls and actions falling short of speech based on the inflexibility of those calls and the
life he envisions accompanying such a restricted use of words. As Rhees points out, the
inflexibility of language becomes an impediment even to their task of building by not allowing
for communication when construction does not proceed precisely as planned. At those times,
Rhees notes that as their words cannot be used for any other purposes then A asking and B
bringing the appropriate stone, they can neither discuss the trouble nor how to alleviate it.
Additionally, Rhees finds that their calls are unusable outside of their particular routine. This is
I0 Whether "Slab!" means "slab' or "Bring me a slab!" -a one word or a four word sentence is discussed at length by
Wittgenstein in 120 of the Philosophical Investigations
important, as it is the use of language elsewhere that typically defines the way we come to know
whether and how language makes sense in a particular instance. The problem with the builders
language is that it seems to preclude this basis for understanding.
It is not just the limited vocabulary in the sense of the actual number of words that calls the
builders language into question, but, as has been pointed out, the sense that either their actions
and communications would have to be so restricted, or they would need to invent a new word for
every new occasion in order to communicate anything. It is this reciprocal need for development
of both their language and their lives that also offers their greatest hope. It is possible then, to
understand the builders language as a language that is developing, not by simply adding to itself,
but by beginning to take on some of the connectedness to and use in other situations that Rhees
spoke of as absent. That process might be seen to begin the first time that something goes wrong
in the building process, the point at which construction can no longer continue in the same
manner the given commands would be useless. In that sense, the builders' language becomes
understandable as a 'complete primitive language' if we understand the language to not be
frozen forever in time, but to be an ongoing process where just the kind of occasions that do
arise and which require, not just new words, but new kinds of words, were added so that
building becomes directed by its own needs. Although it is clearly not our language, it also seems
possible to imagine it developing, perhaps rapidly, into something we would recognize as
language.
Another possibility suggests itself, however. The response to the command "Slab!" associates the
object slab with the structure that it is being used to build, giving it new role - its place in the
structure being built and producing another understanding of the word "slab". and another
possible criterion for its use. Even if this seems, initially, to be beyond the assistant
builder's( B's)actions- it plays an equally strong role in B's learning to understand "Slab!" by
providing a function or effect of the slab used in the structure. The builder's language looses
some of its mechanical nature by not ending with B's correct retrieval and A's implied approval.
Rather, the criteria by which B understands the correctness of his actions are in the structure
which B is helping to build. The extended understanding involves knowing that a slab is the
correct building stone to bring by its role in the stage of the construction. This process of
learning/building may have proceeded in any number of ways, allowing, for example, for a stage
whereby following the call "Slab!", B brought a pillar instead and was shown by A that a pillar
was inappropriate for the work at hand, did not, for example, fit the space allotted or allow for a
level area or for continued building, and so on. "A" could have pointed to the lack of fit -
suggested the dimension and form of the stone required at that time and in that place allowing B
to learn the difference between slabs and pillars or the call "Slab!" and the call "Pillar!'. It is easy
to see that as the building process changed or became more complicated or as unexpected things
occurred, the builders could expand both building processes and words as required in order to
continue.
It remains unclear, however, what the structure being built is (if it is a structure) or how, where
or if it is to be found in the Investigations at all. A possible answer lies in what preceded the
Investigations, in the house Wittgenstein built in Vienna for his sister which immediately
precipitated his return to philosophy, a return itself contingent upon Wittgenstein finding a new
understanding, not just of language, but of philosophical problems that would suggest, against
the declaration of the Tractatus, that all philosophical problems had not been solved or at least
that the dissolution/emptying of philosophy could not proceed as planned. Although it cannot
fully account for it, undeniably, Wittgenstein's re-entry into philosophy is through the practice of
architecture introduced in the opening paragraphs of the Investigations where the builders
intervene to transform the development of language.
How, then, does the builders' language (if it does) develop from their primitive language of
section two? The Investigation's first development of the language-game of the builders
reinforced the existence of some form of structure under construction with specific references to
the building site. It occurs in 98 in the form of the order "this-there" given by A and
accompanied by the act of pointing to the desired stones and to the specified spot on the
building site.
Remembering Wittgenstein's exhortation to the reader regarding the builder's language to
"Conceive this as a complete primitive language" raises the question of what it means for a
language to be complete. This question becomes all the more interesting in that it arises from a
scene of ongoing construction. This juxtaposition hints at what Wittgenstein will later state very
explicitly: that the idea of a continually developing language does not imply that prior to that
development the language was incomplete. What appears incomplete in the scene of the
builders and their language of orders, is Wittgenstein's focus itself. And it is that incompleteness
that accounts for the stultified language (or not quite language) that Cavell and Rhees point to.
That is, the incompleteness points exactly to the narrowness of Augustine's description of
language.
As Wittgenstein will later examine in the Investigations the Tractatus'view of language is the
result of a similarly restricted focus. Although, the builders' language is the result of a severely
restricted focus and view devised to comply with Augustine's description, it maintains an inherent
break from that thinking, arising around the act of construction and the implication of a wider
scene of which A and B are a small part. In that sense, the extent of the limitation of the focus
on the scene of the builders varies throughout the Philosophical Investigations in relation to how
far along the act of construction has proceeded. Accordingly, the focus or view changes as the
language expands in the Investigations in contrast to the Tractatus reliance upon a fixed image.
The initial scene of the builders can thus be understood as a fixed image from the Tractatus, but
one that suggests or demands, through the continued piling up and rearranging, of building
stones, something else. Because of this inherent possibility, the builders are capable of
constructing an extended world and produce new views of that emerging reality. In that way,
language 92 offers as much an example of a language-game, the core of Wittgenstein's study of
language in the Investigations as it does an example of the limited view with which Wittgenstein
explicitly associates the Tractatus. The ambiguity of the image rejects a fixed view1l by shifting
the focus back to the viewer, to the site and the practice of viewing.
Given this, it makes it all the more interesting that what begins to expand the builders' primitive
language is the existence of the building site. The development their language takes is from the
objects of building, more readily coincident with naming, to the more complex notion of site with
the words "there" and "this".- The addition of these words, along with numerals and colors, forms
the beginning of the differentiation of types of words in the Philosophical Investigations. Unlike
the discussion of whether "Slab!" is a simple reference to a particular object, or a sort of
shorthand for the order "Bring me a slab!", the differentiation of types of words into nouns,
colors, numbers, and indexical terms such as "this" and "there", further raises the concept of use.
"It will be possible to say: In language (8) [the expanded language] we have different kinds of
word. For the functions of the word "slab" and the word "block" are more alike than those of
"slab" and "d" [used to designate different colors] But how we group words into kinds will
depend on the aim of the classification, --and on our own inclination." (917)
Wittgenstein rejects attempts to assimilate the descriptions of uses of words, finding that it
"cannot make the uses themselves any more like one another. For, as we see, they are absolutely
unlike." (9110) Distinguishing between different types of words questions the idea of language as
the applying of labels which would hold largely for nouns, rather than number terms or indexical
ones. These differences Wittgenstein likens to the varying types of tools in a tool box. The
11 This ambiguity can be compared to the fixity in the shifting from an image of a duck to the image of a rabbit in
Wittgenstein's discussion of seeing - as and the "duck-rabbit" image discussed in the second part of the Philosophical
Investigations.
differentiation of language via the metaphor of the tools acts as if to give life to the building
stones by offering potential ways of manipulating them. Literally Wittgenstein is bringing in the
tools by which the building stones, and our ability to act with and on them, are greatly enhanced,
allowing for the learning of how to build by learning the tools involved.
11. Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-
pot, glue, nails and screws. ---The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these
objects. (And in both cases there are similarities.)
Of course, what confuses us is the uniform appearance of words when we hear them spoken or
meet them in script and print. For their application is not presented to us clearly. Especially
when we are doing philosophy!
The association with the builders, although not explicit, is implied. The ability for the builders to
continue and further their work is based on their abilities to differentiate materials, types of
construction, particulars of the situation and so on. The multiplicity of language is central to the
development of language - not just for the builders but in the development from the Tractatus to
the Investigations. "It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the
ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said
about the structure of language. (Including the author of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.)"
(923)
Similarly, later in Wittgenstein's discussion of different types of words, numbers, lengths, colors, he
raises the issue of how these different types of words are defined. The question is: how do we
understand a number to be a number type of word when we use it, without already having a
definition of what "number" means. That is, how do we learn to use numbers in the language-
games Wittgenstein is discussing, the call, say, for "five slabs!". The issue, however, comes to
include all of language as all our definitions of words are by means of other words. The search
for continued definitions of the definitions produces a reiterative chain that threatens to become
endless or circular. Asking: "And what about the last definition in this chain? Wittgenstein turns
to architecture, building and the city to understand language as if construction's move forward
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works as if to balance the backing up of one definition by another "(Do not say: 'There isn't a
"last" definition'. That is just as if you chose to say: 'There isn't a last house in this road; one can
always build an additional one'.)" (929)
But Wittgenstein also does not want us to dismiss the possibility of their being a language
consisting solely of orders. Wittgenstein's admonition that we should "not be troubled by the fact
that languages(2) and (8) consist only of orders." (9118) suggests another kind of
differentiation, that between the many kinds of sentences. The seeming limitation of language
with the builders is tied to the idea of what a more full or more complete language would be.
Wittgenstein's understanding of language questions the concept of a "complete" language in two
ways. The first is based on the limited language of the builders, while the second relies on the
understanding that those limitations can be understood as one of endless possible types of
sentences or language-games.
(9123) But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command? -
There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call "symbols", "words",
"sentences". And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of
language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete
and get forgotten.
Wittgenstein includes a list of possible language-games beginning with the language of the
builders and including explicit extensions of that language into architectural practices: "Giving
orders and obeying them- describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements -
Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) - " and so on. While items on the list are
readily considered types of language use, such things as constructing an object from a description
or drawing, or presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams, do not. They do,
however readily tie into what I like to think of as the builders extended activities.
Wittgenstein begins by considering the desire for a "complete" language and responds by
appealing to the multiplicity of kinds of language-games. Some of which involve constructing
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objects in accordance with drawings, a process akin to the constructing of a building from a set
of architectural drawings. The multiplicity of language-games involved in the construction
process, either as a previous or future stage, result from a continually changing language, one
which was never completed but was also never incomplete. That is, language did not lag behind
building, but developed with it.
In 9 1 8 of the Investigations, Wittgenstein uses the builders specifically to address the demand for
completeness in language. Again the builders language is of concern as it only consists of orders
and the response is to compare it to a more developed image of building.
18. Do not be troubled by the fact that languages (2) and (8) consist only of orders. If you
want to say that this shews them to be incomplete, ask yourself whether our language is complete:
-- whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal
calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language. (And how
many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?) Our language can be
seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses
with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with
straight regular streets and uniform houses.
The description of language as an ancient city is a spatial/historical description of how a city,
such as Vienna, grew from a Medieval maze-like series of streets outward around that inner core
to twentieth century subdivisions. By beginning with the language of the builders and again
making specific references to the ways that a city develops architecturally and urbanistically,
Wittgenstein reinforces the association between the builders and the practice of architecture, in
effect placing the builders in the context of the practice of architecture and the practice of
language simultaneously.
Architectural references in the Investigations serve as ways of visualizing the repeated demands
for completion, finality and foundation. In these sections, architecture is offered as a possible
criterion of finality, failing, however, along with the language it is brought in to support.
Wittgenstein appeals to architecture as possible justification in two cases in particular. First in
9118 Wittgenstein compares the structure of the language based philosophical problems which
he has been dismantling, to the structure potentially resulting from the building process of
language.
Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything
interesting, that is, all that is great and important? As it were all the buildings, leaving behind
only bits of stone and rubble.) What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are
clearing up the ground of language on which they stand.
The invocation of building raises the possibility that the builders' constructions potentially led to
these buildings/structures that are now endangered. This suggests, that along with or instead of
language, the builders were constructing the edifices of philosophy, which in destroying them,
reveals the emptiness of their constructions. Wittgenstein likens what is being destroyed to
houses of cards which can first be understood to readily fail as they lack structure, foundation
and cohesion. But I think even more importantly for this discussion, a house of cards can be
understood as incapable of being inhabited. It has no flexibility; any pressure will cause it to fail
and perhaps most importantly it is at a scale we cannot inhabit, leaving us permanently outside.
The activity of "clearing up the ground of language" again invokes the builders in all their
multiplicity. Here they can be seen to be both participating in the, perhaps pointless or empty or
even destructive, building of philosophical problems as well as being understood to be "clearing"
the ground of language ( by returning to a more primitive language and starting from there?) or
building up from the cleared ground of the Tractatus.
In Wittgenstein's discussion of the justification for following a rule in a particular way, he reaches
a similar problem to that of what constitutes a final definition, that of the feeling that every
justification itself seems in need of further and other justifications. Architecture is again
summoned as the final form of justification. But architecture in the end is offered less as a
foundation than as a superfluous formal gesture. In fact, 'solid" foundations are themselves
shown to be a barrier to the continual search for(further) justification rather than a provider of
ultimate justifications.
217. "How am I to obey a rule?" --if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the
justification for my following the rule in the way I do.
If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock and my spade is turned. Then I am
inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do."
The act of reaching bedrock, rather than providing ultimate justification, provided only the
endpoint of moving in a particular direction, after which the spade is turned, only capable of
continuing in some other manner. Wittgenstein is left, not with justification, but rather with the
realization that there is no ultimate justification apart from the functioning of language in our
lives. The search for justification in the use of language gives way to investigation of the
practice(s) of language itself. "This is simply what I do." can then be taken not as the
justification for action - but as the site in which to study it, to consider what it is we do, to see
how everyday language functions. The spade is turned in the direction of an examination of
practice following which architecture re-enters the discussion as the possibility of another kind of
criterion.
(912 17 ).(Remember that we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their content,
but of their form. Our requirement is an architectural one; the definition a kind of ornamental
coping that supports nothing.)
Architecture here is shown to be incapable of adding more than the image of a foundation or
justification. But again it is compared to language that had already failed to provide an absolute,
external justification. What the "definition" has provided, if as ornamental coping it supports
nothing, it still remains a part of the structure, and having failed no more than a foundation.
Wittgenstein also he invokes architectural drawings as explanatory.
What we call "descriptions" are instruments for particular uses. Think of a machine-drawing, a
cross-section, an elevation with measurements, which an engineer has before him. Thinking of a
description as a word-picture of the facts has something misleading about it: one tends to think
only of such pictures as hang on our walls: which seem simply to portray how a thing looks, what
it is like. (These pictures are as it were idle.) (91291)
Later in the Investigations, Wittgenstein again associates "pictures" with scale drawings. In both
cases architectural drawings are functioning within language in much the way architecture
functions within the Investigations. Like language-games they serve as a model for Wittgenstein
and the Investigations
Locating the Stonborough house within Wittgenstein's thought involves reading the gaps within
the philosophy, both between the texts and within them. The Tractatus and the Investigations are
very different works written over a decade apart, 12 yet their association remains intimate.
Wittgenstein even had attempted to have the texts published together so as to literally place the
two works side by side. As he wrote in the preface of the Investigations: "Four years ago I had
occasion to re-read my first book (the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) and to explain its ideas to
someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones
together: that the latter could be seen in the right light only by contrast with and against the
background of my old way of thinking." While he failed in the attempt to publish the works
together (the publisher of the Tractatus did not allow it) Wittgenstein did succeed in bringing
the ideas contained in each together in another way, within the pages of the Investigations often
around visual, spatial and architectural constructs. There they exist not side by side, but
interwoven and overlapping, continuing a process that was begun within the house. Through this
process, the gap between the works is not covered over but forms the site from which the late
work emerges. The fight for space on the page within the text can also be understood as a fight
waged by space as it is through the spatial thinking employed by the Investigations that the
limitations of the Tractatus'thinking are revealed.
The question of how the two texts can be seen together without obliterating or covering over the
space between them -a space that includes Wittgenstein's practice of architecture- then becomes
12 Tractatus - 1921 -22 and the Investigations from 1930 to 1946 published posthumously in 1953.
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another way of asking how Wittgenstein's practices of architecture and philosophy are related.
All of the occupations that Wittgenstein pursued during his ten year break with philosophy are in
ways present in the Investigations - most explicitly: soldiering in the repeated example of a
language composed entirely of orders or commands, teaching in the extensive discussions of the
learning of language and the learning to read or to follow a rule, and architecture beginning with
the builders and continuing through the Investigations to encompass references to architectural
drawings, projections, measurement, spatiality, rooms, houses, architectural details and building
foundations. The particular trajectory of the uses and references to architecture reiterates the
understanding that the importance of architecture to Wittgenstein lies in its practice out of which
both the objects of architecture and the meaning they hold for Wittgenstein follow.
The shift from the Tractatus to the Investigations is most commonly characterized in relation to
philosophy and language. But, another way to characterize that difference is by comparing the
associations each constructs between language, visuality and spatiality, particularly in
Wittgenstein's use of a series of visual and spatial concepts as organizing principle's for his
overriding concerns for the limits and boundaries of language. Specifically, questions arise as to
how each of these texts depicts, constructs, organizes and locates language and meaning. The
Tractatus functions by defining two levels of language outside of the main propositions of the
Tractatus: the level of logic hidden beneath or within the language, (making explicit appearances
in the form of symbolic logic) and the realm of showing that transgresses sensible language.
Each of these levels of language is unseen, the first existing within ordinary language, the second
beyond it and the observable surface of language residing between the two. Together these
otherwise hidden levels are responsible for the production of meaning.
From without to within
If the view from without can best be understood to
summarize how the Tractatus depicts language, then the view
from within is what best summarizes the construction of
language in the Philosophical Investigations The view from
within develops in the space and pages of the Investigations
where the idealized thinking that had defined and limited the
frame of vision and the space of action in the Tractatus is
confronted by the Investigations' spatial practices. Those begin
with the builders and reach a sort of spatial crisis between
sections 103 - 108 of the Investigations, although the entirety
ranges from the discussion of logic that begins twenty sections
earlier to the discussion of methods of philosophy some twenty
sections later. On a smaller scale, this pattern, pitting an
idealized conception of space against physical and social
spatial practices re-emerges throughout the book, as if to test
the limits and workings of the competing images of language.
The emerging spatial crisis begins with the acknowledgment
that the ideal view of language presented in the Tractatus was
just that, a view: The explicit introduction of the subject of
vision launches Wittgenstein's examination of the relation
between language and vision in the Tractatus This section
associates three things: "the ideal", "a pair of glasses", and
"whatever we look at" around the spatial construct of inner
and outer. The ideal here refers to the idealized
103. The ideal, as we think of it, is
unshakable. You can never get outside
it; you must always turn back. There is
no outside; outside you cannot breathe.
-Where does this idea come from? It
is like a pair of glasses on our nose
through which we see whatever we
look at. It never occurs to us to take
them off.
understanding of language in the Tractatus which required
that sense be determinate and that showing be sharply
distinguished from saying. The inclusion of the glasses points
to the distinction between an imposed focus of vision defined
by something external to the subject and unaided or ordinary
vision. Ordinary vision is thus subject to the glasses as the
viewer is either unaware, unwilling or incapable of removing
them. Glasses normally suggest that they assisted or 'correct'
vision making it sharper, clearer and with a greater range of
focus. The distinction Wittgenstein sets up is thus between the
ordinary or everyday unaided vision and the 'improved' vision
of the ideal associated with the glasses. The exact nature of
the glasses, however, initially remains unclear, they may even
be plain glass, as it is impossible to determine the degree of
distortion, until they can be taken off and the view compared.
Ordinary or unaided vision in this respect is itself
undetermined as it is defined in response to a set of criteria
for "correct vision" that are in question. As a result, it is not
immediately clear or simple what view the removal of the
glasses leaves us with, except that it is that of unaided vision.
Wittgenstein's foremost concern at this point is to realize the
presence of glasses, defining or obscuring ordinary vision in
much the same way as the Tractatus understood ordinary
language to obscure the logical form of a proposition.
Wittgenstein's association of the glasses with 'the ideal',
however, involves acknowledging the pre-specified
requirements (the lens) of how we see language while
removing them is associated with the attempt to investigate
language as it is found. The immanent rejection of the ideal
avows that language is not a prescribed way of looking
requiring a special focus to be meaningful or functional, even
for the philosopher. Equally, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that
philosophy should focus its efforts on producing and
understanding a special rather than everyday view of language.
The structure of 9103 functions by inverting the Tractatus'
ordering of vision, space and language in order to make the
glasses apparent, acting as if to provide a mirror in which the
subject can see her/himself and her/his everyday practices
that the Tractatus had shielded. Logic's relation to vision, one
of the central themes and main metaphors of the Tractatus, is
rendered unclear by this realization. Logic in the
Investigations comes into question not in its functioning within
itself - but in its hold on the viewing subject. The glasses as
the prescribed view described in 103 are thus less an aid to
ordinary vision than a usurping of it. To look at 91103 another
way, it is not necessarily the demands of logic or vision, but of
philosophy that are at stake which Wittgenstein makes explicit
by asking: "Where does this idea come from?" The 'where'
Wittgenstein refers to is both a disciplinary concern and a
spatial one.
The questioning of the ideal of logic as defined by the view
through the glasses, leads in 91103 to an immediate spatial
questioning in attempt to locate the ideal in relation to the
newly acknowledged subject. (But who is that subject - is it
the philosophizing self hiding the everyday self?) The
realization with this, the subject becomes aware for the first
time of the narrowness of the space of the ideal. This
realization brings with it a sense of confinement and with that,
the simultaneous desires to escape the limits of the ideal and
the fear of being outside of them. Section 103 thus brings
with it a threat to language and meaning by threatening the
system previously understood to secure the functioning and
use of language in philosophy. As with the Tractatus the
reader/viewer is forced to transgress those encroaching limits
in order to see them. Here the transgression is acknowledged
up front as part of the investigation of language, not after the
fact. Vision comes into being through this act of transgression
where logic reveals itself not as language, but as an imposition
on language, as a limited view and a limitation on viewing.
The ideal begins to be seen as imprisoning. 'You can never get
outside it; you must always turn back." The view from outside
is what had defined the Tractatus by providing a position of
safety from which to view the world and language. From that
position, in its fiction, the world is contained and appears to
be in perfect - or perfectible order. So that outside of that
system of logic it is as if you cannot breathe. But the fear also
arise that logic's external repositioning of order may itself be
unattainable or at least unsustainable
Breath beyond those bounds however becomes possible once
it is understood that the necessity and existence of the ideal in
language arises from a particular view of language. The idea
of being inside the system of logic, of being bounded, can then
be understood as the fundamental
misconception/misperception of the Tractatus. It is only from
the Investigations with the realization of the frame of vision
defined by the glasses, that we can see the limits of "the ideal".
This spatial reconfiguration allows the Investigations to define
itself as the view from the outside, not of language but of the
Tractatus. Not coincidentally, this is exactly the position the
subject has been pushed into, with the climb up the ladder
and the movement beyond the bounds of what the Tractatus
had understood to be language. Inside of language, but
outside of the Tractatus'limited view of language.
The next section, 4104, reiterates that the discussion is about
vision and representation by pointing to the initial conflation
(in the Tractatus) of logic as a method of representation with
what it is representing, thus blurring what the Tractatus'
show/say distinction was instituted to resist. Logic's position as
both divider (between sense and nonsense) and joiner
(between showing and saying) is shown to be itself in conflict.
"We predicate of the thing what lies in the method of
104. We predicate of the thing
what lies in the method of
representing it. Impressed by the
possibility of a comparison, we think
we are perceiving a state of affairs of
the highest generality.
representing it." The search for essence develops from this
implication of universality. "Impressed by the possibility of a
comparison, we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of
the highest generality." That is, by following the demands of
logic, we are led to such ideas as the existence of a general
from of a proposition in which all of language conforms to a
specified model. The clarity called for in seeing such an order
within language is based on the idea that the relation between
language and meaning is transparent. When logic no longer
remains the sole visual component of language, transparency
is no longer guaranteed. Wittgenstein instead, finds in the
Investigations that showing and saying cannot and do not in
practice remain distinct and in their rightful places. Once this
distinction is realized, the situation changes. Logic, in showing
itself as a view rather as coincident with language in 103, can
no longer immediately demand conformity with what is said.
The attempt or belief in the complete separation of showing
and saying - within language - collapses upon itself when it
becomes apparent that the sharpness of that distinction cannot
always be upheld.
Section 105 points to the way in which the ideal of logic, once
accepted, makes ordinary language by comparison appear
inadequate. Drawn into this way of thinking, into being
overwhelmed by an unreachable ideal, the response is as an
attempt to "rack our brains over the nature of the real sign."
That is, Wittgenstein shows how the acceptance of the ideal of
105. When we believe that we
must find that order, must find the
ideal, in our actual language, we
become dissatisfied with what are
ordinarily called 'propositions'. 'words',
'signs'.
The proposition and the word that
logic deals with are supposed to be
something pure and clear-cut. And we
rack our brains over the nature of the
real sign. --- It is perhaps the idea of
the sign? or the idea at the present
moment?
logic leads philosophy into a metaphysical view of language
itself, one that questions the nature of both reality and signs,
but without any real understanding of what criteria would
define that reality. We are led to believe we would know it
when we see it, (the transparency not of language but of
criteria) but, as Wittgenstein has already questioned our vision
- what can be relied upon? "It is perhaps the idea of the sign?
or the idea at the present moment?" As it becomes clear that
the logical form within language is not readily found,
identified or maintained ("or the idea at the present
moment"), it becomes unclear whether even logic can fulfill
the ideal criteria.
The challenge to the representative and descriptive abilities of
language continues in 1106. The inability for language to
conform to an ideal (hence the failed search for the 'real
sign') forces language to supplant logic as the only possible
form of representation, description and thought.
Wittgenstein's writing in response to this failed ideal becomes
more metaphorical or literary, culminating with his conclusion
that "we feel as if we had to repair a torn spider's web with
our fingers." This expression emphasizes the distance between
our lives (and thus our language) and the demands of logic
demands that we feel compelled to fulfill despite the
realization that "we must stick to the subjects of our every-day
thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to
describe extreme subtleties, which in turn we are after all
106. Here it is difficult as it were to
keep our heads up, -- to see that we
must stick to the subjects of our every-
day thinking, and not go astray and
imagine that we have to describe
extreme subtleties, which in turn we
are after all quite unable to describe
with the means at our disposal. We
feel as if we had to repair a torn
spider's web with our fingers.
quite unable to describe with the means at our disposal."
Those means are, of course, language where part of the lack
of descriptive ability can be attributed to literal language - and
so metaphorical language takes over to fill the gap left by
logic.
The (logical) requirement of clarity and transparency yields its
final dissolution in 4107, initially producing the trilogy of
emptiness, silence and immobility. Having reached the point
in the Investigations where Wittgenstein understands that the
requirement of logic cannot be either found or fulfilled, he
begins to imagine a world in which it is fulfilled. The result
renders visible the gap between the requirement and everyday
practices of language. "The conflict becomes intolerable; the
requirement is now in danger of becoming empty." The
dizziness of this continual loop of attempts and unfulfilled
ideals creates an almost literal conflict between the desire to
move and the desire for the transparency that had fixed the
viewer in place "We have got on to slippery ice where there is
no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal,
but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want
to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!"
Turning back toward the rough ground, by allowing
movement, defuses the emerging crisis dissolving into the
implied space of movement. The frozen stance that had
resulted from the imposed ideal of crystalline purity.
107. The more narrowly we
examine actual language, the sharper
becomes the conflict between it and
our requirement. (For the crystalline
purity of logic was, of course, not a
result of investigation: it was a
requirement.) The conflict becomes
intolerable: the requirement is now in
danger of becoming empty. - We have
got on to slippery ice where there is no
friction and so in a certain sense the
conditions are ideal. but also, just
because of that, we are unable to walk.
We want to walk: so we need friction.
Back to the rough ground!
Starting with the act of walking begun in the previous section,
Wittgenstein adds direction in 91108: 'The preconceived idea
of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our whole
examination round. (One might say : the axis of reference of
our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of
our real need.)" Movement and space in the form of rotation
used by Wittgenstein to remove from the point of focus the
preconceived ideal image to which language was meant to
comply. Stripping away the requirement of logic becomes
akin to the removal of the glasses, but, as with the glasses, it is
not immediately clear with what the removal or the
requirement leaves us, as it is both the start of the
investigation of everyday language, yet it is also the result of
investigation that had led to this point. This rotation changes
the relative positions of logic, language and vision so that the
limits of the view of language are no longer coincident with
the bounds of logic. The act is one of positioning logic within
our lives as well as in relation to language and the world
rather than allowing the order of logic to serve a defining role.
In this new place, logic at first seems to have been altered: "for
how can it lose its rigour?" This leaves Wittgenstein asking:
"But what becomes of logic now?" That is to ask both, "How
has this change come about?" and "How can the investigation
proceed?" What is the defining method for philosophy?
The investigation about the fixed point of our real need (real
as in not ideal) begins by claiming that: "We see that what we
call 'sentence' and 'language' has not the formal unity that I
imagined, but is the family of structures more or less related
to one another," and then leads to the conclusion that: "We are
talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of
language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal
phantasm."
Everyday language is acknowledged by Wittgenstein as part of
the world a spatio-temporal way that logic could not be. But
language is also distinguished from logic through the
publicness of its practice. Although logic was always publicly
accessible in the sense of a private (i.e. mental) /public split -
it was at the same time hidden both within language and
within the discourses of philosophy and mathematics, leaving
it at odds with the publicness and pervasiveness of everyday
discourse.
Section 108 returns to the issue of representation. When
raised in 9104, it had not allowed any distinction between
method of representation and the thing represented. After the
rotation of 108, Wittgenstein focuses on the appearance of
language itself and its fundamental ambiguities of meaning,
writing or ornament: "the philosophy of logic speaks of
sentences and words in exactly the sense in which we speak of
them in ordinary life when we say e.g. 'Here is a Chinese
108. We see that what we call
"sentence" and "language" has not the
formal unity that I imagined, but is the
family of structures more or less
related to one another. ---- But what
becomes of logic now? Its rigour
seems to be giving way here. __ But
in that case doesn't logic altogether
disappear? ___ For how can it lose its
rigour? Of course not by bargaining
any of its rigour out of it. -- The
preconceived idea of crystalline purity
can only be removed by turning our
whole examination round. (One
might say: the axis of reference of our
examination must be rotated, but
about the fixed point of our real
need.)
The philosophy of logic speaks of
sentences and words in exactly the
sense in which we speak of them in
ordinary life when we say e.g. "Here is
a Chinese sentence", or "No, that only
looks like writing: it is actually just an
ornament" and so on.
We are talking about the spatial and
temporal phenomenon of language,
not about some non-spatial, non-
temporal phantasm. [Note in margin:
Only it is possible to be interested in a
phenomenon in a variety of ways]. But
we talk about it as we do about the
pieces in chess when we are stating the
rules of the game, not describing their
physical properties.
The question "What is a word
really?" is analogous to "What is a
piece in chess?"
sentence', or 'No, that only looks like writing; it is actually just
an ornament' and so on." His example of Chinese writing
emphasizes language's graphic component, its existence as
marks on a page, by pointing to an alien image not
immediately readable. The second example uses the first one
to allude to the inherent ambiguity and duality of language, is
it writing or is it ornament, meaningful language is it or marks
on a page.
The examples in 9108 make Wittgenstein's focus on the
visible, graphic and physical aspects of language explicit.
These examples themselves reveal their function in the section
as it is only following them that Wittgenstein declares
language to be a "spatial and temporal phenomenon".
Throughout the Investigations, Wittgenstein repeatedly uses
examples that emphasize the graphic nature of language to
focus on both the social and material aspects of reading,
learning to read, expressing pain, recording private sensations,
following a rule and describing a geometrical projection.
Sections 81 - 102 consider the depth of vision and the space
of logic prior to the realization that the ideal of logic is a
particular view of language rather than the entirety of
language. In these sections, which lead up to the crisis of 9's
103-108, Wittgenstein introduces ideas later reconsidered on
the other side of the crisis, including the crucial concepts
81. F. P. Ramsey once emphasized
in conversation with me that logic was
a 'normative science'. I do not know
exactly what he had in mind, but it was
doubtless closely related to what only
dawned on me later: namely, that in
philosophy we often compare the use
of words with games and calculi which
have fixed rules, but cannot say that
someone who is using language must
be playing such a game. - But if you
say that our languages only
approximate to such calculi you are
standing on the very brink of
misunderstanding. For then it may
look as if what we were talking about
were an ideal language. As if our logic
were, so to speak, a logic for a
vacuum. - Whereas logic does not treat
of language -- or of thought -- in the
sense in which a natural science treats
of a natural phenomenon, and the
most that can be said if that we
construct ideal languages. But here the
word "ideal" is liable to mislead, for it
sounds as if these languages were
better, more perfect, than our everyday
language; and as if it took the logician
to shew people at last what a proper
sentence looked like.
All this, however, can only appear in
the right light when one has attained
greater clarity about the concepts of
understanding, meaning, and thinking.
For it will then also become clear what
can lead us (and did lead me) to
think that if anyone utters a sentence
and means or understands it he is
operating a calculus according to
definite rules.
around language's depth, accessibility and degree of
transparency. The discussion begins in section 811 which is
situated between a discussion of boundaries and a discussion
of rules. In this slot of space Wittgenstein introduces the idea
of logic's relation to language. Logic in the Investigations as it
had in the Tractatus lies on a boundary - but here the very
nature of that boundary is what is in question, making explicit
what was repressed in the Tractatus - the concern with
boundaries themselves. He begins by looking at boundaries as
spatial entities recognizing first that they have a dimension,
and that they have depth. In 981 Wittgenstein associates F.P.
Ramsey's idea that logic is a 'normative science' with the ways
in which the use of words in philosophy are often compared
with games and calculi having fixed rules. He is quick to point
out that, with language you cannot say that someone is
operating with definite rules.
In the final paragraph, Wittgenstein makes direct reference to
his previous understanding of the language/logic relation in
the Tractatus: "All this, however, can only appear in the right
light when one has attained greater clarity about the concepts
of understanding, meaning, and thinking. For it will then also
become clear what can lead us (and did lead me) to think
that if anyone utters a sentence and means or understands it
he is operating a calculus according to definite rules."
I Although as frequently happens with discussions in the Philosophical
Investigations, an origin is located elsewhere - the discussion of the subliming of
language begun in c181 refers to the subliming the "logic of our language" in the
attempt to demand all acts of naming to comply with a single notion in 138.
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82. What do I call 'the rule by
which he proceeds'? -- The hypothesis
that satisfactorily describes his use of
words, which we observe; or the rule
which he looks up when he uses signs:
or the one which he gives us in reply if
we ask him what his rule is? - But
what if observation does not enable us
to see any clear rule, and the question
brings non to light? -- For he did
indeed give me a definition when I
asked him what he understood by "N",
but he was prepared to withdraw and
alter it. - So how am I to determine
the rule according to which he is
playing? He does not know it himself.
- Or, to ask a better question: What
meaning is the expression "the rule by
which he proceeds" supposed to have
left to it here?
The discussion of rules begun here does not reach its crisis
until in a discussion some hundred sections later where
Wittgenstein proclaims: "This was our paradox: no course of
action could be determined by a rule, because every course of
action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer
was: if everything can be made out to accord with the rule,
then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so there
would be neither accord nor conflict here." (9201) In the
following section, the idea of rule is subverted to the idea of
practice producing a spatial organization based on
inhabitation and the publicness of practice rather than on a
pre-conceived and often hidden meaning. "And hence also
obeying a rule is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule
is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not to possible to obey a rule
'privately': otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be
the same thing as obeying it."
Sections 82-88 initiate a search for the rule(s) for the use of
signs with the idea that such rules would form a "hypothesis
that satisfactorily describes [the] use of words". (82) The
search is counterbalanced by the fear that no such rule will
emerge. "But what if observation does not enable us to see
any clear rule, and the question brings none to light?" (82)
The encroaching sense of fear turns inward to threaten the
very concept of a rule jeopardizes the search, as the criteria for
such a rule are absent. The circularity of the argument
83. Doesn't the analogy between
language and games throw light here?
We can easily imagine people amusing
themselves in a field by playing with a
ball so as to start various existing
games, but playing many without
finishing them and in between
throwing the ball aimlessly in the air,
chasing one another with the ball and
bombarding one another for a joke
and so on. And now someone says:
The whole time they are playing a ball-
game and following definite rules at
every throw.
And is there not also the case where
we play and - make up the rules as we
go along? And there is even one
where we alter them - as we go along.
exposes its lack of direction: "Or, to ask a better question:
What meaning is the expression 'the rule by which he
proceeds' supposed to have left to it here?" (82)
Wittgenstein responds to this loss of direction by interspersing
this questioning or searching in two main ways: the first moves
the questioning into the realm of practice and the second
spatializes the problem as a way of redefining it. The effect is
to expand the field of space allowing vision to be part of an
activated practice requiring interpretation and
contextualization rather than a passive and completely pre-
determined object. Section 83 unites this concept of practice
with philosophical method through the example of games
which moves the language user from spectator to participant.
In sections 9185-987 Wittgenstein considers the close relation
between rules and explanations. He begins by spatializing,
externalizing and materializing a rule, reinventing it as a sign
post. Explanations are then examined in these sections for
their spatial and material properties in an attempt to locate
them in the spatial order. "But then how does an explanation
help me to understand, if after all it is not the final one? In
that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don't
understand what he means, and never shall!' - As though an
explanation as it were hung in the air unless supported by
another one." (87) Another reminder of practice emerges
immediately following:
84. I said that the application of a
word is not everywhere bounded by
rules. But what does a game look like
that is everywhere bounded by rules?
whose rules never let a doubt creep in,
but stop up all the cracks where it
might? -- Can't we imagine a rule
determining the application of a rule,
and a doubt which it removes - and so
on?
But that is not to say that we are in
doubt because it is possible for us to
imagine a doubt. I can easily imagine
someone always doubting before he
opened his front door whether an
abyss did not yawn behind it, and
making sure about it before he went
through the door (and he might on
some occasion prove to be right) - but
that does not make me doubt in the
same case.
85. A rule stands there like a sign-
post. -- Does the sign post leave no
doubt open about the way I have to
go? Does it shew which direction I am
to take when I have passed it whether
along the road or the footpath or cross
country? But where is it said which
way I am to follow it; whether in the
direction of its finger or (e.g.) in the
opposite one? - And if there were, not
a single sign-post, but a chain of
adjacent ones or of chalk marks on the
ground -- is there only one way of
interpreting them? - So I can say, the
sign-post does after all leave no room
for doubt. Or rather: it sometimes
leaves room for doubt and sometimes
not. And now this is no longer a
philosophical proposition, but an
empirical one.
"If I tell someone 'Stand roughly here' - may not this
explanation work perfectly? And cannot every other
one fail too?
But isn't it an inexact explanation? - Yes; why
shouldn't we call it 'inexact'? Only let us understand
what 'inexact' means. For it does not mean
'unusable'."
Next, Wittgenstein spatializes the measure of exactitude, "And
let us consider what we call an 'exact' explanation in contrast
with this one. Perhaps something like drawing a chalk line
round an area? Here it strikes us at once that the line has
breadth. So a colour-edge would be more exact. But has this
exactness still go a function here: isn't the engine idling?"'
(88) This discussion leads to the pronouncement "These
considerations bring us up to the problem: In what sense is
logic something sublime?"( 89) Which is his asking in what
ways does logic seem to contain a "peculiar depth" or
"universal significance".
While section 89 had declared a visual goal, the desire "to
understand something that is already in plain view. For this is
what we seem in some sense not to understand" 9190
introduces another understanding of where meaning lies. It
begins: 'We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomenon." That
is, to penetrate the surface and 'move beyond' what is in plain
view.
86. Imagine a language-game like
(2) played with the help of a table.
The signs given to B by A are now
written ones. B has a table: in the first
column are the signs used in the game,
in the second picture of building
stones. A shews B such a written sign:
B looks it up in the table, looks at the
picture opposite, and so on. So the
table is a rule which he follows in
executing orders. -- One learns to look
the picture up in the table by receiving
a training, and part of this training
consists perhaps in the pupil's learning
to pass with his finger horizontally
from left to right: and so, as it were, to
draw a series of horizontal lines on the
table.
Suppose different ways of reading a
table were now introduced; one time,
as above, according to the schema:
(diagram)
another time like this:
(diagram)
or in some other way. - Such a schema
is supplied with the table as the rule
for its use.
Can we not now imagine further
rules to explain this one? And, on the
other hand, was that first table
incomplete without the schema of
arrows? And are other tables
incomplete without their schemas?
In the Tractatus, in order to clear up philosophical problems,
the logical form of language had to be exposed. As such the
Tractatus had acted to unveil it, thus setting up and reinforcing
the idea that the meaning of language lies in its depth and not
on its surface. But for logic's showing of itself from within
language in the Tractatus, language must be understood as
transparent. Transparency allows the view from above to be
the view through language to its logical structure on one hand
and to the representation of the world or the other (the
picture theory of the Tractatus).
The embeddedness of meaning within language was
reinforced by the way in which the Tractatus was structured
which began with 'pictures' of the relation of language to the
world and then moved in - penetrating language to reach the
logic beneath. The transparency of the structure of the
Tractatus defined a series of relations beginning with the
"world" - then language - then logic - then the move beyond
the realm of language. The understanding of language as if it
were transparent extends the visual metaphors of the
Tractatus even as it tries to control the terms of vision.
87. Suppose I give this
explanation: "I take 'Moses' to mean
the man, if there was such a man, who
led the Israelites out of Egypt,
whatever he was called then and
whatever he may or may not have
done besides." - But similar doubts to
those about "Moses" are possible about
the words of this explanation (what
are you calling "Egypt", whom the
"Israelites" etc.?). Nor would these
questions come to an end when we got
down to words like "red", "dark",
"sweet". -- "But then how does an
explanation help me to understand, if
after all it is not the final one? In that
case the explanation is never
completed; so I still don't understand
what he means, and never shall!" - As
though an explanation as it were hung
in the air unless supported by another
one. Whereas an explanation may
indeed rest on another one that has
been given, but none stands in need of
another -- unless we require it to
prevent a misunderstanding. One
might say: an explanation serves to
remove or to avert a misunderstanding
- one, that is, that would occur but
for the explanation: not every one that
I can imagine.
It may easily look as if every doubt
merely revealed an existing gap in the
foundations; so that secure
understanding is only possible if we
first doubt everything that can be
doubted, and then remove all these
doubts.
The first sign-post is in order -- if,
under normal circumstances, it fulfils
its purpose.
The association in 190 with the ideas of clarity and analysis
from the Tractatus, leads in 191 to the fear that any acts of
analysis imply or demand a final form of analysis.
Wittgenstein suggests that the claim of analysis or of clarity
does not have to be the claim to some ultimate or unique
form. Instead, he posits the idea of a multiplicity of criteria
for analysis based on the specifics of context. The problem
here is that the generalization and universalization of a
standard functions similarly to the prerequisite requirement of
logic. But logic (as skepticism and meaning) proves itself to
be equally uncontainable despite the attempt at limits in the
Tractatus. This explains the Tractatus'emphasis on limits and
boundaries allowing that the view from above is not an
attempt to see such limits, but is an attempt to define a place
from which to impose and enforce them.
Also foreseen is the Investigation's later discussion in 91104
about the relation of logic as a form of representation to what
it represents. The view from above similarly superimposes the
two so that it is unclear whether the view created the
understanding of language in the Tractatus, or whether the
understanding demanded that view in order to represent itself.
The view from above is the position of control by which to
combat a fear of language in its usual state. Despite that, logic
never quite obeys the limits placed on it, or which it places,
but becomes interminably interwoven with language in the
creation of philosophical problems in the Tractatus. As such,
88. If I tell someone "Stand roughly
here" may not this explanation work
perfectly? And cannot every other one fail
too?
But isn't it an exact explanation? - Yes:
why shouldn't we call it "inexact"? Only let
us understand what "inexact" means. For it
does not mean "unuseable". And let us
consider what we call an "exact"
explanation in contrast with this one.
Perhaps something like drawing a chalk
line round an area? Here it strikes us at
once that the line has breadth. So a colour-
edge would be more exact. But this
exactness still got a function here: isn't the
engine idling? And remember too that we
have not yet defined what is to count as
overstepping this exact boundary; how, with
what instruments, it is to be established.
And so on.
We understand what it means to set a
pocket watch to the exact time or to
regulate it to be exact. But what if it were
asked: is this exactness ideal exactness, or
how nearly does it approach the ideal? - Of
course, we can speak of measurements of
time in which there is a different, and as
we should say a greater, exactness than in
the measurement of time by a pocket-
watch; in the words "to set the clock to the
exact time" have a different, though related
meaning, and 'to tell the time' is a different
process and so on. -- Now, if I tell
someone: "You should come to dinner
more punctually; you know it begins at one
o'clock exactly" - is there really no question
of exactness here? because it is possible to
say: "Think of the determination of time in
the laboratory or the observatory: there you
see what 'exactness' means"?
"Inexact" is really a reproach, and "exact"
is praise. And that is to say that what is
inexact attains its goal less perfectly than
what is more exact. Thus the point here is
what we call "the goal". Am I inexact when
I do not give our distance from the sun to
the nearest foot, or tell a joiner the width
of a table to the nearest thousandth of an
inch?
No single ideal of exactness has been
laid down: we do not know what we
should be supposed to imagine under this
head - unless you yourself lay down what is
to be so called. But you will find it difficult
to hit upon such a convention; at least any
that satisfies you.
the claim of a problem in the logical form of philosophical
problems becomes the claim of a problem with language
itself. Wittgenstein continues in 991, 'That is, as if our usual
forms of expression were, essentially, unanalysed; as if there
were something hidden in them that had to be brought to
light. When this is done the expression is completely clarified
and our problem solved." But.what problems - the traditional
philosophical problems of epistemology and metaphysics or
some new problem of language. "It can also be put like this:
we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions
more exact; but now it may look as if we were moving
towards a particular state, a state of complete exactness; and
as if this were the real goal of our investigation." Performing
according to the rules of logic (which regarding language
became nearly impossible to pin down), the goal of complete
exactness had been the aim in the Tractatus, but in the
Investigations, Wittgenstein questions whether that measure of
exactitude is necessary for the study, use and understanding of
language - even in philosophy.
Despite this, a visual search for the criteria of complete
exactness begins in 992, as if to locate it and make it visible in
order to compare it to that produced in philosophical
propositions. But this seemingly visual search cannot be
contained to a purely visual activity as its need to get beneath
the surface of language forces it to become a spatial one.
Space is both demanded and denied in the desire to penetrate
89. These considerations bring us
up to the problem: In what sense is
logic something sublime?
For there seemed to pertain to logic
a peculiar depth -- a universal
significance. Logic lay, it seemed, at
the bottom of all the sciences. -- For
logical investigation explores the
nature of all things. It seeks to see to
the bottom of things and is not meant
to concern itself whether what actually
happens is this or that. - It takes rise,
not from an interest in the facts of
nature, nor from a need to grasp
casual connexions: but from an urge to
understand the basis, or essence, of
everything empirical. Not, however, as
if to this end we had to hunt out new
facts: it is, rather, of the essence of our
investigation that we do not seek to
learn anything new by it. We want to
understand something that is already
in plain view. For this is what we seem
in some sense not to understand.
Augustine says in the Confessions
"quid est ergo tempus? si nemo ex me
quaerat scio: si quaerenti explicare
velim, nescio". -- This could not be said
about a question of natural science
("What is the specific gravity of
hydrogen?" for instance). Something
that we know when no one asks us,
but no longer know when we are
supposed to give an account of it, is
something that we need to remind
ourselves of. (And it is obviously
something of which for some reason it
is difficult to remind oneself.)
phenomena. Revealing this "hidden" spatial component allows
for the space necessary to separate language and logic, a space
that had collapsed in the Tractatus' construction of a visual
space of control.
In these sections, the belief that the 'essence' of language is
somehow hidden within language shifts from being the
underlying goal of philosophy to one of its foremost problems
The belief that the essence of language is that which cannot be
seen (except through analysis of a particular kind - if then) is
a response to language's multiplicity of images and ways of
meaning on its surface. Wittgenstein later gives up trying to
evade this multiplicity and begins to work with it so that
meaning is a matter of arrangement of what is visible without
dependence on the 'hidden' or 'unseen' (the two forms of
blindness in the book). Logic, in simultaneously underlying
the surface of language and overseeing it, creates another
spatial collapse in the Tractatus. Refocusing on to the surface
of language in the Philosophical Investigations arises from the
understanding that the 'depth' of meaning of language does
not, and cannot, reveal itself at once. Practice reveals 'depth of
meaning' over time and in specific situations rather than at
once as the search through language to get to meaning
implies.
The idea that the essence of language is hidden from us
removes language from practice and objectifies it, producing a
90. We feel as if we had to
penetrate phenomena: our
investigation, however, is directed not
towards phenomena, but, as one might
say, towards the 'possibilities' of
phenomena. We remind ourselves,
that is to say, of the kind of statement
that we make about phenomena. Thus
Augustine recalls to mind the different
statements that are made about the
duration, past present or future, of
events. (These are, of course, not
philosophical statements about time,
the past, the present and the future.)
Our investigation is therefore a
grammatical one. Such an
investigation sheds light on our
problem by clearing misunderstandings
away. Misunderstandings concerning
the use of words, caused, among other
things, by certain analogies between
the forms of expression in different
regions of language. - Some of them
can be removed by substituting one
form of expression for another: this
may be called an "analysis" of our
forms of expression, for the process is
sometimes like one of taking a thing
apart.
91. But now it may come to look
as if there were something like a final
analysis of our forms of language, and
so a single completely resolved form of
every expression. That is, as if our
usual forms of expression were,
essentially. unanalysed; as if there were
something hidden in them that had to
be brought to light. When this is done
the expression is completely clarified
and our problem solved.
It can also be put like this: we
eliminate misunderstandings by
making our expressions more exact
but now it may look as if we were
moving towards a particular state, a
state of complete exactness and as if
this were the real goal of our
investigation.
new metaphysical questioning. The questions: 'What is
language?' 'What is a proposition?' asked in isolation disallow
the possibility of answering them. Where can the answer be?
Language, once called into question, leads us in a speechless
search through a language that seems odd and unfamiliar.
"What is language?" Such questioning is problematic, not
because it calls language into question - but because it does so
by turning language into an alien object rather than by looking
at everyday practices. It is that approach which had led to the
Tractatus' contradictory belief that it is only outside of
language from which the essence of language is revealed.
Segregating language from its context left its location in
question so that approaching it becomes a literal mystery.
Philosophical problems in this view become the space of
mystery, later defined as taking the form "I don't know my
way about." ( 123).
The following sections, 93 to 97, examine the view of
language, propositions and thought produced by this
estrangement The desire to overcome the resulting distance
from language initially confirms the belief that we need to
penetrate phenomenon in order to know it. The Investigations
turns this situation around by suggesting that what we view
has been shrouded by our approach to create the haze of
distance. Wittgenstein continues by comparing the views.
"One person might say "A proposition is the most ordinary
thing in the world" and another: "A proposition - that's
92. This finds expression in
questions as to the essence of
language, of propositions, of thought. -
For if we too in these investigations are
trying to understand the essence of
language - its function, its structure, --
yet this is not what those questions
have in view. For they see in the
essence, not something that already lies
open to view and that becomes
surveyable by a rearrangement, but
something that lies beneath the
surface. Something that lies within,
which we see when we look into the
thing, and which an analysis digs out.
The essence is hidden from us' this
is the form our problem now assumes.
We ask: "What is language?" "What is
a proposition?" And the answer to
these questions is to be given once for
all; and independently of any future
experience.
93. One person might say "A
proposition is the most ordinary thing
in the world" and another: "A
proposition -- that's something very
queer!" And the latter is
unable to simply to look and see how
propositions really work. The forms
that we use in expressing ourselves
about propositions and thought stand
in the way.
Why do we say a proposition is
something remarkable? On the one
and, because of the enormous
importance attaching to it. (And that
is correct). On the other hand this,
together with a misunderstanding of
the logic of language, seduce into
thinking that something extraordinary,
something unique, must be achieved
by propositions. - A misunderstanding
makes it look to us as if a proposition
did something queer.
something very queer!" --And the latter is unable simply to look
and see how propositions really work." (93) The first view
suggests "something extraordinary or unique about
propositions but offers few clues as to where to go or how to
proceed. Instead, it produces the starting point of a state of
being lost. It becomes clear now, that Wittgenstein had, in
order to counteract that state, sought a state of complete
transparency. This idea, necessitating a pure intermediary
between language and the world, is that chimera which is as
problematic in its suggestion of a pure intermediary as in its
separation of language and the world.
Section 96 continues to focus on this illusion. "Other illusions
come from various quarters to attach themselves to the special
one spoken of here. Thought, language, now appear to us as
the unique correlate, picture, of the world." Wittgenstein here
lays out the series of associations of limits drawn in the
Tractatus, showing how each marks the same boundary with
different titles and reiterating the spatial/visual collapse of the
Tractatus - where each frame lies directly behind the others.
'These concepts: proposition, language, thought, world, stand
in line one behind the other, each equivalent to each." The
view from above requires that each of these must be
transparent so as to allow the ones behind to be seen.
Whereas the suggestion of transparency allows us to get
directly to the 'essence': the implied equality and transparency
however makes it unclear what each boundary contains.
94. 'A proposition is a queer
thing!' Here we have in germ the
subliming of our whole account of
logic.
The tendency to assume a pure
intermediary between the
propositional signs and the facts. Or
even to purify, to sublime, the signs
themselves. -- For our forms of
expression prevent us in all sorts of
ways from seeing that nothing out of
the ordinary is involved, by sending us
in pursuit of chimeras.
95. "Thought must be something
unique". When we say, and mean, that
such-and-such is the case, we - and our
meaning - do not stop anywhere short
of the fact; but we mean: this - is -so.
But this paradox (which has the form
of a truism) can also be expressed in
this way Thought can be of what is not
the case.
96. Other illusions come from
various quarters to attach themselves
to the special one spoken of here.
Thought, language, now appear to us
as the unique correlate, picture, of the
world. These concepts: proposition,
language, thought, world, stand in line
one behind the other, equivalent to
each. ( But what are these words to be
used for now? The language-game in
which they are to be applied is
missing.)
Viewing becomes a 'purely visual' act - an exercise in empty
vision (yet another kind of blindness). Why, for example, is
the final level any less transparent, empty, or insufficient than
the other ones?
Section 9197 describes the chimera produced by this situation:
thought is seen as if "surrounded by a halo." (suggesting WB's
ideas on aura that also keep us at a distance.) Thought and
language seem separated from us. We mistake this halo,
Wittgenstein tells us, for the very essence of language (another
confusion between inner and outer) and take it as
simultaneously providing and presenting the a priori order
common to both thought and world, a view that separates us
from 'the world' it claims to define - "no empirical cloudiness
or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it - It must rather be
of the purest crystal." The mention of crystalline purity
foreshadows and defines the point of crisis between an ideal
and practice in Wittgenstein's defining moment on the ice.
Sections 98 - 100 associate sense with issues of space
(boundaries)and practice( rules). The question in these
sections revolves around the implications and prerequisites
involved in using and understanding sentences. Wittgenstein is
questioning how far (at what distance) from the ideal a
proposition can move and still retain meaning. Two examples
are offered: that of an indefinite boundary and that of a game
with some vagueness in its rules. In both cases, Wittgenstein
97. Thought is surrounded by a
halo. -- Its essence, logic, presents an
order, in fact the a priori order of the
world: that is, the order of possibilities,
which must be common to both world
and thought. But this order, it seems,
must be utterly simple. It is prior to all
experience, must be run through all
experience: no empirical cloudiness or
uncertainty can be allowed to affect it
- It must rather be of the purest
crystal. But this crystal does not appear
as an abstraction: but as something
concrete, indeed, as the most concrete,
as it were the hardest thing there is
( Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus No.
5.5563).
We are under the illusion that what
is peculiar, profound, essential, in our
investigation, resides in its trying to
grasp the incomparable essence of
language. That is, the order existing
between the concepts of proposition,
word, proof, truth, experience, and so
on. This order is a super-order
between -- so to speak -- super-
concepts. Whereas, of course, if the
words "language", "experience",
"world", have a use, it must be as
humble a one as that of the words
"table", "lamp", "door".
turns to spatial demarcations and practices to determine how
language functions.
Wittgenstein repeats this process in c 100 with a discussion of
the necessity of a game's reliance on definite rules to be a
game. " 'But still, it isn't a game, if there is some vagueness in
the rules.' -- But does this prevent its being a game?" The
pattern seems the same, but a shift has been enacted.
Wittgenstein now poses the questions not as from himself but
from the point of another - the so-called interlocutor. By
placing the question in quotation marks, Wittgenstein takes
another step beyond his previous thinking. Although it is
already clear in the text that neither games, boundaries, nor
rules need to be ideal to function, the question remains
whether the use of words like "game", "boundary", "rule" can
also function in this manner and maintain their sense. In so
doing, Wittgenstein is asking whether the same thinking
applies to words and to practices. He concludes the section
with "But I want to say: we misunderstand the role of the ideal
in our language. That is to say: we too should call it a game,
only we are dazzled by the ideal and therefore fail to see the
actual use of the word 'game' clearly."
The following section gets to the heart of this discussion by
returning to the subject and functioning of logic. The return is
however from a new position, one recognizing that in practice
we often call something with vague rules a game and
98. On the one hand it is clear
that every sentence in our language 'is
in order as it is'. That is to say, we are
not striving after an ideal, as if our
ordinary vague sentences had not yet
got a quite unexceptionable sense, and
a perfect language awaited
construction by us. - On the other hand
it seems clear that where there is a
sense there must be perfect order. -
So there must be perfect order even in
the vaguest sentence.
99. The sense of a sentence - one
would like to say -- may, of course,
leave this or that open, but the
sentence must nevertheless have a
definite sense. An indefinite sense --
that would really not be a sense at all.
-- This is like: An indefinite boundary is
not really a boundary at all. Here one
thinks perhaps: if I say "I have locked
the man up fast in the room - there is
only one door left open" - then I
simply haven't locked him in at all: his
being locked in is a sham. One would
be inclined to say here: "You haven't
done anything at all". An enclosure
with a hole in it is as good as none. -
But is that true?
100. "But still, it isn't a game, if
there is some vagueness in the rules". -
But does this prevent its being a game?
-- "Perhaps you'll call it a game, but at
any rate it certainly isn't a perfect
game." This means: it has impurities,
and what I am interested in at present
is the pure article. - But I want to say:
we misunderstand the role of the ideal
in our language. That is to say we too
should call it a game, only we are
dazzled by the ideal and therefore fail
to see the actual use of the word
"game" clearly.
something with an incomplete or fuzzy edge a boundary. The
practices and elements have retained their sense even when
their functioning was no longer ideal. The focus shift to logic,
was initially challenged by this encroaching vagueness. But an
interesting thing happens when logic is now reconsidered - the
demand for the ideal itself seems, impossible unless it too is
found in practice. Language and practice once separated,
defined and limited by logic, now demand logic to abide by
their rules of practice.
As an inner requirement, logic was understood not to arise
from an investigation of what is out there before our eyes, but
as an illusion we have projected into the space in front of us.
"We think it must be in reality; for we think we already see it
there." (19101 ) In revealing logic as an inner requirement
(which, if we follow, causes us to mistake what we see),
Wittgenstein shows that philosophical problems can arise from
a confusion between inner and outer requirements which blur
the distinction between what is real and what is unreal. This is
not to imply that Wittgenstein is denying the reality, the
existence of the inner or mental; but rather, that he is trying to
clarify where these conceptions about reality are located and
from where they arise. As Cora Diamond points out, the aim is
to draw our attention to the unrealism in philosophy; to the
unrealism in the questions we are asking. She states that we
ask philosophical questions "about our concepts in the grip of
101. We want to say that there
can't be any vagueness in logic. The
idea now absorbs us, that the ideal
'must'be found in reality. Meanwhile
we do not as yet see how it occurs
there, nor do we understand the
nature of this "must". We think it must
be in reality, for we think we already
see it there.
an unrealistic conception of what knowing about them would
be."2
The reality that Wittgenstein refers to is both the obvious - the
in the world and in language - and that in philosophy.
Wittgenstein's questioning here is as much about his relation
to philosophy as logic's relation to language. If logic is losing
its place in language, is philosophy also losing its place in
discourse or in our lives? Is philosophy still philosophy
without these ideals, topics, and methods; without the rigors of
logic or traditional argument and form?
Logic in 91102 emerges again as that which is behind, hidden
or embedded within the sensible use of language - "hidden in
the medium of the understanding." But what is that medium:
language, philosophy, vision, space? Section 103 declares that
the medium is the frame and lens that defines the practices of
observation and investigation, the glasses on our nose. The
lens of the glasses is thus caught between the transparent and
the hidden - between inside and out, unreachable in one and
unmoveable in the other.
102. The strict and clear rules of
the logical structure of propositions
appear to us as something in the
background - hidden in the medium
of the understanding. I already see
them (even though through a
medium): for I understand the
propositional sign, I use it to say
something.
Sections 109-133
Section 108 had ended with the comparison of a word and a
chess piece as both elements in a game or parts of a practice.
2Cora Diamond, The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and the Mind,
(Cambridge, MA: M I T Press, 1991), p.6 6.
The point of the analogy was to assist in defining our "real
need" in the study of language. That real need being not some
ontological or metaphysical discussion into a word's nature or
essence creating a removed, and ineffectual language, but
rather a discussion of the functioning of language, a surface
discussion that focuses on the everyday use of language.
Section 109 begins from this position to draw the conclusions
and problems for philosophy suggested by the previous twenty
sections beginning with the reconsideration of the nature and
method of investigation and the idea of our "real need". As a
method, the rejection or limiting of explanation that
Wittgenstein has hinted at since the book's opening
paragraphs is explicitly dealt with here with arrangement and
description in their many guises emerges the most viable
practices.
This declaration is Wittgenstein's attempt to redefine the
territory of philosophy which for him must be done in relation
to other discourses and other uses of language: science, logic,
everyday language, varying games, building and so on. This
activity demands both transgression of the discipline and
inhabitation within it as Wittgenstein's movements in and out
of philosophy mark the territory he is trying to describe. This
aspect is very different from the knowledge and visibility of
the fixed places and points of view of the Tractatus, replaced
hereby methods of arranging made possible only by moving
through space to achieve a multitude of viewpoints and
depiction of the resulting views. Vision remains indispensable,
but movement makes the practices of vision possible and
productive, turning it from a requirement of a particular view
into an investigation.
The section concludes with a famous but not unproblematic
statement : "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of
our intelligence by means of language." This immediately
brings to mind the example of the Chinese sentence in 91108
and the question of whether it is writing or ornament with its
implied suspicion that the line between writing and ornament
needs to be drawn (i.e. another boundary) for fear that it
could become blurred. But the statement itself - a defining
statement of philosophy - seems at odds with what has been
stated up to this point. It would seem to make more sense the
other way around - language is a battle against the
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of philosophy.
Philosophy, which had seemed to be in danger through the
dissolution of its substance of philosophical problems, now
seems to be in the position of directing language in response
to problems inherent within language itself - not to ones
created by philosophy's propensity for mishandling,
mistreatment, or misrecognition. But Wittgenstein has indeed
rotated the axis - to leave us with the suggestion and position
that our real need is in understanding the space of language
rather than the space of philosophy. Language is primary. In
so doing, he has given philosophy a purpose - one that can
109. It was true to say that our
considerations could not be scientific
ones. It was not of any possible
interest to us to find out empirically
'that, contrary to our preconceived
ideas, it is possible to think such-and
-such' -- whatever they may mean.
(The conception of thought as a
gaseous medium.) And we may not
advance any kind of theory. There
must not be anything hypothetical in
our considerations. We must do away
with all explanation, and description
alone must take its place. And this
description gets it light, that is to say its
purpose, from the philosophical
problems. These are, of course, not
empirical problems: they are solved,
rather, by looking into the workings of
our language, and that in such a way
as to make us recognize those
workings: in despite of an urge to
misunderstand them. The problems
are solved, not by giving new
information, but by arranging what we
have always known. Philosophy is a
battle against the bewitchment of our
intelligence by means of language.
finally be entered into and inhabited. Wittgenstein with this
declaration of a philosophical activity (battle), has begun to
inhabit philosophy as a subject of everyday language.
Philosophy also declares itself as a spatial practice, one of
finding one's place in contrast to philosophical problems as
defining a state of being lost as in 9123. Rotating the axis has
rearranged what we see by 180 degrees. Where as it would
have been impossible earlier, and now still remains somewhat
of a shock - Wittgenstein has declared a place, however
convoluted, for philosophy to continue in relation to language.
The emphasis on battle also emphasizes the ongoing nature of
this process which can neither be avoided nor simply won.
Sections 110-111 consider the appearance of these
philosophical/grammatical problems that in battle become
entangled with language . Confusions in appearances are
what Wittgenstein in 9110 calls grammatical illusions. Such
an illusion was that language (or thought) is something
strange or involving a unique practice. In response to visual
confusion Wittgenstein again spatializes the problem in order
to create a palace and ways to fully examine this implied
illusionary space. "The problems arising through a
misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character
of depth."
110. "Language (or thought) is
something unique" -- this proves to be
a superstition (not a mistake!), itself
produced by grammatical illusions.
And now the impressiveness retreats
to these illusions, to the problems.
Depth of language as described in these sections of the
Investigations alludes to, but differs from, the depth given to
language in the Tractatus by the logical form hidden within it.
In the Tractatus, that depth was both the site of philosophical
problems as well as the place from which they were
expunged. Logic was at once collapsed into language and
held apart from it or at least away from an explicit
appearance on the surface. To see that (hidden) logical form
and close the gap between it and the surface of ordinary
language was the philosopher's work. (An unacknowledged
spatial problem.) The depth created was, however,
mysterious with its simultaneous demands of penetration and
distance. In the Investigations Wittgenstein is refers to an
implied depth in both language and ourselves, but it is depth
itself which is being examined, inviting the reader to enter into
a space shared by the subject and language that had
previously prohibited or escaped examination. The question
then of "Why do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep?" is
one of self-examination as to why do we see a separation
between such things as thought and language or language and
grammar. Wittgenstein is questioning both the supposed
private nature of thought and the possibility of language being
separate from grammar, or of words being separate from
their meanings. Wittgenstein uses this examination to further
define the space of philosophy, equating the depth of a
grammatical joke with the depth of philosophy.
111. The problems arising through
a misinterpretation of our forms of
language have the character of depth.
They are deep disquietudes: their roots
are as deep in us as the forms of our
language and their significance is as
great as the importance of our
language. --- Let us ask ourselves: why
do we feel a grammatical joke to be
deep? (And that is what the depth of
philosophy is.)
In sections 112 - 123 the persistent idea from the Tractatus of
the existence of a general form of a proposition underlying
language reappears. Over the next ten sections this idea
becomes transformed from the search for the general form of
a proposition to the understanding that it is philosophical
problems that have a general form. In response to the
Tractatus' 4.5 "The general form of propositions is : This is
how things are." the Philosophical Investigation's proclaims
that : "A philosophical problem has the form : "' don't know
my way about.'"(91123) These statements stand in
diametrical symmetry, together forming the corollary to the
shift enacted in 91109 from an ideal language with
philosophical problems arising from the inability to see that
ideal, to the view that language is not ideal and philosophical
problems arise in the failure to see everyday language.
Sections 112-123 parallel that shift by moving from the
demand and the belief that language conform to a specific
structure in relation to the world - offering a picture of it - to
the belief that philosophical problems themselves, not
language, have a specific form in relation to language.
Out of the grammatical illusions and misinterpretations of our
forms of language Wittgenstein points to the deep association
of philosophical problems with language. With Wittgenstein's
rejection of the hidden element in language is his equal
rejection of hidden elements in philosophical problems. The
grammatical illusion or character of depth in the
112. A simile that has been
absorbed into the forms of our
language produces a false appearance,
and this disquiets us. "But this isn't
how it is!" - we say. "Yet this is how it
has to be!"
misinterpretations of our forms of language is shown to be a
misreading of surface by mistaking (implied) spatial
associations. The emphasis on surface in the Investigations
destroys the hierarchical production of space that had, despite
attempts otherwise, created confusion between the inner and
the outer. Misinterpretation, however, is no longer seen to
arise from the misalignment between language and logical
form which had spawned the Tractatus' attempts to align
them. Illusions disrupt clear readings of the space, suggesting
that there may be no clear readings of language itself, that
philosophy is in fact engaged with language in a battle
brought about through misinterpretation, illusion. etc. The
combination of misinterpretation and illusion is itself telling in
its consistent pairing of the visual and the verbal.
Wittgenstein in order to adjust the reader's focus has
redefined the space of language from a segregated language
to a shared social space of practice. This understanding leads
to a related understanding of depth: the "deep disquietudes"
brought about through the misinterpretation of our forms of
language. Wittgenstein finds these disquietudes to be as deep
in us and as significant and important as language itself. By so
doing, he is not simply dismissing or dissolving those problems
- rather he is discussing our involvement with them - both in
the practice of philosophy and in our everyday use of
language. Depth has been internalized, solidifying
philosophical problems as our problems rather than ones we
simply found in the world. Searching for the problems
beyond and distinct from ourselves proves to be a confusion
between inner and outer by not understanding that many
resulted from self-imposed ideals and requirements.
Responding to philosophical problems - as in defining the
territory of philosophy thus involves negotiating the
relationship between inner and outer in a multitude of ways.
The shift from the search for the general form of a
proposition to the understanding that it is philosophical
problems - not language - that follow a general form, begins
with a questioning of the appearance of language. "A simile
that has been absorbed into the forms of our language
produces a false appearance, and this disquiets us." (112)
This "false appearance" produces confusion that seems at first
to require what Wittgenstein has called for all along - clear
vision. To decide what the case is, what is a false vision and
what we see correctly, Wittgenstein speaks of the attempt to
see absolutely clearly in order to make a final determination.
"'But this is how it is --- ' I say to myself over and over again.
I feel as though, if only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply
on this fact, get it in focus, I must grasp the essence of the
matter." (9113) Vision, the main form of clarity in the
Tractatus, persists in the Investigations but alongside, rather
than above, other practices. Absolute clarity of vision which
went hand in hand with the idea of a transparent language,
had allowed vision alone to be sufficient because it was
thought to be total. The Philosophical Investigations in
questioning other beliefs from the Tractatus, questions this one
as well. That is, the Philosophical Investigations questions the
practice of vision in the Tractatus by first recognizing that it is
a practice and then understanding that it is not the only
possible practice but one of many.
The Investigations reconsiders the role of the visual in
philosophy, in language and logic on the assumption that if
clear vision was an integral component in the dissolution of
philosophical problems, then vision itself must be investigated.
The Tractatus had made the visual-verbal relation in language
explicit in the distinction between showing and saying. But at
the same time vision itself functioned in some kind of haze -
in an unsayable and potentially unstable way. Vision, which
had been discussed as if transparent in the Tractatus,
reemerges tarnished in the Investigations through association
with a viewer. Vision itself in some way did not exist in the
Tractatus, although, and perhaps consequently, it was always
demanded. Although implied throughout, vision was in some
way lacking in the Tractatus exactly because the process was
not discussed as to do so would bring in other factors such as
a subject, space, and so on, all of which the dominance on
logical space and determinate sense were meant to exclude.
The Tractatus had no functioning practice of vision, only an
idealized model.
113. "But this is how it is ---" I say
to myself over and over again. I feel
as though, if only I could fix my gaze
absolutely sharply on this fact, get it in
focus, I must grasp the essence of the
matter.
In 9114, Wittgenstein explicitly transforms the idea of a
general form of a proposition into the frames of the glasses
themselves. The confusion or mediation of inner/outer is
here defined by the frame which mediates between viewer
and viewed. Confusion results from the inability to distinguish
between that which is found and that which is produced,
between the requirements of investigation and the results.
This distinction, clear in the Tractatus, is now also in question.
Wittgenstein, in re-examining the world that is found, in
realizing that the Tractatus'view was the requirement and not
the result of investigation, questions not just the requirement,
but the distinction between the found and the produced. The
distinction comes apart in the Investigations around the act of
looking with the realization that it fails not at the point of the
object in sight, but around the act of viewing as signified and
materialized by the glasses.
Section 115 further dismantles the fixed view by focusing on
how it is inextricable from language. "A picture held us
captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our
language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably."
The picture refers to the picture theory of the Tractatus and to
the view constructed by the Tractatus. While 9114 had
associated a particular framed view with a central notion from
the Tractatus, 91115 collapsed that frame with language and
9116 began to dislodge language from the frame by placing
114. ( Tractatus L o g i c o-
Philosophicus, 4.5): "The general
form of propositions is: This is how
things are." ---- That is the kind of
proposition that one repeats to oneself
countless times. One thinks that one is
tracing the outline of the thing's nature
over and over again, and one is merely
tracing round the frame through which
we look at it.
115. A picture held us captive. And
we could not get outside it, for it lay in
our language and language seemed to
repeat it to us inexorably.
side by side the frame and the image within it, comparing the
metaphysical and the everyday uses.
Section 115 also points to the deep association of the verbal
and the visual. This is the situation then - the acts of repetition
- of our tracing round the frame over and over again - and the
correlative repetition of an image by language. We are caught
in somewhat obsessive and blind acts. These acts go nowhere,
suggesting the idea of an engine idling, reinforcing the same
frame and same image, and thus pointing to the image of
repetition itself. It is the mechanization of the view attempted
in the Tractatus, here acted out.
Section 116 examines the boundary between philosophical
and everyday language, proceeding by moving in and out of
philosophy and in and out of vision. The section focuses on
the distinction between the use of words in everyday language
and in more traditional philosophical, i.e., non-Wittgensteinian
usage. Wittgenstein in response sees the work of the
Investigations as a reversal of the traditional philosophical
approach. "What we do is to bring words back from their
metaphysical to their everyday use." The "we" are
philosophers, or more specifically, philosophers using
methodology akin to that of the Investigations. Philosophy
here is a mediating activity that begins to explain its relation to
Wittgenstein's own movements in and out of the discourse as
if on missions of rescuing and returning language. That
activity blurs the boundaries even as it defines them. The blur
can be seen as a measure of the movement back and forth
across those boundaries as a still photograph capturing a
moving image. Inhabitation becomes the place in which
words have a use and the concept of home is directly
reiterative of that practice of inhabitation.
Wittgenstein's understanding of language-games as homes - as
ways of inhabiting language, are offered in contrast to the
metaphysical use of language that can only be understood as
pure transgression - as words in exile. The metaphysical in its
alienating and estranging approach cannot provide context
because it does not provide a place, but is an illusion. By
creating an unsatisfiable demand it refers to a place that can
never be reached - a utopia. Such is the site of the ice in
1107 which at first seems ideal and exactly because it is, it is
incapable of allowing movement or inhabitation.
The examples Wittgenstein offers - "knowledge", "being",
"object", "I", "proposition", "name" are all words that
philosophy has taken into the metaphysical, abandoning their
everyday use for some mythical or illusory essence. Specifically
illusory in that it cannot be located in space or found in
practice. Essence was associated with depth, with what lay at
the thing's core and what seems to make something what it
uniquely is to distinguish it (unquestionably) from everything
else. Surface is rejected as the site of essence as there are too
116. When philosophers use a
word -- "knowledge", "being", "object",
"I", "proposition", "name" - and try to
grasp the essence of the thing, one
must always ask oneself: is the word
ever actually used in this way in the
language-game which is its original
home? -
What we do is to bring words back
from their metaphysical to their
everyday use.
many similarities between surfaces. This possibility of
confusion had called for an absolute clarity but the surface did
not supply that image. Essence thus is located where it cannot
be seen and at the cost of spatial clarity as it cannot be
precisely located but is sited in some infinite regress to
produce a completely clarified level of language ultimately lost
within the Tractatus' layers of transparency. It is for this
reason that in the metaphysical use, essence, originality and
ontological status have the false appearance of 'home'. By
contrast, the original home or language-game becomes of
importance not because of some ontological claim, but
because meaning for Wittgenstein arises out of social practices.
Wittgenstein turns this concept around by suggesting that it is
the unwillingness to deal with those surface similarities, those
potentially false appearances that account for the move to the
metaphysical and the search for the unique meaning and
appearance of a word. His response is to return the word to
its everyday site as a "spatial-temporal phenomenon" - not an
intangible essence. If essence, ontology, metaphysics demand
a unique place and meaning they cannot allow words to be
used in other ways, they cannot be 'moved'. But, the move
from the everyday to the metaphysical requires transgression.
That is, essence rather than being pure, arises from a paradox:
it is reliant upon a one to one correlation of meaning and
place, while simultaneously it is dependent on the
transgression of the everyday practices from which words arise.
As a result, the metaphysical use takes words away from their
origins in the search of their essence and despite its claims,
essence can only be a secondary home, existing in a sort of
nonplace removed from social functioning.
In 9117 Wittgenstein considers how a language game's
original home functions in everyday use by considering the
sense of a sentence. Here, the interlocutor (as the voice from
outside the Investigations but at the same time integral to it -
as is the Tractatus states: "You understand this expression, don't
you? Well then - I am using it in the sense you are familiar
with." To which Wittgenstein comments "As if the sense were
an atmosphere accompanying the word, which it carried with
it into every kind of application." Sense once placed in
relation to the spatiality and physicality of language becomes
that which needs to be investigated. One line of investigation
is to consider sense in relation to phenomena or aura. Both
terms imply a word existing within a sort of haze with a
potentially more exact core of meaning at some
(unreachable) center. In this way sense and the word seem
kept, if not at a distance, at least not directly on top of each
other. The image of the word in this case is it sitting within its
sense which spreads out around it and sustains its ability to
mean, as does atmosphere for breath. The atmosphere by this
way of thinking provides the general possibility for specific
meanings as it moves with the word from place to place with
sense becoming something like life support.
117. You say to me: "You
understand this expression, don't you?
Well then - I am using it in the sense
you are familiar with." -- As if the sense
were an atmosphere accompanying the
word, which it carried with it into every
kind of application.
If, for example, someone says that
the sentence "This is here" (saying
which he points to an object in front of
him) makes sense to him, then he
should ask himself in what special
circumstances this sentence is actually
used. There it does make sense.
There is another sense of support suggested here by what the
interlocutor says. The possibility exists for sense to function
akin to explanation and so with the same problems. With
Wittgenstein's reference to the support or lack of it for
explanation in 9187, Wittgenstein had asked how an
explanation can be useful if it is not the final one. That is, if it
is not the ultimate explanation. To which the interlocutor, in
realizing the potential instability of the situation exclaims, '"But
then how does an explanation help me to understand, if after
all it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never
completed; so I still don't understand what he means, and
never shall!"' Wittgenstein responds by again alluding to some
indefinable atmosphere: "As though an explanation as it were
hung in the air unless supported by another one."
Wittgenstein's rotation of the search for a support for
language comes around his concept of language-games as a
response to the search for a metaphysical foundation of
meaning that Wittgenstein finds hazy at best. He replaces this
distancing haze with an infinite number of possible observable
practices of language or language-games through which
meaning emerged. Wittgenstein's point is that the way to
understand language is to look at the use of words, not to
isolate the words in a surrounding fog. And the suggestion is
that attempts to penetrate phenomena are misguided because
they are attempts to understand the physical property of words
when understanding language is more akin to studying or
observing the rules of the game (s).
The grammatical illusions is that words have depth rather than
that they exist in space. As an example Wittgenstein offers a
proposition that along with its accompanying gesture seems to
carry its sense with it. And yet, Wittgenstein uses it to point to
its very specificity. "If, for example, someone says that the
sentence "This is here" (saying which he points to an object in
front of him) makes sense to him, then he should ask himself
in what special circumstances this sentence is actually used.
There it does make sense." To say that sense arises from the
language-game which was its original home is thus to say that
meaning arises from practice and inhabitation. Sense can thus
be fully transportable as it arises from practices in a multitude
of contexts.
Both transgression and inhabitation are therefore necessary
components to the functioning of language as the basis of any
language-game is its positing of an original home and in its
transgression of that locale. The Tractatus in its singular act of
transgression can now be seen not to be as much in error, but
as in having been arrested midstep. Rather than having
misstepped, the Tractatus has walked too little, leaving it to
posit as complete what was only a beginning.
Making sense, then, in many ways turns out to be as much an
act of making as one of sense. To that end, a word does not
and cannot carry with it its sense as an atmosphere
accompanying it, but it can carry with it its language-game (its
history of practices) as generative - part of the act of making
sense. The language-game in this way does not serve to bind a
word to a given place but like a rule, it allows the word to
make sense in other locations. "This is here" along with its
accompanying gesture in Wittgenstein's example is offered -
not to be analyzed as to its structure, but to be recognized as
part of our lives.
Section 118 takes the inevitable step of questioning
Wittgenstein's current practice of investigation. The image he
offers is telling in its return to the concept of building. With it
he inverts the traditional view of metaphysics as ground,
depicting that which seemed to define philosophy as built
upon the ground of language. Furthering this, Wittgenstein
suggests that the inquiries of metaphysics only appear to be
buildings, while in fact that image is another illusion. What
had been thought to be buildings turned out to be houses of
cards, buildings without structure or any possibility for
inhabitation. This idea stands in sharp contrast to
Wittgenstein's own practice of building with which he began
the Investigations.
Clarity becomes a literalized practice in 9118 with the idea of
clearing up the ground of language. Clearing as an activity
replaces a given clarity as the building of language had
replaced discussing a complete language. Clearing instead
turns out to be an activity (in this case) of scale - what had
been thought to be buildings were really just houses of cards
as what had been thought to be the limits of language had
turned out only to be limits within language. (Another
confusion of the inner and the outer.)
118. Where does our investigation
get its importance from, since it seems
only to destroy Where does our
investigation get its importance from,
since it seems only to destroy
everything interesting, that is, all that is
great and important? (As it were all
the buildings, leaving behind only bits
of stone and rubble.) What we are
destroying is nothing but houses of
cards and we are clearing up the
ground of language on which they
stand.
Section 119 reconfigures the already revised metaphor of
ground now associated with language - shifting it from the
image of a foundations to build upon, to that of spatial
container. In this shift, Wittgenstein underscores the
movement away from the view from above constituted by the
Tractatus. While the image of a ground of language
potentially reinforced that view, Wittgenstein for the first time
within the Investigations specifically refers to the "limits of
language," simultaneously constructing a new understanding of
them. Wittgenstein is doing more here than in his previous
discussions of boundaries that had allowed for imprecision
and indefinability: the discussion is now being organized
around a limit which not only is not clearly in view, but is one
which we cannot see directly at all, a fundamentally new kind
of limit - one which gives the sense of what it is to be inside, a
sense distinctly absent from the Tractatus.3
The image then, of spatial containment, the view from inside,
becomes exactly not a view. The vantage point of the
Investigations has not just created another picture, but has
suggested another way of understanding. While the first
sentence of this section seems to reiterate the redirecting of
philosophy as a response to the misdirection of traditional
metaphysics, the second sentence points to its value. The
results of philosophy are at least dual, they uncover two
distinctly different kinds of traces, that of the nonsensical
objects of philosophical production (metaphysics etc.) and the
painful(?) traces on ourselves of that practice. But
Wittgenstein says that those bumps on the head "make us see
the value of the discovery." (Still, the idea that bumps on the
head make us see the value of the discovery does suggest a
rather questionable discovery.)
The suggestion that we run into the limits of language is for
two most probable reasons: we could either not see the limits,
or we thought they were moveable and would give way. The
first is a lack of awareness of the existence or placement of
these limits while the second is a testing of them. The
continued bumps suggest again the inability to see, but as
3Wittgnstein's discussion of the philosophy of psychology and the
subjection in the Tractatus doesn't really enter this territory, but simply re-
inscribes its limits, as if delineating a missing space in the Tractatus.
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119. The results of philosophy are
the uncovering of one or another piece
of plain nonsense and of bumps that
the understanding has got by running
its head up against the limits of
language. These bumps make us see
the value of the discovery.
Wittgenstein places the value in the bumps themselves, that is
he does not visualize this activity - I take it that the limit is not
visible. It is not drawn, because as Wittgenstein has noted,
drawn limits have width, and more importantly, they have two
sides, they imply a ( possible) transgression even as they try to
contain it. The limit Wittgenstein is discussing in 9119 cannot
be drawn and, as suggested by these bumps, it is not readily
located. In fact, the bumps and nonsense are the (indirect)
signs we get of it, they are the way we know that language
and sense have limits. In that way, the limit acts somewhat
like the appearances of the unconscious in language, making
itself known without being seen, drawing a boundary of which
we are only aware indirectly, and yet one that is still capable of
offering a way of explaining aspects of our practices.
Wittgenstein in sections 120 - 121 starts to discuss the use and
meaning of words in order to clarify when we tend to push up
against the limits of language. He begins by looking at the
ability of our language to speak about itself, to perform
exactly the kind of inquiry that Wittgenstein is pursuing in the
Investigations. It questions the limits of language's - and thus
Wittgenstein's and the reader's - ability to do the work at
hand. Such a discussion had in many ways broken down with
the Tractatus by its use of symbolic logic to achieve certain
goals and by the limitations resulting from the defining of a
sharp show-say distinction that always threatened silence. All
of this marked, if not the failure of language, at least its
limitations for self-reflection without transgression into silence.
The question itself of language's and philosophy's self-reflective
abilities is fundamental to the Investigations work.
Put another way, Wittgenstein is asking whether language
needs to transgress itself in order to be self-descriptive. That
is, it asks whether the view from inside, from within the
limitations of language marked by those bumps on the head,
is capable of providing sufficient description for the purposes
at hand.
This section again raises the relation between the interior and
the exterior of a word and the continuing desire to penetrate
phenomena. The concluding part of c 120 specifically focuses
on the relation between 'words' and 'meanings'.
"You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning,
and you think of the meaning as a thing of the same
kind as the word, though also different form the
word. Here the word, there the meaning. The
money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But
contrast: money, and its use.)"
Wittgenstein's point is that everyday language functions
meaningfully; meaning is not a separate entity or component,
"here the word, there the meaning". The focus on the
meaning of a word's surface and into its practice is
emphasized by the example of "orthography" in the following
section. Meaning then has no place to reside outside of what
is seen, it is neither somehow an appendage nor that which is
120. When I talk about language
(words, sentences, etc.) I must speak
the language of every day. Is this
language somehow too coarse and
material for what we want to say?
Then how is another one to be
constructed? -- And how strange that
we should be able to do anything at all
with the one we have!
In giving explanations I already have
to use language full-blown (not some
sort of preparatory, provisional one);
this by itself shews that I can adduce
only exterior facts about language.
Yes, but then how can these
explanations satisfy us? -- Well, your
very questions were framed in this
language: they had to be expressed in
this language, if there was anything to
ask!
And your scruples are
misunderstandings.
Your questions refer to words; so I
have to talk about words.
You say: the pint isn't the word, but
its meaning, and you think of the
meaning as a thing of the same kind
as the word, though also different
from the word. Here the word, there
the meaning. The money, and the cow
that you can buy with it. ( But contrast:
money, and its use.)
embedded within the word, hidden from view. The idea of
use, however, differentiates this association from the
correlation of meaning and a word in the Tractatus which had
treated of them as separate entities in need of a spatial
practice to define their association.
The following section, asks similar questions about
philosophy's ability for self-reflection. The analogy made
between philosophy and orthography is telling, again
demanding that philosophy look at language and particularly
at the surface or exterior of language. The graphic aspect of
language is thus not secondary, but is an inseparable part of
language and our practices of meaning. As such the
Investigations allows for the examination of both "philosophy"
and philosophy as material constructions. In the Investigations
there is the understanding that part of what is represented by
language, is language, hence the example of orthography, so
that language simultaneously constructs and represents itself as
part of it s functioning. Wittgenstein is insisting that
"philosophy"/philosophy not be treated any differently than
any other word or topic..
Vision follows suit here with the continual oscillation of the
visual and the verbal, re-emerging explicitly in 91122 by
focusing on the shift from looking as a passive activity to a
constructive one.
121. One might think: if philosophy
speaks of the use of the word
"philosophy" there must be a second-
order philosophy. But it is not so: it is,
rather, like the case of orthography,
which deals with the word
"orthography" among others without
then being second-order.
This section posits the critical shift from the Tractatus'demand
for clarification, dependent on stability and a clear view to the
more complex spatial understanding and functioning of vision
and language in the Investigations It begins with the
acceptance that with language viewed from within we cannot
command the clear view implied from the outside. "Our
grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity." The emphasis
then moves to the need to develop a form of perspicuity
dependent not on seeing all of language but on working
within language by "seeing connexions" and then with the
emphasis on activity, of "finding and inventing intermediate
cases.
Wittgenstein thus introduces a new criterion of
seeing/functioning to go with the new position of the viewer -
the idea of a "perspicuous representation." "The concept of a
perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for
us. It earmarks the form of account we give the way we look
at things." That is, the demands of a new way of looking
create the development of new forms of representation, hence
the distinction between the structure of the Tractatus and the
structure of the Investigations The section thus begins with
the acceptance of the failure of language to offer the critical
distance found in the view from above. By placing the viewer
within language, the viewer becomes a user and viewing itself
becomes an active part of the construction of language.
122. A main source of our failure
to understand is that we do not
command a clear view of the use of
our words. - Our grammar is lacking in
this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous
representation produces just that
understanding which consists in 'seeing
connexions'. Hence the importance of
finding and inventing intermediate
cases.
The concept of a perspicuous
representation is of fundamental
significance for us. It earmarks the
form of account we give, the way we
look at things. (Is this a
'Weltanschauung'?)
The limitations of the scope of the view from within are thus
allowed to function not as the end point, as a limit of
language, but as the beginning. As we cannot see all of
language we need to make connections between what we see,
remember, arrange, locate, etc. The move from the Tractatus
to the Investigations can be seen as the move from an overt
clarity to a continual process of having to make connections.
The sketches, reminders and games that form the
Investigations are thus attempts at perspicuous representation,
suggesting that it cannot be a single image, but must be a
series of connections or intermediate cases rather than the
overview of the Tractatus. Additionally, the spatial practices of
editing, cutting down, fresh approaches and rearrangement
are all involved. Perspicuity itself is being investigated, leaving
its form open and ( conceivably) continually changing.
One problem of the view from within of the Investigations is
that it has nothing over the state of philosophical problems. "
A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way
about."' (l 23) This definition bears an uncanny similarity to
the description of language found in 9 203. "Language is a
labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know
your way about: you approach the same place from another
side and no longer know your way about." The two images
coalesce into a dual description of the spatial ordering of both
philosophical problems and language. The demand for the
need to understand language and philosophy as spatial
123. A philosophical problem has
the form: "I don't know my way about".
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constructs and practices is overwhelming. Not knowing the
way about continues the discussion of the inability to see all of
language as in the view from within. As there is no other
possible view in the Investigations, then, that is the condition
of using language. Equally, however, Wittgenstein in offering a
series of reminders of everyday language practices, points to
the fact that this is deeply familiar territory. To that end, the
idea of the view from within, in denying the possibility of any
other view denies any possible inner/outer distinction. The
recurrent spatiality in these examples underscores the
knowledge that working in and with language is a spatial
practice and needs to be understood as such.
Sections 124 - 133 forms the Investigation's response to 6.53
of the Tractatus which outlined the limited possibilities and
one "strictly correct method" for the practice of philosophy.
Section 124 makes clear that the methods used in philosophy
and the possibilities for the practice of philosophy are
inseparable from the limits of the discipline of philosophy
itself, limits Wittgenstein continually redefines, transforms and
transgresses. Wittgenstein's concerns with philosophy at its
limits conjoined with his moving in and out of the practice of
philosophy define spatial practices. His examination of the
discourse of philosophy simultaneously defines a spatial
discourse allowing philosophical problems, understood as
linguistic or grammatical problems, also to be understood as
spatial problems. The relation between inner and outer
101
defined around the subject forms a core understanding of the
spatiality in the practice of language in that the public nature
of language involves defining of the boundary between the
realms of inner and outer space. The correlate of these beliefs
is that it is necessary to understand the space of a practice in
order to understand the practice. This connects with
Wittgenstein's understanding that "to imagine a language
means to imagine a form of life." (19)
In many ways Wittgenstein had acknowledged, if not the
spatial, at least the visual in the Tractatus, with his emphasis
on showing. Despite its restricted role allowed in the
Tractatus, that role is crucial. It is the act of showing through
which the logical structure of a proposition is known. And it is
the logical structure of a proposition which it is necessary to
understand, or again, see correctly, in order to find the root of
philosophical problems. Those problems had been dissolved
or silenced in this act of making the structure of a proposition
clear. The association between dissolution and silence further
blurs the distinction by locating a place in which showing and
saying come together. Clarity emerges as a location in which
the two meet.
124. Philosophy may in no way
interfere with the actual use of
language: it can in the end only
describe it.
For it cannot give it any foundation
either.
It leaves everything as it is.
It also leaves mathematics as it is,
and no mathematical discovery can
advance it. A "leading problem of
mathematical logic" is for us a
problem of mathematics like any
other.
In 916.53 of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein had distinguished
philosophy from the natural sciences; in 1124 of the
Investigations, Wittgenstein emphasizes philosophy's
separateness from mathematical logic. As a result,
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mathematical logic no longer has the privileged place it held
in the Tractatus. Equally philosophy has no special relation to
language. It is just one of an infinite number of topics that
philosophy may discuss. And, just as logic no longer provides
the structural foundation of meaningful language, philosophy
is not foundational to other discourses. It offers neither their
advancement nor their foundation. "It leaves everything as it
is." This lays open new interdisciplinary possibilities. Without
any special relation to language and knowledge (as the
foundation of knowledge upon which other discourses can
build) philosophy itself becomes open to the action of other
discourses. Its borders become more permeable and less well
defined. Philosophy as Wittgenstein describes comes into
being along with other discourses, made of the same language
and describing them rather than preceding them. Philosophy
also no longer provides the sole frame for looking, but instead
defines and structures itself around what it sees. It is this
situation which allows the acknowledgment of the discourses
of spatiality, visuality and architecture to inhabit the
Investigations along with any number of other topics that
Wittgenstein lists in the preface to the Investigations, including
"the concepts of meaning, of understanding, of a proposition,
of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of
consciousness and other things."
Section 125 continues trying to situate philosophy by moving
back through philosophy's history of self construction to the
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point at which it intersects with our everyday practices and the
society of which they are part. Wittgenstein again begins with
the topic of mathematical logic and the question of any special
relation it might hold in the solution, resolution, or dissolution
of a philosophical problem and, as in the previous section,
dismissing the idea that it holds a unique relation to
philosophy while raising the question : What relation does it
have? Mathematical logic in no longer providing a
framework, that disallowed conflict as contradiction so that
philosophy's place of action becomes one of conflict rather
than of resolution.
What is initially at stake when the unique relation with logic is
dismantled is both the practice and the representation of
philosophy. What changes is how deeply philosophy is
intertwined with the practice of language. That is, the distinct
barriers and limits associated with logic which had demanded
a unique association of language and philosophy, once
dismantled, take with them the related ideas of clarity of
vision as the association of logic with a fixed perspective view
once dismantled takes with it the view itself. The associated
criterion of clarity no longer holds. Wittgenstein's
parenthetical comment that constructing/determining a clear
view of the state of mathematics (or whatever) before the
resolution of conflict and contradiction is not a sidestepping of
the challenge such a resolution poses, underscores
125. It is the business of
philosophy, not to resolve a
contradiction by means of a
mathematical or logico-mathematical
discovery, but to make it possible for
us to get a clear view of the state of
mathematics that troubles us: the state
of affairs before the contradiction is
resolved. (And this does not mean
that one is sidestepping s difficulty.)
The fundamental fact here is that we
lay down rules, a technique, for a
game, and that then when we follow
the rules, things do not turn out as we
had assumed. That we are therefore
as it were entangled in our own rules.
This entanglement in our rules is
what we want to understand (i.e. get a
clear view of).
It throws light on our concept of
meaning something. For in those cases
things turn out otherwise than we had
meant, foreseen. That is, just what we
say when, for example, a contradiction
appears: "I didn't mean it like that."
The civil status of a contradiction, or
its status in civil life: there is the
philosophical problem.
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Wittgenstein's recognition of the difficulty in describing,
depicting or accepting a state of conflict.
The shift to inhabitation in the Investigations is evidenced in
112 5 where Wittgenstein offers a different sense of "we". The
"we" here is more than a nominal "we", but one in which the
practice of philosophy is troubling. With the inclusion of the
subject in the Investigations, the self becomes part of what is
viewed and the subject is implicated in the act of viewing and
construction of views. In this sense, part of what we need to
get a clear view of is the self, ourselves and achieving a clear
view of a state of contradiction becomes integrally associated
with the acceptance of the possibility of discord, not just in
mathematical logic, but as a fundamentally human discord.
The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules,
a technique, for a game, and that then when we
follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had
assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled
in our own rules.
This entanglement in our rules is what we want to
understand (i.e. get a clear view of.) (91125)
This understanding defines the move from an external
discussion of rules to a discussion of what it is like to
simultaneously follow and become entangled in those rules.
The view from inside language and our lives is made clear in
its inability to limit the meanings within the language we use.
The shift then has been made from the more
philosophical/technical discussion of logico - mathematical
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contradictions to a common everyday contradiction in the
practice of language. "For in those cases things turn out
otherwise than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we
say when, for example, a contradiction appears: 'I didn't mean
it like that."' Contradiction and meaning are shown to be
intertwined in practice, to the location of meaning not in the
intentionality of the speaker, but within the practice of
language. The speaker, incapable of completely controlling
the meaning of language can only comment on it : "I didn't
mean it like that." - statement that points as much to our
helplessness as to our indignity. The position as developed in
the Investigations of the subject within language thus exists in
sharp contrast to the controlling position outside of language
that would allow us to 'see' the full use of our words, to see
where they lead and plan accordingly.
Wittgenstein makes our involvement with language clear in
the subtleties of the last lines of 91125 . 'The civil status of a
contradiction, or its status in civil life : there is the
philosophical problem." This understanding of philosophical
problems complements 91123's statement of the form of a
philosophical problem. "I don't know my way about."
Philosophical problems are thus defined in two ways in the
Investigations, as spatial and as social (thus pointing to the
intersection of the spatial and social). This understanding
places philosophy as part of the world, rather than the
discrete, strictly bounded practice of the Tractatus. Philosophy
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as defined in 912 5 is therefore a public activity with which
the private intentionality of meaning becomes subsumed to a
publicly accessible language, and as such civil life is the arena
of philosophical problems. The subject is located here not
between epistemology and metaphysics on the one hand and
ethics, aesthetics on the other (as with the Tractatus), but
exists between the potential privateness of an interiority and
the publicness of language and practice, lost in philosophical
problems and at odds with civil life. Philosophy's integration
and understanding as a socio-spatial problem allows for
Wittgenstein to finally approach problems and spheres of
philosophy (ethics and aesthetics for example) that he could
not within the Tractatus.
Given 91125's laying bare of the contradiction in our use of
language and within our selves and society, 91126 seems to
back down or away from that state of conflict, instead offering
a state of calm in which Wittgenstein can achieve a "clear
view" of "the state of affairs before the contradiction is
resolved.", a clear view of philosophy's territory. This move is
part of the continued positioning and repositioning of the
discipline or practice of philosophy in relation to other social
practices. Where as 91125 defined the state of entanglement
with language and society, 91126 extricates the practice of
philosophy not by conflict resolution but by conflict revelation.
Which is not to say that philosophy serves to reveal conflicts
otherwise hidden, but rather it serves up a state of conflict that
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was less hidden than ignored. "One might also give the name
'philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and
inventions."
Wittgenstein's emphasis in sections 126 - 129 is on the
refocusing of the vision of philosophy, a subject that he has
touched on since the discovery of the coincidence of vision and
philosophy in the frames, if not the lenses, of the glasses. Yet,
positioning and repositioning, fundamental acts of the
Investigations, demand that Wittgenstein go over the same
territory, repeatedly on varying paths and finding new
positions. The repetition allows these sections to be more than
the initial uncovering of vision. As Wittgenstein is now
operating within the socio-spatial field of philosophy, the idea
of clarity has been transformed by the repositioning of
philosophy with civil life, the rotation about our real needs of
91108.
126. Philosophy simply puts
everything before us, and neither
explains nor deduces anything. - Since
everything lies open to view there is
nothing to explain. For what is hidden,
for example, is of no interest to us.
One might also give the name
"philosophy" to what is possible before
all new discoveries and inventions.
Section 126 potentially defines a place of what Wittgenstein
later calls "peace". Spatial limitations play a strong role in
defining the possibility for 'philosophical peace' which might
be understood as the ability to be still rather than the inability
to move. The attempt at calm is nearly audible in the
sentences. The realms defined here are no longer however
the sayable/unsayable of the Tractatus, but rather the
visible/nonvisible. The shift invokes parallel repositionings in
subject and object. In 91126 the subject seems to be almost
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stilled within a space of action defined by vision. Not,
however, in a place where there is or can be no action, but at
time that it is not required. There is no work involved in
maintaining the situation, except in the negative sense. It is a
moment that attempts to profoundly maintain the present, to
exist fully on the surface. Such suggestion seems at odds with
the scene of conflict in 1125, but 127 goes on to suggest
some of the work to be done in this space of philosophy by
defining activities that begin with what we have before us
rather than uncovering that which is hidden (logical structure,
the interiority of the subject, intentionality). Section 127 thus
provides possible action for the philosopher given the form
and social status of a philosophical problem. '"The work of the
philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular
purpose.
As 91127 offers activity it also sheds a new reading on the
calm of 91126. The stillness of 9126, as Wittgenstein has
noted does not sidestep difficulties. The oscillation between
these three sections from conflict to consensus to conflict is
repeated in sections 128 and 129. The idea of reminders
marks a space between the visible and the hidden, between
surface and depth. The assembling of reminders is actually an
act of redefining the surface of vision by reassembling that
which we have available to us. Reminders make visible what
is or has been. They are meant not to be new information, but
are again the act of return or stasis in what happens before
127. The work of the philosopher
consists in assembling reminders for a
particular purpose.
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new discoveries, before conflict resolution, before the point in
which work is normally seen to begin. To that end,
Wittgenstein is shifting the practice of philosophy as he had
shifted its focus, away from hidden depth or future resolution -
both stages that hide the surface of conflict that Wittgenstein
wants to make visible. The reminder of what is visible points
to the very material of philosophy, of text and discourse.
Wittgenstein's demand in the assembling of reminders is thus
for the redefining of the field and surface of vision around
some particular purpose as he does in the Investigations.
Section 128 parallels the stillness of 126, furthering the sense
of inaction and seemingly even more at odds with the idea of
philosophy as a space of conflict. "If one tried to advance
theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to debate
them, because everyone would agree to them." Wittgenstein
here is sharply distinguishing between the practice of
philosophy, its activity of assembling reminders for a particular
purpose, and the development of some solely philosophical
thesis. That is, the space of conflict in which philosophy
engages is, for Wittgenstein, part of the larger space of social -
linguistic - spatial action. And the purposes of philosophy are
to return what had been taken to be the sphere of philosophy
and return it back to its everyday use. Reminders are
reminders of a particular action/practice, one not originally
philosophical. Theses in philosophy are akin to the
128. If one tried to advance theses
in philosophy, it would never be
possible to debate them, because
everyone would agree to them.
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establishing of the view from outside, a space removed from
conflict and hence creating one of inevitable agreement.
Section 129 challenges both the nature and importance of
that which is hidden making it clear that the emphasis is on
our vision rather than on the object of that vision. "One is
unable to notice something - because it is always before one's
eyes." The specter of the glasses, however, continues to cast a
shadow by raising the question of how do we know if we are
looking through the distorted or prefocused lens or looking
with our "own" vision. The criterion of vision always seems to
remain in question. Wittgenstein never counteracts this within
vision itself, instead he responds in the Investigations by
adding other criteria. Vision proves to be not enough on its
own, clear views come to be understood not as the starting
point of investigation, but the result of it. Clarity of view can
not be given, it can only be constructed and continually
reconstructed within philosophy. Philosophy turns out to be a
practice not of seeing clearly and philosophy does not look out
at other disciplines (the view from outside) and solve
problems or resolve contradictions. Instead it turns out to be
a process of finding one's way, of developing clear views, of
assembling reminders, a process of continual construction.
129. The aspects of things that are
most important for us are hidden
because of their simplicity and
familiarity. (One is unable to notice
something - because it is always before
one's eyes.) The real foundations of
his enquiry do not strike a man at all.
Unless that fact has at some time
struck him. -- And this means: we fail
to be struck by what, once seen, is
most striking and most powerful.
130. Our clear and simple
language-games are not preparatory
studies for a future regularization of
language -- as it were first
approximations, ignoring friction and
air-resistance. The language-games are
rather set up as objects of comparison
which are meant to throw light on the
facts of our language by way not only
of similarities, but also of
dissimilarities.
Rather than relying on clarity of vision as the criterion, the
Investigations offers practice, examples and comparisons.
Wittgenstein constructs the Investigations as both a method
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and practice of philosophy, not a thesis of philosophy. He
works within philosophy to construct such a space. Section
130 confronts the practices within the Investigations. "The
language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison
which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language
by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities."
Theses are the view from without philosophy, which is
possible, unlike language. But, Wittgenstein in the
Investigations wants something else, not a way out of
philosophy, but a way of continuing within it, a way of
practicing philosophy without losing sight of that practice, a
way for philosophy to work, rather than idle.
The language-games Wittgenstein refers to in 9130 are
specifically discussed in 91131 as forming criteria of
functioning language. Importantly, Wittgenstein's focus is on
their materiality. They are not idealized or theoretically
posited functions of language, but are as such, examples of the
actual thing - involving "friction and air resistance". He
continues in this section to describe the functioning of
language-games as models not just of how language functions,
but as a model for how philosophy may function. Functioning
in this case becomes akin to the idea of doing work, the
opposite of what 9132 will describe as an idling engine.
Intertwined with Wittgenstein's study of language is his
continual questioning and search for ways in which philosophy
may function, for ways in which philosophy is not just an
131. For we can avoid ineptness or
emptiness in our assertions only by
presenting the model as what it is, as
an object of comparison -- as, so to
speak, a measuring-rod; not as a
preconceived idea to which reality
must correspond. (The dogmatism
into which we fall so easily in doing
philosophy.)
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engine idling. Language-games become the model and the
measuring rod of both language and a working philosophy.
Importantly, and as further distancing from the stance of the
Tractatus, Wittgenstein emphasizes that they are not a model
to follow, a predetermined ideal but one for comparison.
They are a found measuring rod derived from everyday
practices of language.
Section 132 presses the distinction between working in
accordance with a preconceived idea to which the results of
that work must correspond, and working with a particular end
in view. One distinction is that a preconceived result too
narrowly defines the work to be done - leading to, for
example, the Tractatus'insistence on language's functioning in
accordance with an (unseen yet defined by logical showing)
underlying structure. The Investigations instead stresses the
multiplicity and unpredictability in the ways in which language
is meaningful. * We want to establish an order in our
knowledge of the use of language: an order with particular
end in view; one out of many possible orders: not the order."
The range of order and meaningfulness of language is thus
widened to include any of the ways language functions in
everyday use. At the same time, the Investigations narrows the
range of the philosopher's task re: language. The idea of
language being in a general need of reform is denied while
the reformation of the philosopher's discussion of language is
affirmed. How and to what ends is language of interest and
132. We want to establish an order
in our knowledge of the use of
language: an order with a particular
end in view: one out of many possible
orders; not the order. To this end we
shall constantly be giving prominence
to distinctions which our ordinary
forms of language easily make us
overlook. This may make it look as if
we saw it as our task to reform
language.
Such a reform for particular
practical purposes, an improvement in
our terminology designed to prevent
misunderstandings in practice. is
perfectly possible. But these are not
the cases we have to do with. The
confusions which occupy us arise when
language is like an engine idling, not
when it is doing work.
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importance to the philosopher is itself in question. Having
moved beyond the specific - preconceived search for a fully
clarified form of expression that had occupied the work of the
Tractatus, Wittgenstein searches for a new role for philosophy -
one in which the idea of a clear view is itself at stake. "Clarity"
as the measuring rod needs to be reinterpreted within the
revised understanding of language.
Wittgenstein distinguishes between the reformation of
language and the possibility of improvement in terminology as
a means of preventing misunderstanding in the work of the
philosopher, although leaving the range of work unspecified.
It is, however, not associated with everyday practice - a
practice not in need of reform despite its possibilities for
misunderstandings. That is not the role of philosophy. As
Wittgenstein has stated before, philosophy leaves everything
(including language) as is. Instead Wittgenstein focuses on a
particular class of confusions within language that gave rise to
philosophical problems. "The confusions which occupy us
arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is
doing work." The idling engine is an activity that produces
confusion by masquerading fixity as action. Philosophy then is
what is in need of reform - not because of what it does, but
exactly because it does not go anywhere, because it cannot
move - yet Wittgenstein's own movements in and out of
philosophy created an activated philosophy.
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The very scope of philosophy is in question. Do philosophical
problems completely exhaust philosophy? Wittgenstein
answers this question - at least in part -with the understanding
that philosophy may not have any subject matter of its own
-although it does have methods and practices, exactly what is
needed for motion. That is, Wittgenstein cannot and will not
try to say what comprises philosophy, what its scope or essence
is - but he will, as with the idea of the language-game, give
examples and speak of its practices, creating new surfaces,
spaces and territories of philosophy. Philosophical methods
are thus presented in direct relation to language-games, that
take form in the Investigations as a series or set of examples.
Where as the Tractatus suggested that language needs to be
reformed in order to clarify and clear up philosophical
problems, the Investigations instead looks to everyday
language, as itself the model of reform for philosophical
problems.
Section 133 offers another type of stillness Rather than the
immobility or fixity induced within the space of philosophical
problems, 91133 offers a desired stopping - the corollary to the
wanting to walk and another possible method. The desire to
stop highlights the dual nature of being stuck, of the engine
idling. For in that state there exists along with the inability to
go somewhere, the inability to stop trying to, as with the
attempts to get outside of language. Instead these same
actions are repeated over and again - the idling engine. The
133. It is not our aim to refine or
complete the system of rules for the
use of words in unheard-of-ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at
is indeed complete clarity. But this
simply means that the philosophical
problems should completely disappear.
The real discovery is the one that
makes me capable of stopping doing
philosophy when I want to. -- The one
that gives philosophy peace, so that it is
no longer tormented by questions
which bring itself in question. --
Instead, we now demonstrate a
method, by examples; and the series of
examples can be broken off. --
Problems are solved ( difficulties
eliminated), not a single problem.
There is not a philosophical
method, though there are indeed
methods, like different therapies.
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inability to see becomes coupled with the inability to move.
Section 133 underscores that association between the demand
for clarity and the inability to find one's way. Or, in a more
constructive sense, between (yet another understanding of)
clarity and the ability to stop. Stopping doing philosophy in
this state is associated with the ability to go on - but not
necessarily with philosophy or with a given problem, but
potentially, to move beyond philosophy. This desired
transgression joins with the (inhabited) notion of peace and
exists in contrast to the forced transgression of the Tractatus.
In 91133 the criterion of complete clarity which had ruled the
Tractatus is transformed. The locus of clarity had been strictly
defined around the dissolution of philosophical problems, the
clearing of the haze which made finding one's way so difficult.
The clarity now demanded is structured according to the
specific aims of given philosophical problems. As with
language-games, Wittgenstein is trying to establish the
multiplicity of these problems, the many different ways in
which they are defined and hence the many types or aspects of
perspicuity which might be suitable.
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Tractatus, house logic and the view from without
The Stonborough house did not enter into the discourse of modern architecture until over forty
years after it was built Once it did, however, beginning with Bernhard Leitner's 1970 article1 in
Artforum and followed by his 1973 more complete documentation of the work in his The
Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein, the house was not discussed without at least acknowledging
the question of the relation it bears to Wittgenstein's philosophy.
The existing literature on the house treats this problem in a variety of ways. A main purpose of
Bernhard Leitner's 1973 inaugural book was to document and publicize the house prior to its
threatened sale and destruction. The documentation includes a short history of the house, a
reprint from Hermine Wittgenstein's 2 family recollections about her brother, a few formal
analytical remarks by Leitner, and a limited quote from Georg Henrik von Wright, a philosopher
and former student of Wittgenstein's. This last inclusion, while only minimally defining a
relationship between Wittgenstein's architecture and philosophy has had a surprisingly strong and
enduring influence.
Two sentences from von Wright's statement are of particular interest. Von Wright declared that
the beauty of the architecture of the Kundmanngasse3 "is of the same simple and static kind that
belongs to a sentence of the Tractatus." But, at the same time, von Wright finds a "striking
contrast between the restlessness, the continual searching and changing in Wittgenstein's life and
I The first publication of the house was in the 1969 Viennese journal Bau, which printed the official plans of the
house. The 1970 Artforum publication was the first extensive documentation.
2 Hermine was the younger of Wittgenstein's two sisters, Margarethe for whom the house was built was the older.
3 The house is referred to as the Kundmanngasse in accordance with the Viennese tradition of naming the house for
the street in which it stands.
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personality, and the perfection and elegance of his finished work."4 To this, Leitner added that
the "hall on the main floor and the spaces surrounding it are highly characteristic of this balanced
and static quality."5
These comments by von Wright have done much to set both the tone and parameters for the
philosophical study of the house, although problematically, or, interestingly enough, they are
unable to locate it. In so doing, they replicate the philosophical inability to reconcile the
indeterminate status of aesthetics and aesthetic objects with a simultaneous desire to found that
study. Interestingly, the difference in the reception of Wittgenstein's early and late work
reappears in the house, so that the acceptance and use of the early work (for example, the
interest by members of the Vienna Circle) resurfaces around the house, while the difficulties and
uniqueness of the later work eludes grasp within the discussion of the architecture.
In von Wright's first statement, the house is seemingly presented in aesthetic or formal relation to
the Tractatus with their shared type of beauty. The second statement contrasts the house to the
shifts, phases and continual searching definitive of Wittgenstein's 'life and personality'. Taken
together these comments set Wittgenstein's life against his work - conceiving the 'work' to be
static and perfected and the 'life' to be fragmented and in continual flux.
Despite its apparent similarity with the perfected elegance of the Tractatus and implied
separation from the "restlessness" of Wittgenstein's life and personality, however, the house
cannot help but be associated with (if not actually definitive of) that restlessness. As a notable
aspect of Wittgenstein's continual searching is the drama of the ten year period during which he
abandoned philosophy, Wittgenstein's two and a half year practice of architecture strongly
contributed to this designation. Equally, that break with its dramatic shifts and returns, far from
4 Bernard Leitner. The Architecture of Ludwig Wittgenstein. (New York: New York University Press. 1976), p.50. -(referring to both Wittgenstein's house and Wittgenstein's one piece of sculpture done at that time)
5Ibid, p. 50.
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separating the two, contributes to the inseparability of Wittgenstein's 'life' and 'work'. Beyond
even the importance of the specific intervening events, the movement in and out of philosophy
and other disciplines acts not simply as a disruption of or break in Wittgenstein's philosophy.
Instead, it contributes to the development of his philosophy which itself exhibits related shifts, not
just of topic, but of scope and view, moving from without to within and developing from stasis to
transgression to inhabitation. The house, on this thinking, and given von Wright's, comments
exhibits both aspects of stasis and movement, leaving it paradoxically caught between the two -
left indecipherable as to whether it is part of Wittgenstein's 'life' or of 'work'. (The house, as will
be discussed later, literally exhibits aspects of both of these.)
While von Wright associates the house's formal simplicity and static qualities with the Tractatus
and contrasts it to both the restlessness and series of phases and shifts in Wittgenstein's life and
personality, von Wright also clearly dissociates the architecture from the philosophy. Viewed
more closely, von Wright was not suggesting that the architecture is like the philosophy of the
Tractatus - but only like the form of the Tractatus - possessing similar qualities to a "sentence of
the Tractatus." 6 This statement thus simultaneously distances not only architecture from
philosophy, but form from content, while paradoxically emphasizing the Tractatus'unique form.
Focusing on the 'form' of the Tractatus apart from its 'thinking', however, cannot bring the
architecture and philosophy into comparison, as it shifts the line of division to within the
philosophy, leaving the architecture and philosophy distinctly separate.
Von Wright's association of the image of the house and the image of the Tractatus, thus limits the
architecture-philosophy association to the Tractatus in more ways than one. While this approach
may initially seem obvious, as the Tractatus was Wittgenstein's only philosophy for a long period,
by ignoring the later philosophy of the Investigations, von Wright ignored a philosophy that is
neither simple nor static. (it as a philosophy that both looks and functions differently.) But
6 This already suggests another part of this study - the need to look at the form of the writing of the Tractatus itself.
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because of the positioning of the house in Wittgenstein's life and work any philosophical frame
for viewing the house cannot just be the early philosophy of the Tractatus - but is literally the
formation of the early-late distinction around the period that includes the house. The order of
Wittgenstein's productions - philosophy - architecture- philosophy when reduced in this way to
philosophy-architecture has two effects : it suggests that the latter be seen in the receptive and
reflective mode, which disallows the positioning of it as constructive of the later philosophy and
leaving architecture, no longer the middle term, to appear solely as the product of the earlier
philosophy. And, secondly, it limits possible associations when philosophy and architecture by
limiting the terms by which the house is considered. This is not just a problem of excluding the
architecture from consideration regarding the philosophy, but is an epistemological concern in
that it is not just important to the understanding of the house to see what ideas, practices, etc.
may have contributed to it, but to also see what ideas, etc. it produced.
Approaching the house from the standpoint of the early philosophy supposes any understanding
of it on the Tractatus in more ways than one. Beyond the (often rejected) possibility of the
house revealing, reflecting, exploring or otherwise instituting ideas from the Tractatus, the
Tractatus is reinscribed in the house in a more important way: It employs ideas and distinctions
based in the Tractatus or a Tractatus-like way of thinking in which sense is determinate, and
showing is sharply distinguished from saying. That is, vo-n Wright's thinking viewed the house as
if through the conceptual lens of the Tractatus, with all the baggage that implies.
The Tractatus - Stonborough house association also reinforces the line of thinking which demands
that architecture be understood as structured, concrete and absolute. Turned back on the
Tractatus, this substantiates the ( erroneous) view that the Tractatus is, itself, architectural with its
exacting "static" ordering and demand that all its elements, thoughts and meanings be contained
in, and defined by, that order. Equally, von Wright's split thinking reiterates the Tractatus -
Investigations break that sees the later philosophy only in a direct relation to the earlier,
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eliminating everything in between as inconsequential, house included. Von Wright in mimicking
the Tractatus'exclusion of life, subjecthood and practice from its pages and its philosophy, forces
the distinction between product and process, omitting practice along the way. The result further
separates if from Wittgenstein's 'work' in the exclusion from discussion of the practice based
philosophy of the Investigations The life/work separation does more, however, to define the
Tractatus-Investigations split than to locate the practice of architecture. The corollary, of course, is
that locating the house in relation to these texts, relocating it really, reveals much about these
texts as well. Locating and relocating thus, as they were central to Wittgenstein's life, can also be
understood as central to his work and to understanding and engaging with that work.
Leitner confirmed the need to define a relationship between Wittgenstein's architecture, life and
philosophy by his reprinting an excerpt from a family recollection written in the 1940's by
another of Wittgenstein's sisters, Hermine Wittgenstein. Leitner's own conclusions seem greatly
influenced by this. The recollection offers an image of Wittgenstein's involvement with
architecture and other aesthetic practices.7 Several things Hermine writes have been quoted
repeatedly and her recollections as with Von Wright's comments have greatly contributed to both
the understanding and mythology of Wittgenstein's practice of architecture. The reprinted section
focuses on her brother's development from childhood through the period in which he worked on
the house and serves to broach the question, by attempting to provide a foundation for it, of how
a philosopher, otherwise untrained in the discipline, came to practice architecture.
Hermine recalls Wittgenstein's history of involvements with architecture, 'technical', and 'aesthetic'
activities, with the technical and aesthetic offered as if components of the architectural. She
begins by explaining that in "his youth Ludwig showed great interest in technical things." The
example she offers is of a ten year old Wittgenstein constructing from wood sticks and wire a
7 Unfortunately Paul Engelmann's much later Letters from Wittgenstein With a Memoir which might be expected to
discuss at length Wittgenstein's involvement with architecture and the house during the period of collaboration, does
not discuss this period.
121
model sewing machine capable of sewing a few stitches. Hermine describes what she refers to as
Wittgenstein's 'other interests' from the period of the house's design and construction, all of which
involve the arts, including Wittgenstein's relationship with a sculptor named Michael Drobil.
During the house design/construction period Wittgenstein "became very much interested in the
sculptural projects which the artist had embarked upon, and even influenced him in a way. . . .
He even began to sculpt, since he was tempted to make his own version of a head which he had
disliked in one of Drobil's sculptures. He actually managed to produce something very graceful.
and the plaster cast of the head was set up by Gretl in her house."8 In anther example, she
describes some related primary school lectures Wittgenstein gave while a teacher at the boys
occupational school prior to his work on the house. In these he had the students invent a steam
engine, draw a sketch construction of a tower on the blackboard, and depict moving human
figures.
Wittgenstein's lifelong interest in "technical matters" and issues of construction, although often
suggested as the reason that Wittgenstein's sister Margarethe proposed he work on the house
along with the idea that it would be a sort of therapy for the mental state he had been in since
the end of the war. Wittgenstein's interest in the spatial, the technical and the constructional - all
considered as outside the bounds of philosophy, have been segregated from his philosophical
production, discussed instead as a series of discrete episodes on their own, with any connections
made to his philosophical work limited and largely unidirectional. Wittgenstein although rightly
taken first as a philosopher, needs to be recognized as a philosopher for whom the visual and
spatial are themselves "central" or "foundational" to the philosophical thought.
Hermine outlines Wittgenstein's education beginning with his attending the Technische
Hochschule in Berlin from 1906 to 1908, during which "he occupied himself extensively with
questions concerning aerodynamics and experiments." The recollections emphasize how exactly
8Leitner, Op. cit., p. 22. Gretl is Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein
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at the time that he "was suddenly seized so strongly and so completely against his will by
philosophy, i.e., by reflections about philosophical problems, that he suffered severely under this
double and conflicting calling, and felt inwardly divided." As described, this period is the reverse
of Wittgenstein's having suddenly left philosophy after the completion of the Tractatus, here
dropping a previous course of study for philosophy, and, as such serves, to define another datum
against which his life and work may be seen.
Although Hermine offers Wittgenstein's intense interest in philosophical questions as a sudden
personal crisis causing Wittgenstein to choose between courses of study, his actions also suggest
that for Wittgenstein philosophical concerns arose from within an immersion in the technical and
the mechanical. If you take the emphasis of her recollections - to not simply outline
Wittgenstein's engagements with the arts and "technical matters" - but to show within
Wittgenstein a long and continual interest in such matters - then two possibilities emerge which
are useful here. First, Wittgenstein might not, as Hermine suggests, have been as much seized by
something external to what he was studying, but by something he knew to be deeply connected
with it. And given that, secondly, the possibility that these technical and aesthetic interests not
only intermingle within or even pervade his philosophy - but that they may play an active and
formative role within that philosophy. It is this understanding of Wittgenstein's not dual, but
deeply interrelated thinking that I want to develop here and which I see as indicative of the
philosophy-architecture association in his work. It is my belief that the practice of architecture
played such an influential role in his philosophical development not because it was unrelated to
his previous work, or presupposed an entirely separate set of issues, but that it is exactly because
he was already concerned with related and shared issues that the practice of architecture, in
offering and demanding a new but associated way of thinking, forced the reconceptualization of
his philosophical practice.
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In the confrontation with architecture, with necessarily having to work and thus being forced to
conceptualizing in other ways, not only did Wittgenstein's thinking change, but ideas arising from
the architecture emerge and enter into the later philosophy. The resulting intersection of ideas,
constructs and themes are not simply the result of Wittgenstein's having been a philosopher who
then worked on a house, but whose philosophy and methods themselves already contained
related ideas, of one whose philosophy already understood that the bounds of philosophy are not
only potentially arbitrary and permeable, but must necessarily be transgressed in its construction.
Through the work on the house, in the literalization, manifestation and materialization of the
architectural process, the thinking of the Tractatus becomes concretized and reemerges
transformed in the later philosophy's reliance on "the builders" and issues of spatiality, visuality,
limits, boundaries and inhabitation.
Wittgenstein had initially intended to do advanced study neither in philosophy nor mechanical
engineering, but in physics with Ludwig Boltzmann at the University of Vienna. Boltzman,
however, committed suicide just prior to Wittgenstein's entry into the program. In response,
Wittgenstein abandoned his plans and chose to study mechanical engineering at the Technische
Hochschule in Berlin. Two years later, Wittgenstein's interests brought him to the study of
aeronautics at the University of Manchester in England, and while there, further pursuit brought
him to the foundations of mathematics and ultimately to philosophy. This last move was
precipitated by the incorporation of the foundations of mathematics into the central concerns of
philosophy in large part through the work of the German mathematician turned philosopher,
Gottlob Frege and by the British philosopher Bertrand Russell.
Frege, somewhat similarly to Wittgenstein, had not entered philosophy directly. He began his
work as a mathematician, but in his search for the foundations of arithmetic he was led to
problems of logic and the philosophy of language. The turning point in his work was his attempt
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to define the concept of number. Frege began with the mathematical and ontological question -
"What is a number? but transformed it to answer instead how it is we use "number words" in
language. Frege thus reconceived the mathematical and ontological concern of the nature of
"number" as a problem of language, leading him to pose such questions as how can we
distinguish between a number and Julius Caesar.9 Wittgenstein's interest in this work led him to
visit Frege and it was he who suggested that Wittgenstein leave for Cambridge to study
philosophy with Russell. Wittgenstein took this advice and in September, 1911 went to
Cambridge and began his official engagement with philosophy.
Almost immediately upon his entry into philosophy at Cambridge, Wittgenstein began advanced
work in logic. Hermine Wittgenstein reports that when she visited Ludwig in Cambridge in 1912
Russell surprised her by saying: "We expect the next big step in philosophy to be taken by your
brother."10 In the next two years Wittgenstein searched for a place of seclusion in which to work
, a search that led him to the house in Skjolden in Norway where he stayed off and on until the
outbreak of W.W.I and his decision to return to Austria and enlist in the army.
Wittgenstein continued his work on the Tractatus while he was in the army, completing it in
1918 just prior to being taken prisoner of war in Italy where he remained for six months. He
was released in August 1919 and returned to Vienna whereupon he gave up his family wealth,
dividing it among his siblings (excluding Margarethe who unlike the others had retained most of
her wealth through the war). He then decided to choose what he thought of as a "completely
unpretentious" vocation and become a primary school teacher in a small Austrian village.
Planning for that vocation, Wittgenstein entered the Teacher's Training College in Vienna, after
which, following a short period where he worked as an assistant gardener in a seminary outside
of Vienna, he spent the period from late 1920 until the spring of 1926 teaching in first one and
9 Gottlob Frege. The Foundations of Arithmetic. trans. J.L Austin. (Oxford, 1974), p. 68.
10 Op. cit., p.18.
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then another Austrian village primary school. Then in almost an act of symmetry, he returned to
Vienna and again worked as an assistant gardener until October 1926. It was during this last
period, toward the end of Wittgenstein's work as a primary school teacher, that his sister,
Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein suggested that he join herself and the architect Paul
Engelmann in the design of her city house.
Hermine Wittgenstein summarized her recollections about Wittgenstein's architecture with an
interpretation of the house derived from the Tractatus. With it, she describes Wittgenstein as a
logician who transferred that thinking to architecture. This often quoted remark, similarly to von
Wright's, emphasizes the tie between the house and the Tractatus.
For instance even though I admired the house very much, I always knew that I neither wanted to,
nor could live in it myself. It seemed indeed to be much more a dwelling for the gods than for a
small mortal like me, and at first I even had to overcome a faint inner opposition to this 'house
turned logic' as I called it, to this perfection and monument size. II
During the design and construction of the house, Wittgenstein, although in demand
philosophically, largely shunned the philosophical community. Margarethe attempted to reinvolve
Wittgenstein with philosophy by mediating between Wittgenstein and Moritz Schlick, philosopher
and member of the Vienna Circle. Schlick, interested in discussing the philosophy of the Tractatus
with Wittgenstein, had initiated contact by writing to him in December of 1924. Through
Margarethe, Wittgenstein agreed to meet with Schlick, but only individually, rather than with the
entire group, as he believed that only by meeting one on one, would he be able to judge whether
"he would still be capable of formulating any significant philosophical thought." Wittgenstein also
did not participate in formal gatherings of the Vienna Circle, except for the one occasion he
attended a lecture given by Schlick. They first met in February of 1927 and had regular
meetings, although Wittgenstein was "not always receptive to philosophical discussion." In those
I 10p. cit., p.23.
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instances Wittgenstein preferred to read poetry. Of these meetings, "Many years later Wittgenstein
told his student K. E. Tranoy that thanks to the discussions with members of the Vienna Circle 'I
felt at that time that I had thought more, and more successfully, about certain problems than
others had done.' "
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Existing Literature
Two studies that specifically focus on the relationship between Wittgenstein's architecture and his
philosophy by defining two of the possible approaches to that relationship are: Francesco
Amendolagine's article entitled "The House of Wittgenstein" published in 1982 and Paul
Wijdeveld's 1994 book Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect. While Amendolagine begins to take up
the affect Wittgenstein's work on the house had on his philosophy, for Wijdeveld the question is
how to relate the architectural categories, ranging from traditional architectural designations of
classical and modern, to philosophical ones including the more promising Tractatus inspired idea
of aesthetic and philosophical clarification. Wijdeveld's book employs categories.
One part of the book considers the house as an architectural object, analyzing both its formal and
its historical attributes. Wijdeveld situates the house historically as a product of both classicist and
modernist thinking, citing Wittgenstein's admiration for the Viennese baroque, his appreciation of
Viennese Biedermeier classicism and his upbringing in traditional Viennese aristocratic Palais
architecture, on the one hand and his association with Loos and contemporary Viennese
architecture on the other. Uniting the two approaches Wijdeveld summarizes Wittgenstein's
architecture as a gesture caught between the classical and the modern. What Wijdeveld calls
Wittgenstein's 'architectural gesture' began with Paul Engelmann's (Wittgenstein's initial
collaborator) preliminary design. Wittgenstein according to Wijdeveld acted to purify and clarify
Engelmann's "classicizing" design by removing all ornament, taking volumetric clarity to its limit,
and accentuating the asymmetry.
Wijdeveld looks at the house as not just an architectural undertaking but also as a "significant
landmark" of early 20th c. Viennese culture. His belief is that Wittgenstein was striving for "an
'authentically modern' design. Consequently, he attempted to determine Wittgenstein's idea of
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modernity and the relation of that view to the architecture of the time which he limits largely to a
comparison of Loos' and Wittgenstein's "implicit conceptions" of architecture.
Wijdeveld denies any 'simplistic' claims that the house somehow represents the philosophy or that
it is a physical, literal translation or materialization of it. 12  Wijdeveld also denies that
Wittgenstein intended any resemblance between the two as that would contradict his conception
of philosophy and aesthetics as he developed in the Tractatus. Despite these rejections, Wijdeveld
does take up the idea of a presumed stylistic similarity or identity between the Tractatus and the
Stonborough house by attempting to see what such ideas as simplicity, precision, and clarification
mean in each realm along with certain 'stylistic' terms such as classical, monumental, unadorned.
The question of Wittgenstein's aesthetics is central to Wijdeveld who finds that the "house appears
to be, at first, an unattributable example of early modern architecture, but looked at more closely
"the design and the many peculiar details of its construction are so unique within the context of
early twentieth century architecture that one is led to suspect that it must be the result of the
deliberate application of 'the' principles of 'Wittgensteinian aesthetics' under the direct
supervision of the philosopher himself."13
Wijdeveld formulates the architecture-philosophy problematic by asking how the relationship
between an architectural object and a conceptual structure can be meaningfully established. 'To
12This is a more or less standard denial of what is seen as a simplistic association by which architecture represents
philosophy. Yet, as much as the denial may be apt, such an achievement of representing the philosophy of the
Tractatus seems itself in no way trivial, but instead would be a major achievement. My opposition to such a view lies
in the implication that architecture can only function in the receptive mode, not that it might at times or in some
ways.
13This statement seems at odds with Wijdeveld's dismissal that the house in some way represents the philosophy or
is a translation of it. What of the application of Wittgensteinian aesthetics. Does he mean to imply that aesthetics is
not part of philosophy -or not part of Wittgenstein's philosophy? as he adds that "unlike most philosophers
Wittgenstein never developed a systematic theory of aesthetics and wrote only a little on the subject." Given the state
of 20th c. aesthetics and the general dissolution of systems of philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries , this seems
quite an odd comment. Is the central concept for Wijdeveld then the distinction between applying and representing
the philosophy?
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establish a meaningful connection between Ludwig Wittgenstein's classicizing 'architectural
gesture' and his philosophical thinking, based on the imperative of an intuitively clear 'rule' of
absolute beauty, we should begin with the assessment of his ideas on philosophical aesthetics
during the period of the design and construction of the Kundmanngasse."1 4 This approach, thus,
begins by accepting philosophy and architecture as separate realms following which Wijdeveld
attempts to connect them through the mediating (and Tractatus dependent) concept of showing
and the Tractatus'goal of philosophical clarification.
Wijdeveld begins this comparison by considering what there is of Wittgenstein's aesthetic ideas in
the Tractatus. To more fully establish Wittgenstein's view of aesthetics at the time of his practice
of architecture, he further looked to Wittgenstein's 1929 thoughts on aesthetics as they emerged
in his lecture on ethics given to a Cambridge popular society called The Heretics in 1929, the year
following Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge and to philosophy. The lecture confirmed for
Wijdeveld that Wittgenstein's ideas on aesthetics were unchanged from the time and text of the
Tractatus. (Wijdeveld does not take up the importance of Wittgenstein turning to this subject at
this time.) The relevant conception he finds in both texts is the view of aesthetics as an act of
( philosophical) clarification based on the limited mentions Wittgenstein made on aesthetics and
the associated ideas of a rule governing the principle/mechanism of showing both from the
Tractatus. Wijdeveld sees Wittgenstein as having transposed and transformed the act of
philosophical clarification developed in the Tractatus to the clarification of classical architecture,
as he would have been presented with in Engelmann's preliminary designs. That is, he sees
Wittgenstein's 'aesthetic gesture' as acting to clarify Engelmann's initial classical ideas to produce a
purified and modernized version of the design. 15
14 Paul Wijdeveld. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Architect. (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1994), p.1 83.15 Cacciari in his Architecture and Nihilism offers another take on the Tractatus' use of showing and silence which
fits well with his negative dialectics but problematically remains dependent on the Tractatus and on a particular
reading of the Tractatus.
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Amendolagine offers another approach to the philosophy-architecture problematic in
Wittgenstein's work, one that allows the house to be considered a stage in Wittgenstein's
philosophical research which fundamentally altered Wittgenstein's approach to philosophy. For
Amendolagine, Wittgenstein's philosophical research within the house functions in two stages,
almost as action and reaction. The first phase is seemingly directly reiterative of Wittgenstein's
work on the Tractatus, and involves analyzing the house as a sort of logical circuit. The suggestion
is that throughout the house Wittgenstein leads us through a path in which we periodically have
to make a decision between one of two choices, left or right, continue or turn. Amendolagine
sees these decisions as paralleling the form of logic's bi-polar structure, as in the Tractatus, in
which we always have to decide between one of two opposing poles - right or wrong, true or
false. The second phase, not specifically located by Amendolagine, amounts to the simultaneous
verification and surmounting of the ideas in the Tractatus and of the rigidity of the logical circuit.
The ability to surmount the ideas contained in the Tractatus arose for Amendolagine, through
Wittgenstein's involvement with "everyday facts" in the design and construction of the house. It
occurs as the logical circuit adapts over time to other uses so that it is no longer just a matter of
true or false, and the house is not used as a logical circuit involving a continual series of yes-no,
right-left choices. Use and time are thus seen to alter the idealized design of the house as a
"logical circuit." Amendolagine does not indicate how this occurs, as the house would retain those
built in logical 'circuits', and the series through the house remains unchanged from its initial
design. Additionally, Wittgenstein would not have lived in the house to experience this circuit
breakdown.
Perhaps, more importantly it is not clear why Amend sees the house as having been designed as a
logical circuit in the first place, except that Amendolagine posited that view in accord with the
Tractatus in an attempt to link the architecture and philosophy. Even if the plan works as he says
it seems as if many more or less traditional house plans would also, without having been
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designed as such, in that presumably a path through would create a series of left, right, straight,
turn choices. For that matter, it is unclear how Wittgenstein's house does create a logical circuit
with its multiple entries and exits to and from rooms, leaving the choices often clearly more than
bi-polar.
The importance of the breakdown of the logical circuit, the most intriguing part of
Amendolagine's article, is that it allows for the transformation of the house into the machine that
Wittgenstein envisaged in his later work, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, which
Amendolagine quotes: (chk)
"The machine (its structure) as symbolizing its action: the action of a machine - I might say at
first - seems to be there in it from the start. What does that mean? We talk as if these parts
could only move in this way, as if they could do nothing else. How is this - do we forget the
possibility of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on?" 16
The move from the perfected logic of the plan to the fallible machine of use highlights
Amendolagine's central understanding and interest in this phase of Wittgenstein's work. As a
mathematician, Amendolagine's concern was with how the house functions as a stage of
Wittgenstein's work in the foundations of mathematics. Amendolagine's belief is that working on
the house restimulated Wittgenstein's interest in the foundations of mathematics - an interest that
had first led Wittgenstein into philosophy, and which Amendolagine sees as playing that role
again.
While Amendolagine allows for Wittgenstein's interest in machines to arise from within his work
on mathematics, Wijdeveld discusses the incorporation of actual mechanical elements by
Wittgenstein into the architecture. He includes in this category not just the actual mechanical
devices, but also the construction of the metal doors and windows and their locks and handles
along with the elevator, and the heating system. He then ties these architectural elements to the
16 Ludwig Wittgenstein. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. ed. G.H. von Wright, Rush Rhees, and G.E.M.
Anscombe. trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. (Oxford, 1956 first edition, 1978 third edition), p. 84, N9122.
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Tractatus where he finds the view of the machine as the efficiently functioning mechanical system
serving also as the paradigm of the philosophical explanation of the world, including the good
and the beautiful. (Which he directly correlates to the ethical and aesthetic) That is, for
Wijdeveld the machine acts as the criterion of rightness and beauty, and the philosophy becomes
a logical demonstration of that. For example, the door and window frames for which
Wittgenstein designed all the fastenings, latches and locks are for Wijdeveld mechanical
interpretations of simplicity or clarification, paralleling the precision and goals of Wittgenstein's
philosophy. Wijdeveld also emphasized the importance of Wittgenstein's training as a mechanical
engineer as having influence on his interest in machines, the design of the house, and the idea of
the machine he finds in the Tractatus, concluding with the idea that Wittgenstein's ethical-
aesthetic association in the Tractatus ties together the activities of the engineer, the designer and
the artist.(check 17 - 26) Thus while Amendolagine points to the imperfect machine of the
post-house period, Wijdeveld ties the actual machines of the house to their ideals in the Tractatus.
Despite the importance that Amendolagine places on the house for Wittgenstein's philosophy, he
curiously defuses the focus on architecture, relegating it to logic and mathematics on the one
hand and the confrontation with everyday facts on the other. Amendolagine, for example, points
to Wittgenstein's entry into the 'everyday', but he does not differentiate the confrontation with the
architecture 'everyday' from the other 'everydays' that Wittgenstein had made during his
departure from philosophy. By that way of thinking, it remains indistinguishable from a
soldiering, teaching, and even gardening everyday.17 The question that needs to be asked by
Amendolagine is instead how does the architecture "everyday" differ from these others. To truly
examine the impact of working on the house, a shift in focus must be made from the general
understanding or 'everyday' facts to Wittgenstein's actual practice of architecture as manifested in
the design and construction of the house for his sister.
17 They too, particularly the teaching make regular appearances in the Investigations Stanley Cavell for example in
his "The Argument of the Ordinary Scenes of Instruction in Wittgenstein and in Kripke" in his Conditions Handsome
and Unhandsome, implicitly refers to the practice of teaching primary school in the Investigations.
133
Wittgenstein clearly had an interest in the everyday before it became part of - or more to the
point - the fundamental basis for his later understanding of language. His leaving philosophy for
various "unpretentious vocations" (would architecture be included?) was part of this. The
question is: how was Wittgenstein able to incorporate that thinking into philosophy, or how did it
came to incorporate itself? That shift of focus requires more than just the involvement with
everyday facts but the mechanisms which caused Wittgenstein to reconsider the functioning and
basis of language as not some logical essence, but an everyday functioning..
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The Stonborough house
The Stonborough house appears on the exterior as an unadorned, white, asymmetric cubic
building with a main central block and a largely regular grid of vertical windows. Because of
these basic characteristics, the exterior is repeatedly compared to the architecture of Adolf Loos
while the interior is what Leitner calls unique and Wijdeveld writes the "house appears to be at
first- an unattributable example of early modern architecture -but looked at more closely, "the
design and the many peculiar details of its construction are so unique within the context of early
twentieth century architecture
The house contains on the ground floor a salon, a library/informal living room, a dining room,
breakfast room, Margarethe Stonborough's private rooms and the central hall around which
many of the rooms are situated. The upper floors also contain her husband's rooms, the
children's rooms, guest rooms, rooms for a governess, secretary and dress maker, servants rooms,
and bathrooms. In the basement was the kitchen, an additional servant's room and another
bath. The house thus in size and program was to be traditionally aristocratic - although the
architecture of the house was always meant to be modern in accordance with Margarethe's
thinking.18
Materials act in the house as a fundamental transmitter of meaning, largely of place and
difference. To begin, surfaces are emphasized due to the absolute simplicity of the architecture
and materials used: the exterior walls are finished with fine grained plaster, the interior walls are
18Neither Wittgenstein nor Engelmann had professional experience in building and so relied on Jacques Groag
(engineer) who had also worked in Loos' office to design the structure of the Stonborough house in accordance
with some of the more technologically advanced building techniques of the time. The structure of the house divides
between inner and outer with the outer walls structural and load bearing, composed of stuccoed brick and the
interior structured with a framework of concrete supports, some of which are reinforced. The inner walls are
prefabricated and non-load bearing. The floors are formed of concrete ribs and crossbeams that rest on either
interior concrete columns or the outer load bearing walls. (see Wijdeveld for a fuller discussion.)
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off white plaster, ceilings are white or off white, most of the ground floor is made of xylolite - a
gray/black artificial stone flooring, floors on upper levels are parquet and the kitchen and
bathrooms are tile. . The doors on the ground floor and all the windows were made of glass
and steel and were designed during the building period. The salon doors are plain metal and
doors on the upper floors are wood.
Definitive building plans of the Stonborough house date from the official purchase of the site on
22 October 1926. The building plans were approved a few weeks later on the thirteenth of
November. The Kundmanngasse site where the house was built was however not the original
one. The original site was similarly park like, although located instead near Wittgenstein's
parental home on the Alleegasse in a more aristocratic and residential district of Vienna, which
would have been a far more traditional choice for the type and scale of house Margarethe
planned to build. The new site was found and purchased by Margarethe when the designs were
nearly complete, but as all phases of Engelmann's sketches had placed the building in the
northern section of the site which worked ideally for the new site, the design, despite the change
in site, was not altered.
Margarethe's choice of the Kundmanngasse property was very unconventional. The 32,000
square foot site occupied the larger section of a city block in the third municipal district of
Vienna. Formerly it had been an horticultural nursery and had only recently been rezoned for
residential use, and the unbuilt section was to remain densely covered with trees, as a form of
garden or park. The site originally sloped downward along the street, leaving the northern end
of the site, where the house was to be situated, at the lowest point. The decision was made to
greatly alter the site by building a retaining wall that allowed for the northern end to be raised
above the street, making it level with the highest section of the site and situating the house a full
story above the street. The wall thus created an enclosed plinth upon which the house was
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placed. This, coupled with the grove of trees at the southern end, effectively isolated the house
from the city beyond.
The entrance to the site was originally along the Kundmanngasse, where the entry drive began at
the rear of the house and curved through the park/garden, behind the house, to the main
entrance located on the opposite, Parkgasse side. The entrance was thus an inversion of the
traditional, moving from the rear of the house, around to the front. This reversal, while a
response to the elevation of the northern end, furthers the sense that the house is more a part of
its site than of the street. In 1971, however, that all changed. The house and property were sold
by Margarethe's son and heir, Thomas Stonborough to a real estate developer who wanted to
build an office tower on the site. Bernhard Leitner, in opposition to the house's immanent
destruction organized a protest that included architects, art historians and philosophers from
around the world. The protest succeeded in having the house declared a protected monument 19
just prior to its scheduled destruction. Although the house was saved, the remaining section of
the site was allowed to be sold to the developer which forced the demolition of the drive and the
relocation of the main entrance of the site to the Parkgasse side.
That Stonborough house was conceived of beginning in November 1925. At that time
Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein first mentioned the idea of building a large city house in
Vienna for which she engaged the architect Paul Engelmann (1891-1965), a family friend and a
student of Adolf Loos. Her brother had been introduced to Engelmann through Loos ten years
prior during the war, when Wittgenstein was sent for officer training to Olmutz, Engelmann's
19 From 1973-5 the building, although saved from destruction was without funds and fell into decay until in 1975
the Bulgarian Embassy purchased the building to house its Cultural Institute which still occupies the house. During
the period from 1976-7 the Kundmanngasse was poorly renovated by local architects. At the same time a group of
students made an extensive survey of the house and were able to record much important data, although some had
already been destroyed. Wijdeveld's book in a more extensive account includes this updated information.
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family home. Engelmann ultimately became a friend of both Wittgenstein and his family, and
acted previously as the architect for the interiors of their brother Paul's apartment in Berlin.
In April and May of 1926 Engelmann, in what Hermine described as "close cooperation" with
Margarethe,20 drew a series of sketches of possible designs for the house. The sketches focused
on the massing of the building as well as the basic layout of the rooms on the ground floor. It is
unclear what the extent of Wittgenstein's influence was in the early phases of the design. As
Hermine's recollections suggest, he would have at least commented on the various phases of the
sketches during that period 21. It is clear, however, that despite her much stronger role in the
design with Engelmann, Margarethe gave her brother, once he became involved, "a free hand in
all matters concerning the house." As Hermine recounts, Wittgenstein's comments on these
sketches formed the beginning of his gradual involvement in the project.
At this point Ludwig joined them, showed in his usual intense way great interest in the plans and
models, began to alter them, and became more and more absorbed in the matter until he finally
took it over completely. Engelmann had to give way to the much stronger personality, and the
house was then built, down to these smallest detail, according to Ludwig's plans and under his
supervision. (20)
Engelmann's final sketches, dated 18 May 1926 form the starting point of Wittgenstein's
revisions.22 Wittgenstein waited until the fall of 1926, however, to leave his job as gardener and
devote himself to the full time role of architect, officially becoming co-architect in September
192 6 as evidenced by the inclusion of his name along with Engelmann's on the drawings. Later
Engelmann's name disappeared from the completed plans . As usual, Wittgenstein's life and
work were inseparable, so that Wittgenstein, once part of the project, became completely
20 Engelmann later presented these sketches to Margarethe in Christmas 1926 in the form of a book. The
sketchbook is currently in the Reserve Collections of the Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities in
Santa Monica, California.
21 Wijdeveld suggests the possibility that Wittgenstein's ideas may be reflected by the lack or limited amount of
adornment from phase three of the sketches on, or by the verticality of the windows from phase six on, both aspects
of which were realized in the house.
22 Wittgenstein officially became co-architect in September 1926- as evidenced by the inclusion of his name his
name along with Engelmann's on the drawings. Later Engelmann's name disappeared from the plans.
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absorbed in it, going so far as to move onto the site and live in the small house which existed
there and served as the architecture office for the project. As Wittgenstein entered into and took
over the design process, the collaboration with Engelmann completely fell apart. During the
period of collaboration, according to Engelmann, Wittgenstein pushed his own plans through in
such an "uncompromising manner" that Engelmann felt he no longer played a role in the design.
In February 1928, Engelmann went to his hometown of Olomouc and did not return until after
the Stonborough house was completed. It was following that time, that the interior of the house
was designed and built, a task wholly appropriated by Wittgenstein. Later on Engelmann wrote
regarding the dissolution of the collaboration that: 'This solution proved to be a very happy one,
for him [Wittgenstein] as well as for the building. From that moment he was the actual architect,
not I, and though the plans were ready when he joined the undertaking, I regard the result as his
achievement, not mine."
Wijdeveld, in his book Ludwig Wittgenstein, Architect, analyzes the sketchbook Engelmann
presented to Margarethe in December 1926, dividing the sketches into ten distinct phases. They
range from a traditional and classical version of an aristocratic house with which Engelmann
began to a range of possibilities that included a curving main facade at one phase and a forty
five degree angle cutting through the center of the plan at another.
As the sketches progressed, Engelmann's design became more asymmetrical and simplified. Even
in the later phases however, Engelmann continued to suggest ideas ultimately rejected for the
final design, including planning the building based on a modular grid which he attempted to
meld with the building's massing. The last phases began to suggest the final cubic composition,
defined by a tall central block with two main wings and several smaller asymmetrically placed
volumes with the final design phase in the sketchbook as the closest to what was eventually built.
139
The beginning of the basic layout of the built design of the ground floor first appeared in
Engelmann's sketches about half way through, although the massing of the volumes remained
still largely symmetric and lacked the clarity of the final design. Following that phase, the first
design with a dominant central block akin to the final design emerged. This initial version was
much grander and more 'ornamental' than what Wittgenstein built. It included an additional
story and an attic as well as a continuous balustrade along the entire roof line.
Engelmann's also made sketches for the central entry hall that were similar in proportion to what
was built. As developed in subsequent phases, his version of the main hall had many of the
general ideas of the built one but with very different materials, details, finishes, and proportions.
For example, although Engelmann did show large glass doors leading from the hall to the
terrace, and a ceiling with visible beams, the proportions were different and the
columns/pilasters had ornate capitals. Wittgenstein instead left the columns devoid of ornament
and simply recessed the capitals while keeping the beams exposed and changed the details and
design of the glass doors.
Wittgenstein's altered the final plans with which Engelmann was involved in four main ways : 1.
He enlarged the building by adding a continuous horizontal block with an angled skylit roof
running along the entire rear of the building at the level of the basement and ground floors.
Both the angled roof with continuous skylight and the window organization make this section of
the building noticeably different from the rest of the house. This addition allowed Wittgenstein
to situate all of Margarethe's private rooms on the ground floor as she had wanted, but that
Engelmann had not provided. Wittgenstein's extension included Margarethe's private rooms -
salon, dressing room, bathroom, and a servant's room with a private corridor connecting them
and provided a second corridor apart from the main path through the house that linked her
rooms as a separate apartment. Additionally, this allowed for Wittgenstein's larger reorganization
of the ground floor, whereby he interchanged the library and Margarethe's private living room,
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placing the library at the front of the house. This move achieved two things - first it allowed for
the grouping of all of Margarethe's private rooms together on the ground floor, and secondly it
collected and separated the more private from the more public spaces with Margarethe's private
living room as the connecting element.
2. Wittgenstein removed the mock attic story, the balustrades and ornament that had been part
of Engelmann's design. 3. Wittgenstein, in various ways, reproportioned or relocated elements
from Engelmann's collaboration or designs. He revised the proportions of the entire building and
of individual rooms, elevated the breakfast room on the ground floor to provide the height
necessary for a cloakroom below, and omitted, reproportioned and redesigned window and
interior openings throughout the building. These changes tended to elaborate the asymmetry of
Engelmann's design by, for example, moving the main entrance off center of the central block
and adding a lower entrance portal projecting slightly from the south east facade of the house.
Wittgenstein also extended the steps leading to the south terrace along the terrace's entire width
in contrast to the small perpendicularly oriented flight of stairs descending from the north
terrace.
4. Finally, Wittgenstein designed all elements on the interior, including choosing all materials and
finishes, details, mechanical, plumbing and electrical systems, and designing elements such as the
stair/elevator combination with its concrete frame, glass elevator cage and glass enclosure of the
elevator mechanism that allows the elevator mechanism to be seen even as the stair wraps
around it.
Engelmann himself commented on how the house had changed after his departure from what
he had envisioned. In a letter he wrote in response to photographs of the house that Hermine
had sent to him after the house's completion Engelmann wrote :
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The pictures of the rooms in the Kundmanngasse pleased me extraordinarily and I thank you very
much for that. As pictures they are truly exceptionally beautiful. That is your achievement. In
addition, one can also see the achievement of your sister and your brother. So, even though I
have no share at all in these pictures, I am satisfied with the thought that I had something to do
with the origin of such beautiful things, regrettably more in a negative than in a positive way: at
that time I wanted something different, something of myself. Now that the work of your brother
can be seen in them in its final form, it is clear how much this something of myself would have
paled in comparison to this accomplishment, which is better, and which at that time I barely
understood. Unfortunately one only becomes wise after the event and therefore I then acted
rather as a hindrance than a help. Anyway, I was there, if that can be said to be an achievement.
Because the design of the Stonborough house includes two main people - Engelmann and
Wittgenstein, the question of attribution arises. This is also where the question of how to relate
Wittgenstein's philosophy and architecture takes center stage - for to enter into that question it
seems necessary to carefully delineate Engelmann's contribution from Wittgenstein's and thus
indicate to what extent, and in what elements, the philosophy may be located. This act defines
the limits of Wittgenstein's architecture by insuring the object in question. Declaring the house, or
aspects of the house, to be solely or largely Wittgenstein's allows for it to be in some necessary
association with his philosophy.
This is also the place where the question of the point at which Engelmann's contribution stopped
and Wittgenstein's began becomes of interest not because of possible answers, but because of the
question itself. While the clarity of the separation between Engelmann's and Wittgenstein's
respective contributions might be important for certain readings of the architecture-philosophy
relation, Wittgenstein's architectural practice cannot be simply equated with the house. Instead, it
is possible to see Wittgenstein's architecture - philosophy relation not solely to revolve about the
'object' in question. My contention is that Wittgenstein's architecture needs to be situated not
simply within the object produced (the house), but within the practice of architecture - a place
where the exact limits of Wittgenstein's contribution or the espoused architectural value of the
house (another question requiring legitimation of the object as worthy of study) are neither
central nor foundational. Understanding the house to be a series of concepts and problems
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situated within a practice suggests the need to look at Wittgenstein's engagement or
confrontation with the practice of architecture as a way of looking at "the house." Furthermore
the shift to practice - or from product - allows the Stonborough house not to be seen solely as
Wittgenstein's (the philosopher's) contribution to architecture, but rather as representative of
architecture's (i.e. the practice of) contribution to (his practice) of philosophy. Wittgenstein's
architecture is thus not coincident with the house he designed, but must be understood within his
engagement with the practice of architecture, as it is through architecture that Wittgenstein found
a way to overcome the idealized solipsism of the Tractatus so as to reintegrate both the subject
and the practice of philosophy with the wider culture.
Practice is a key concept that Wittgenstein develops in his later philosophy. While Amendolagine
recognized the possibility and importance that working on the house affected Wittgenstein's
philosophy - he did not look to the philosophy itself for signs of architecture - but only for signs of
change. Wittgenstein's practice of architecture, however, acted as far more than a catalyst, a
confrontation with the everyday, or as a repository of aesthetic thinking. The house instead
makes manifest what had been implied in, but missing from the early philosophy. The Tractatus'
discussion of boundaries, it's flattened and restricted visual space, its defining of the limits of the
ethical and aesthetic from without, and its emphasis on showing, all exhibit and describe a
severely restricted and idealized use and understanding of space. Exactly because of that, the
practice of architecture was in a position to fundamentally change the way in which architecture
inhabits Wittgenstein's philosophical work. That is, to change the definition and understanding of
space in the text itself. This is apparent in the development from the pre-house Tractatus to the
post house Philosophical Investigation. Also, Wittgenstein's confrontation with the 'everyday' in
architecture can be seen as a confrontation with the literal, as the literal spatial and visual, limits,
borders, structure, etc., are all re-evaluated in the later work in intimate association with their
philosophical counterparts.
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The point of view of practice allows the house to be conceived less as a product of the Tractatus,
by allowing for the possibility that the Investigations is in part a product of Wittgenstein's practice
of architecture. The practice of architecture is not limited to a series of operations to produce an
object, but, rather is a productive and informative practice in its specifics. As with Wittgenstein's
jettisoning the search for an essence of language by considering the multiplicity of practices that
are involved in language, understanding the Stonborough house as the compilation and
interpenetration of a series of practices allows architecture to not be synonymous with its objects.
As such, the Stonborough house is no longer an object in comparison to philosophy, but a process
that, as with the philosophy of the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations, is concerned
with a series of topics - such as boundaries, limits, visuality, spatiality, inner-outer, relationships,
rule following, meaning, representation and so on. This view neither forces Wittgenstein's work
to be viewed as a continuum, nor as a series of shifts and phases, but one that takes continuity
and disjunctions equally. Not coincidentally, this shift in method and practice is also a way of
understanding the move from the Tractatus to the Investigations, from the applied method of
logical analysis in the Tractatus to the investigation and description of the multitude of practices
that comprise language in the Philosophical Investigations.
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The practice of architecture
The Stonborough house is often associated with its austere exterior image of asymmetrically
grouped cubic white blocks with regular vertical windows. This is the image of the house that
has been most taken to parallel the seemingly similar austerity and precision of the writing of the
Tractatus. Both of these are what I define as the view from without. I want to contrast that
image with one from the interior, with the view from within, the scene of inhabitation.
Upon entering the house, one moves through the front glass doors into the small vestibule, with
its light walls and dark floor, through the next set of glass doors, up the dark stone stairs and into
the central hall. To the left, a glass wall and doors let light into the hall and lead out to the
terrace. To the right, are a pair of metal doors leading to the salon. Straight ahead is a wall with
two pairs of translucent glass doors off to either side, with those on the left leading to the dining
room and those on the right to a hallway, staircase, and the owners private rooms. Turning
around one hundred eighty degrees to face the front doors reveals three sets of glass doors : the
central doors leading to the entry vestibule, the pair of doors to the salon side, leading to the
library, and to the other side, raised up two steps, the doors leading to the breakfast room. The
dark stairs recessed into the center of this space are framed at their end by two white columns
The central hall thus presents itself, defined by this series of seven paired glass and steel doors on
six different surfaces, set into both solid wall and glass plane, and leading into the house from
the main entry, out to the south-west terrace, the dining room, breakfast room, library and to the
staircase and upper floors beyond. The doors are tall and structured by thin metal frames with
one vertical division in each glass panel and no horizontal divisions. The one exception to this is
the pair of doors connecting vestibule and hall in which the glass is not sub-divided, but allows
for a clear view of the main entry beyond. As counterpoint the hall also displays the plain metal,
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bi-paneled doors leading to the salon. The hall thus remains poised between the simplicity and
austerity of the exterior and the almost mazelike series of reflections formed by these paired
glass doors erupting from three sides and defining the movement through the hall as that
between the practices of vision and of space. There in the central hall of the house, the visitor is
presented with a scene of quiet conflict where the idealized pictorial view presented in the
Tractatus fully encounters the spatial practices of architecture.
At the moment of arrival into the house, the austerity, monumentality and isolation of the house
gives way to almost a maze of these like designed, paired glass and steel doors, each reflecting
and reiterating the others. It is the repetition of this image that forms the focus of the house,
both inside and on the exterior. Repetition is not, however, the sole activity here. a More
precisely, the image is not exactly repeated, but exhibits coincident subtle shifts of detail each
time it is relocated.
In 9112 2 Wittgenstein presents the challenge to clarity posed by the view from within.
A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of
our words. - Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation
produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. hence the importance of
finding and inventing intermediate cases.
The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks
the form of account we give the way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?)
Wittgenstein's is an architecture that comes into being as connections - visual, physical, spatial and
epistemological. The doors visible from the entry hall, in their varying locations and degrees of
illumination, are a prime example of this. The doors also differ in size, with even doors in close
proximity exhibiting subtle changes. For example, the flanking sets of doors on either side of the
stairs and leading to the living room/library on one side, breakfast room on the other at
differing elevations and of different heights. The door handles are at varying heights according
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to door type: glass door handles are at 5 feet 3 inches, marking the intersection of their
diagonals, and placing them near eye level. The salon door handles are a little lower at 4 feet 8
1/2 inches, and the handles on the glass entrance doors are still lower at 4 feet 1 inch. There is
also a difference of size between the door handles on the ground and those on the upper floors.
The continual transformation or mutation of the glass doors produces what will be a major
theme of the Investigations the repeated locating and relocating of an element as a way of
understanding a word or practice. By examining it in a multitude of positions and in a variety of
places Wittgenstein also focuses on the act of "seeing connections" and in the "finding and
inventing of intermediate cases". This creates the situation that later plays a defining role in the
Investigations whereby a thing approached from one direction appears quite different when
approached from another. "Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and
know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your
way about." (9203)
The central hall, thus, when considered outside of the Tractatus' frame, cannot be simply
understood in terms of the stasis often attributed to it. Instead, it multiplies effects and situations,
and in so doing defines and works out philosophical issues. As they multiply in the space of the
hall their clarity and 'transparency' is destroyed both literally and metaphorically. The compiling
of transparent and translucent glass forms the basis of a discussion of transparency and
correspondence. The doors and windows of the house both encode what lies on either side of
them and in their repetition act out variations on a theme played out in multiple situations.
Similarly, in the move from the Tractatus to the Investigations the singularity of view is destroyed.
There is no longer one view, but a series. The repetition of an element or relationship in varying
contexts works to shift the focus from specific views to the connections between them. The
central hall acts to allow Wittgenstein to create a series of intermediary connections and cases as
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later called for in the Investigations as the necessary activity by which philosophy may achieve a
clear view.
The doors themselves are an intricate construction, creating a complex boundary between spaces.
Because of the climate, double exterior windows were a necessary and common practice in
Austria. But, Wittgenstein extended this idea to the interior. With the exception of the doors to
the breakfast room, and those connecting vestibule and hall, all of the glass and steel doors in the
interior are bi-paneled, double doors that always open out into the rooms in both directions. On
the exterior where these double glass and steel doors occur, the two sides contain the same
transparent glass, but in the interior, that is not always the case. While the mediation between
interior and exterior is equalized and conventionalized so as to present the same image on either
side, the complexity of spatial relations on the interior destroys any singularity of approach. The
series of glass doors in the central hall, instead, define a range of possibilities. While the doors
connecting the living room and hall repeat the exterior condition of clear glass on both sides,
those between dining room and central hall and staircase and central hall differentiate between
the two sides. Each of these paired doors are clear glass on the hall-side and translucent glass on
the other, thus allowing for varying degrees of separation and privacy provided by both the visual
coding and the restriction of vision depending on which panels are open and which closed.
In each of the instances in the hall where two different materials or degrees of transparency are
brought together, the less transparent material is placed on the more private side of the doors
and the more transparent on the more public side. But, what seems to be a simple declarative
principle, confronts in spatial practices a complex series of relationships to yield at times curious
reversals of association. Examples of this occur in the dining room and in the salon. In the
dining room the doors to the hall are aligned on a wall with three similar sets of paired glass and
steel doors that lead directly outside to the south-west terrace. This situation creates a dilemma
as to whether the dining-room to hall doors should exactly match the other three sets along the
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same wall, as they do in size and detail, or whether they should also mark what is on their other
side. To which room and which wall do the doors belong? What boundaries do they define?
Wittgenstein's decision to place translucent glass on the dining room side and clear glass on the
hall side clearly distinguishes the two spaces even as it connects them. It also highlights the
complex nature of the boundary, allowing it to present different faces as it is approached from
opposite sides.
WOOHN2itTE-AI HALL& SAAL. TERRASSIL
A similar situation occurs with the double doors leading from the salon to Margarethe
Stonborough's private living room. The twist here is that all of the interior doors leading to the
salon are plain metal so that these doors combine not two types of glass to create the
transparent/translucent pairing, but glass and metal to form a transparent/opaque combination.
This connection illustrates further the kind of boundary clashes Wittgenstein was faced with in
the design of the house. Similarly, as with the dining room - hall connection, the doors in
question occur along a plane that also contains exterior doors to a terrace. While the sets of
paired doors leading out to the terrace are of clear glass, the interior doors connecting hall and
salon and salon and the library/family living room are plain metal doors. The metal is important
here in that the salon is the only room in the house to possess such doors. They exist in sharp
contrast both in material and the resulting differences in opacity to the glass doors of the central
hall and throughout the public rooms and entries at the ground floor. As such, metal comes to
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be identified solely with the salon. The connection between salon and private living room thus
had to navigate a series of three conflicting rules: the continuation of the glass doors along the
exterior wall, the placing of the more opaque material on the more private side, and the rule
that all interior doors to the salon and only to the salon, are plain metal. All of these could not
be satisfied at once. Instead Wittgenstein opted to place metal on the salon side and clear glass
on the private living room side. This allowed the metal doors to remain solely associated with the
salon but it disrupted the series of glass doors along the same wall and left the private living
space designated by the more transparent material.
My point in this discussion of this series of boundary rules and their accompanying and almost
endless list of exceptions is that what started with an apparent singular and repeated image gives
way to a multitude of possibilities arising from the specifics of site and the demands of use.
What began as an attempt for absolute clarity and differentiation ultimately yielded a series of
functioning ambiguities.
The paired doors in the central hall function in several other ways to break down the absolute
correlation of place, element and meaning. That is, to break down the fundamental relation of
correspondence as constructed by the Tractatus. The conflicting reflections by each pair of doors
in the other creates a visual - spatial collapse. When looked at directly, the two layers composing
a pair of the double doors coincide so that the front metal frame completely obscures the frame
beyond. Moving off to one side disrupts the singular image to reveal a double image emerging as
a spatial dislocation. The importance of this - and of related circumstances that rely on the visual
alignment of architectural elements in space, is their ability to reveal their dependence on a fixed
observer. Movement through space destroys that singular, fixed image and reveals it as an
idealized condition that gives way to the vicissitudes of movement and space. This is an
important effect of the design of the central hall as in the Investigations, Wittgenstein distinctly
associates movement through space with everyday language and in contrast to the fixity that
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results from the Tractatus'collapse of language and logic, realized most succinctly in the contrast
between the immobility of the ice and the desire to walk.
107. The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between
it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of
investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable the requirement is now in
danger of becoming empty. - We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a
certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We
want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!
Similar spatial issues occur with the location and alignment of the floor joints, location of window
and door openings on inside and out, problems of localized symmetry within the asymmetric
plan, as well as issues of proportions, lighting, materials, the various mechanical systems, and so
on. Unlike what Wittgenstein said about philosophical problems in the Tractatus, these problems
do not dissolve through analysis but arise from it.
Design and construction issues with which Wittgenstein was confronted also arose in the
navigation from a two dimensional set of drawings to the three dimensional house. That
translation did not always go smoothly for Wittgenstein as various anecdotes reveal. After the
initial construction, Wittgenstein remained dissatisfied with several aspects of the design which he
proceeded to alter. These changes most infamously include his raising of the ceiling of the salon
by about three inches. (A move that sounds slightly more outrageous and trivial than it really is.
While three inches may seem like an insignificant amount in relation to the entire height of the
wall it is substantially more critical in relation to the datum line created by the top of the doors
displaced around the room leaving only about two feet to the ceiling.) At the end of the
construction process, when Wittgenstein was finally forced to complete the work, he still
remained dissatisfied with three windows on the rear facade along the staircase. This situation
created the one time Wittgenstein bemoaned having relinquished his share in the family wealth
which would have allowed him to pay for the cost of further reconstruction, leaving him later
confessing to purchasing a lottery ticket with the hope of winning the money to cover the costs
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It is not that these are such profound or unusual activities or issues arising from the design and
construction processes, but exactly that they are typical of the experience of design that
Wittgenstein encountered. It is this set of problems, introduced to Wittgenstein in the practice of
architecture, which in spatializing his understanding of limits, boundaries, relations, practice, and
correspondence, literally defined a place from which Wittgenstein could reconsider the limits and
functioning of language and philosophy. The movement through space and the disposition of use
that fostered the reconsideration of limits, boundaries, the relation of the visual and the spatial,
complex associations and identities, and so on, reveals how spatial concepts cannot be discarded
to leave the philosophical problems intact. This understanding lends itself towards the creation
of a practice based aesthetics by showing that spatial problems share territory with traditional
philosophical problems in logic and epistemology. It is in the reworking of that shared territory
that Wittgenstein came to describe the reconceived ways in which he understood language.
Importantly, spatial issues and problems in providing examples of the functioning language in the
Investigations are offered there as an inseparable part of the language itself, in exactly the same
way that all meanings of a word, or examples of a practice, contribute to our understanding of
the word or concept. As Wittgenstein tells us when he offers these examples, often without
further explanation, he does not offer less than he knows himself. He is thus offering the spatial
examples as one of the ways in which he knows language to function. Wittgenstein, through
these discussions and examples is revealing, not just what he himself knows, but the ways in
which he came to understand a given series of concepts. The linguistic and the spatial are
inseparable, although, importantly, they are not identical.
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Both inspection of the house and endless stories about it reveal an emphasis on the precision of
the design and construction of the doors and windows, their fittings, latches and locks, the
radiators, metal curtains, and mechanical systems of the Stonborough house. Repeatedly they are
referred to as having been designed as if they were precision instruments. They form much of
the visual focus of the house as any photograph or experience, particularly of the entry hall and
rooms on the ground floor, will show. The glass doors for example, had metal curtains that
could be raised from within the floor just below the inner pair of doors. The glass doors and
windows were difficult to construct and required a great deal of communication between
Wittgenstein and the fabricators because of the extreme rigidity needed to prevent the narrow
and tall glass panes from breaking, the largest of which measures 10 7/8 inches by 9 feet 10
inches. As Hermine wrote in her family recollections:
Ludwig designed every window, door, window-bar and radiator in the noblest proportions and
with such exactitude that they might have been precision instruments. Then he forged ahead with
his uncompromising energy, so that everything was exactly manufactured with the same exactness.
I can still hear the locksmith, who asked him with regard to a keyhole, Tell me, Herr Ingenieur, is
a millimetre here really that important for you?' and even before he had finished the sentence,
the loud, energetic 'Ja', that almost startled him."23
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23 Op. cit., p. 20.
But, as much as the idea of precision can be readily associated with the exacting demands of
logic as in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein's experience with these elements in the practice of
architecture can be as strongly affiliated with his critique of the over-exacting demands for
precision in the Tractatus. For example, the Investigations frequently questions the Tractatus'
requirements by offering examples of physical and spatial measurements. The same may be said
for his comments on proportion in his 1938 lecture on aesthetics that used the example of
finding the right dimension for doors and windows. In the Investigations Wittgenstein writes:
"Am I inexact when I do not give our distance from the sun to the nearest foot, or tell a joiner
the width of a table to the nearest thousandth of an inch?". (9188) The inter-related concepts of
exactness, precision and measurement that Wittgenstein discusses in the Investigations serves to
recall his own battle with the exactness of dimension and precision of construction he
encountered in the design and construction of his sister's house.
Symmetry/asymmetry - (further acts of location and relocation)
The central hall is not, however, the only 'center' of the house. The salon, located between the
entry hall, the library, the western terrace and Margarethe Stonborough-Wittgenstein's private
rooms, acts as a competing 'center', distributor of space and datum of meaning. As much as
variations of glass and light define the hall and movement through it, the datum material of the
salon is metal to which the glass is sharply contrasted, forming an interior/exterior distinction
except at the crucial juncture of the public/private relation with the entry doors to Margarethe'
private rooms.
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Both the central hall and the salon occupy complex positions as simultaneous
programmatic/conceptual centers and spatial centers within the ground floor plan and within
the house. The salon is the central room on the ground floor paralleling the importance and
functioning of the central hall. Each is integrally connected on all sides, so as to organize the
spaces around them. Each one also acts as an interior connection leading on all sides to other
rooms including the outdoor rooms of the terraces. From the central hall, the salon clearly
distinguishes itself with the metal doors that connect the two spaces. Other spaces share to a
lesser extent some of these properties- with Margarethe's private living room also acting as a
connection between her private rooms, their internal corridor, the salon and the terrace. Her
private living room, however, is already once removed from the centrality or publicness of the
hall. On the upper floors any central space or sense of connection is severely limited to the literal
hall running down the center of the building and leading to the stair-elevator at one end to the
main room at the other with a series of private rooms and storage spaces along both sides.
In the massing of the building with its main central block, two not quite symmetric wings and
their similar, but rotated terraces on either side, one facing forward, the other one to the side, the
house involves a continual series of shifts from the asymmetry of the overall plan to the localized
symmetry of many of the spaces, rooms and elevations. This condition occurs in the massing of
the building, in the elevations ( both interior and exterior) and in the plans. In addition, these
shifts define the fundamental condition of moving through the house. The oscillation between
these two spatial principles takes form as a series of asymmetrical moves and reciprocal shifts to
create or restore local symmetries that commence at the point of entry. The conflict between the
overall asymmetry of the house and the localized symmetries that he desired, caused Wittgenstein
to make a series of adjustments to create symmetric rooms. In the library, for example,
Wittgenstein created a structurally unnecessary column along the same wall as a structural one in
order to create a symmetric wall.
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The series of shifts and moves thus begins from the outside with the creation of a projecting entry
block that disrupts the symmetry of the front elevation, leaving the door/entry off center from
that of the windows above, and disrupting the symmetry and regularity of the left bay and the
front facade. Additionally, while the door defines the center of the front hall, it occupies from
the exterior the left bay of the central block. The projecting entry block thus creates a situation
of asymmetry while the door centered within it restores a local symmetry to the entrance that
resonates through the house as it aligns with the interior central axis. The shift to the left of the
entry thus simultaneously aligns the front door with the center of the interior while removing it
from both the center of the front facade and the regularity of its grid of windows on that facade.
The result is to disengage or dislocate the exterior line of center from the interior, about the point
of entry.
Another example of this constant recentering lies in the markings and orientation in the flooring.
The floor material found throughout the ground floor was a poured artificial stone that allowed
for subdivisions in nearly unlimited ways. The joints in the flooring are so as to at times suggest a
ground plane that spreads out beyond the dividing walls, while at other times to be clearly
demarcating individual rooms. Where it suggests a continual ground plane, however, as when
the grid is not coincident with or contained by the walls, as, for example, in the library, that view
is deceptive. The floor grids rather are always room or area specific, employed to produce,
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extend or emphasize spatial relations. The grids created change both alignment, patterning, size
and shape from room to room in order to mark local centers of doors, or align with windows
and openings. At one extreme is the central hall which has the most unique and complex pattern
(marking some of the only visible structure in the house) and at the other is the first floor
hallway, which is entirely undelineated as if there were no associations to mark whatsoever.
Various design decisions - such as Wittgenstein would have been deeply involved with in the
rearranging of rooms on the ground floor and in the reproportioning of those rooms, windows
and exterior elevations, set up a pattern of establishing and re-establishing local symmetries and
alignments. Importantly, such localized associations and relations do not involve an overview as
would total symmetry. Rather, it is something encountered in glimpses, in rooms and in moving
through the house in contrast to an entirely symmetric plan that would not be as readily
experienced, but would exist largely on paper or in conceptual reconstructions that act as if the
entire house is seen from beyond and above. Beyond the specific aspects and resolutions of these
problems, these issues point to the problems Wittgenstein would have faced for the first time as
an architect. This situation curiously reappears in some of the discussions of Wittgenstein's work,
written as if the writers were themselves confronting architectural problems themselves for the
first time, and as a result see Wittgenstein's concerns with such issues as the aligning of the joints
in the floor with the center lines of doors and windows as particularly striking.
Interior/exterior
For someone designing a building for the first time the inner-outer relation exhibits a surprising
lack of coincidence, revealing a previously non-apparent series of dissociations that exposes the
inner-outer relation to be less transparent than it initially seems, not unlike the relation between a
word and meaning
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In a deceptively simple building such as the Stonborough house (particularly from its exterior)
the relation across a wall from interior to exterior, or between interior spaces, would seem to be
that of a direct correspondence, as they simply share the wall. But, that is not always the case, as
with, for example, the attempt to construct a symmetric, centered window in the breakfast room
on both interior and exterior elevations, here problems arise due to the thickness of the wall
disrupting the symmetry of adjoining spaces. In this instance, Wittgenstein had to slightly project
into the room part of the window wall on the interior to account for the perpendicular wall on
the exterior which had determined the original frame of reference and center of the window.
The protrusion in the wall served to create an equal length of wall on either side of the window
on the interior.
The mediation between interior and exterior, while clearly one of the main themes of the house
also exists in the philosophy. As Stanley Cavell wrote in The Claim of Reason it is also one of the
main themes of the Investigations: "I would have been glad to have suggested that the correct
relation between inner and outer, between the soul and its society, is the theme of the
Investigations as a whole."24 Two main aspects of Wittgenstein's house seem to relate to this -
the split he develops and encodes between the public areas of the house and the private ones,
and the idea of making connections: philosophical, spatial and visual in addition to the more
obvious interior/exterior of the building. It is on the interior of the house where most of the
emphasis exists as it is from there that these issues are most often defined and considered. The
explicit interior/exterior connection is perhaps better understood as a subset of a series of
interior connections.
24 Stanley Cavell. Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism and Tragedy. (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 1979), p.329.
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The house both in coding and zoning sets up a public/private discussion. Functional groupings in
the house define three zones on the ground floor The section with the line of pantry - dining -
breakfast-room with the kitchen below it, the central zone defines passage, containing entry,
central hall, stair/elevator combination and the connecting hallway, and the third area contains
the living areas including Margarethe's private rooms, the salon and the library/music room, with
the further distinction of the more private rooms placed in the back and accessed, not from the
central hall, but from the salon or internal hallway, and more public rooms, the library and salon
to the front.
The doors again become of importance here, acting as almost literal signs - of enter, don't enter,
open, closed, and defining an array of possible actions to be taken or options that Wittgenstein
offers. They draw attention as well as organize movement, hovering between the defining of
physical and visual space. The doors in the public rooms of the Stonborough house, however,
blur the strict dichotomy between open and closed. Although all glass doors may similarly be
seen to blur such distinctions, the Stonborough house defines a complete range from open to
closed all within the space of the central hall, while the salon lives at the extremes - solid metal
or clear glass only. The hall thus emphasizes the varying (visual) degrees between open and
closed, between visually accessible and separated, between being a continuation of visual space
and a disruption of it.
In contrast to the ground floor, the upper floors are of quite another character. The upper floor
plans seem to be determined largely by practical considerations with only the front room on the
first floor of 'aesthetic' note. Except for the area of circulation with the stair and the elevator, the
spaces on the upper floors act largely as closed or isolated spaces with limited connections
between them. In what seems to be a design problem of filling a largely predetermined volume,
large storage areas lining the hallway were created. The storage units, in taking up the space
between the hall and the private rooms, act as a sort of buffer zone between the two, a barrier of
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uninhabited, unactivated space. The hallway floor although of the same artificial stone flooring
as the ground floor, is undifferentiated with no joints to mark alignments, make connections, or
suggest direction. The floor material of the rooms on the upper floors are, by contrast, wood,
and the wooden doors of these rooms define a different language than that of the more public
rooms downstairs. As such, they signify another system, some other type of separation, suggesting
that, without the public component, there seems to be no 'space' and no discourse.
In the Investigations Wittgenstein considers the possibility of a so-called 'private language' as a
central component of his discussion of the relation between the interior of the individual and the
public, externality of language. Where as many of he examples of the Investigations involve what
is necessarily publicly accessible language, the private language argument considers the possibility
of a private language, one that theoretically is impossible to teach or convey to another person.
Wittgenstein, however, rejects, if not the possibility of the existence of such a language, at least
the possibility of discussing it. 25 Yet, the question, once asked, persists. In effect, this posits a new
unsayable, a new realm of silence, one unlike that of the Tractatus, in that it truly cannot be
located in language, even as a transgression of sense and is not definitive of the realm of the
showable.
25 See The Claim of Reason for an extensive discussion of this topic.
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Stonborough House, 1926-28.
Stonborough House, central hall.
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Stonborough House, central hall views towards terrace.
Stonborough House, central hall views across hallway.
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Stonborough House, central hallway, dining room doors with translucent glass.
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Stonborough House, door to pantry and stairs to basement.
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Visual space and the visual room
Wittgenstein gave, in the end, over two years of his time to the design and construction of the
house for his sister. In January 1929, immediately following the completion of the house, he
returned to Cambridge and to philosophy. In a letter he wrote at that time to Moritz Schlick, the
philosopher of the Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein spoke of his decision to remain in Cambridge "for
a few terms and work on visual space ( Gesichtsraum) and other things."26
Architecture had provided the starting point and final impetus for Wittgenstein's so-called "later
work", by providing and defining the site of his interests in visual space, it is not clear what visual
space is. While the architecture of the central hall provides some clues to this term with glass
serving as a pre-eminent material for the study of visual space, Wittgenstein's discussion of "the
visual room" in the Investigations offers some additional ones.
Wittgenstein's sections in the Investigations on the visual room reveal the space of architecture as
a space of philosophical concern. That space defines sites of philosophical problems, and in so
doing, continues the construction of a shared territory that began with the builders.
Wittgenstein's question of "Who does the visual room belong to?", "Who owns it?" can also be
understood as questions of what disciplinary concerns are in question. The questions focus on the
boundaries of ideas as well as of space. The problematics of the move from two dimensional
space to three dimensional space are played out repeatedly in the Investigations One form of
this is the examples in the Investigations that focus on the multiple possibilities suggested by a
two dimensional drawing of a three dimensional geometric projection and the resultant
ambiguities that arise from its implication of more than one possible three dimensional form
fitting the description or depiction.
165
2 6 Nedo, Op. cit., p. 28.
Wittgenstein's curious discussion of the "visual room" constructs another association between
drawings and architecture. The discussion while invoking architectural drawings, landscapes and
houses, is most interesting for its association of the subject, the self and the question of the
inhabitation of language. The visual room serves as a way of envisioning what it is like to have a
visual image, either real or imagined, of a spatial 'object'. While the visual room might be
consolidated under Wittgenstein's discussion of the relation between the inner and outer, private
mental imagery and publicly accessible language, as with his discussion of pain sensations; the
situation here is markedly different. Rather than 'language' forming the specific outward
criterion as in the earlier examples, here the visual, spatial and architectural are the primary form
of comparison. And, if only because of the example chosen, the act of envisioning a room that is
not yet there, suggests an activity Wittgenstein would have encountered in the practice of
architecture.
398 "But when I imagine something, or even actually see objects, I have got something which my
neighbour has not." --- I understand you. You want to look about you and say: "At any rate only I
have got THIS." -- What are these words for? They serve no purpose. - Can one not add: "There
is here no question of a 'seeing' -- and therefore none of a 'having' -- nor of a subject, nor
therefore of 'I" either"? Might I not ask: In what sense have you got what you are talking about
and saying that only you have got it? Do you possess it? You do not even see it. Must you not
really say that no one has got it? And this too is clear: if as a matter of logic you exclude other
people's having something, it loses its sense to say that you have it.
But what is the thing you are speaking of? It is true I said that I knew within myself what you
meant. But this meant that I knew how one thinks to conceive this object, to see it, to make one's
looking and pointing mean it. I know how one stares ahead and looks about one in this case -
and the rest. I think we can say: you are talking (if, for example, you are sitting in a room) of
the 'visual room'. The 'visual room' is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it as I can
walk about it, or look at it, or point to it. Inasmuch as it cannot be any one else's it is not mine
either. In other words, it does not belong to me because I want to use the same form of
expression about it as about the material room in which I sit. The description of the latter need
not mention an owner, in fact it need not have any owner. But then the visual room cannot have
any owner. "For" - one might say - it has no master, outside or in."
Think of a picture of a landscape, an imaginary landscape with a house in it. --- Someone asks
"Whose house is that?" - The answer, by the way, might be "It belongs to the farmer who is
sitting on the bench in front of it". But then he cannot for example enter his house.
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The question of ownership that Wittgenstein introduces here is interesting. When you design a
house, a room for someone else, whose is it? It is the product of the designer's thinking, yet it is
certainly not owned by him or her. The concept also raises questions of privacy and accessibility,
ideas repeatedly examined by Wittgenstein. The impossibility of entering into the Tractatus'
conception of language if as solipsism (hence the view from without)- is revealed as the
impossibility of entering into a non-public language, is contrasted here with the demand for
inhabitation of the physical, not just mental kind. That is, the exclusion of private mental space is
shown, literally, to be akin to the impossibility of others entering and inhabiting that space,
marking it as spatially inaccessible.
The distinction drawn at the end of the middle paragraph between "ownership" of a physical -
rather than a "visual" room - brings with it the question of the connection between the two. A
question concerning, among other things, issues of space and inhabitation. The visual room
cannot have an owner "outside or in". While this excludes ownership of the visual room it does it
on the basis of the ambiguous position that the "visual room" maintains between outside and in.
And, the visual room, as it turns out, in 9399 is very much like language in that it has no outside.
"One might also say: Surely the owner of the visual room would have to be the same kind of
thing as it is; but he is not to be found in it, and there is no outside."
The space between outside and in is equally the space between the Tractatus and the
Investigations. Whereas we are not assuredly outside the Tractatus (and language) in the view
from the ladder, the Investigations brings with it inhabitation and the understanding that we are
more certainly within language. By understanding that we are utterly and inescapably within
language - the Investigations also brings with it the impossibility of being outside of it. That
admission begins to dismantle the inner/outer distinctions and positioning in relation to
language. As we cannot be outside of language - being inside also loses its meaning. The outside,
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as with Wittgenstein's discussion of ownership, begins to lose its meaning as we have no way of
understanding, describing, depicting or speaking about it.
Architecture, then, becomes an even more intriguing example here. While clearly a physical room
can be inhabited, owned, entered, exited, etc., - a visual room, that which arises in the attempt to
understand a proposition (non-coincidentally is about a room) is akin to language, which is
equally ambiguous in its relationship to ownership. With the discussion of the visual room,
Wittgenstein's discussion of a private language can be understood to be examined at three
different scales in relation to the subject : on par with the subject in the discussion of a private
language, pain and sensation, on a smaller, external scale, in the discussion of the beetle in the
box, and, at the third scale, in the implied enclosure of the subject with the discussion of the
visual room. The discussion of the visual room thereby solidifies the association of the spatial
and the linguistic in the inner/outer, private/public discussion.
The visual room proves its usefulness in the understanding of language one paragraph later. 'The
'visual room' seemed like a discovery, but what its discoverer really found was a new way of
speaking, a new comparison; it might be called a new sensation." (CH400) The practice of
architecture has thus produced a new way of speaking and a new understanding of language.
The association again of architecture and language, here particularly the idea of the visual room,
offers a new way of speaking, and a new understanding of language in the Investigations that ties
together architecture, the subject and language.
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Section two : Images of Entanglement
The landscape of language
In the preface to Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein constructs two analogies as a means of
explaining the text that follows. The first is between the investigations of language and a series
of "long and involved journeyings" - "criss-cross in every direction", while the second is between
the "philosophical remarks" that form the book and "a number of sketches of landscapes" made
during those journeys. Together these analogies equate philosophical, and thus Wittgensteinian,
investigations to the sketches, and language to the landscape the sketches traverse.
Wittgenstein describes the text of the Investigations as a collection and "arrangement" of these
sketches that together offer a "picture of the landscape" rather than a finalized version of a single
sketch, leading to the conclusion that the book "is really only an album". The sketches are
presented in much the manner in which the structuring of the remarks that form the text are,
with a similar concern for how each is formed into a 'whole'. Introducing the question of how
and when the sketches are made, the criteria by which they are judged, the practices by which
they are combined, the rejections, repetitions, editing, cropping, arrangement and rearrangement
provides the tools for an understanding of how the landscape sketches serve to describe the
surface of the landscape of language.
The thoughts which I publish in what follows are the precipitate of philosophical investigations
which have occupied me for the last sixteen years. They concern many subjects: the concepts of
meaning, of understanding, of a proposition, of logic, the foundations of mathematics, states of
consciousness, and other things. I have written down all of these thoughts as remarks, short
paragraphs, of which there is sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject, while I
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sometimes make a sudden change, jumping from one topic to another. - It was my intention at
first to bring all this together in a book whose form I pictured differently at different times. But
the essential thing was that the thoughts should proceed from one subject to another in a natural
order and without breaks.
After several attempts to weld my results together into such a whole, I realized that I should never
succeed. The best that I could write would never be more than philosophical remarks; my
thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural
inclination. --- And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation. For
this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought criss-cross in every direction.---The
philosophical remarks in this book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which
were made in the course of these long and involved journeyings.
The same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different
directions, and new sketches made. Very many of these were badly drawn or uncharacteristic,
marked by all the defects of a weak draughtsman. And when they were rejected a number of
tolerable ones were left, which now had to be arranged and sometimes cut down, so that if you
looked at them you could get a picture of the landscape. Thus this book is only an album.1
Wittgenstein, from the start, through the intimate association he constructs between landscape
sketches and viewer (or draughtsperson), relies upon spatial thinking to define his philosophical
objectives. The metaphor of the landscape and the journeying through it allows for the
admittance of a subject into language and philosophy who had been missing from the Tractatus.
The importance of understanding language as a landscape stems from the landscape's implied
inclusivity, defining the investigation of language from within. The stated need to traverse the
landscape, criss-cross in every direction, in order to see and know it, insists that both language
and the Philosophical Investigations, cannot simply be 'understood', but must be re-enacted by the
reader in order to be known.
The imagery of the landscape set up by the preface re-engages the study of language at definitive
junctures within the body of the text. This association is best summed up by paragraph 203, in
which Wittgenstein directly equates the landscape with language:
203. Language is a labyrinth of paths: you approach from one side and know your way about;
you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about.
Preface of the Philosophical Investigations.
171
Landscape sketches and the depicted landscape itself are both metaphors for the relation
between viewer and language, or between language user and terrain - each combining a visual
and verbal component. But, the spatial organizations they suggest are of essentially different
kinds. The subject is positioned in relation to each in very different ways. A sketch is something
which we view from the outside, a pictorial image with defined boundaries. Sketches also
suggest a rough rather than 'finished' drawing or description, potentially as preliminary or
preparatory for future work. Wittgenstein's discussion of the sketches dependence on a
"draughtsman", reinforces the association between the viewer and the construction of language.
The landscape, on the other hand, is three dimensional: it is something we are, or can be, in. It
surrounds the viewer with no defined boundaries, or perhaps no boundaries at all. Considering
this very landscape as a two-dimensional image, by depicting it, necessarily creates boundaries
that limit the view of the landscape. Altering the viewer's position in relation to the landscape by
moving through it overcomes some of those limitations. It is this latter approach that defines
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations and which integrally ties together the act of viewing
and the landscape of language in the construction of the text.
Wittgenstein's remarks in the preface to the Investigations regarding the writing of the text are
equally remarks about how to read the Investigations These instructions focus on the form and
construction of the text in relation to the subjects of study. The preface does not begin with the
image of a landscape, however, but it begins by describing the (seemingly) literal organization
of the Investigations, stating that the book is composed of "remarks" or "short paragraphs, of
which there is sometimes a fairly long chain about the same subject" but which at times jumps
from one topic to another. This description is then interrupted with what Wittgenstein refers to
as his 'previous' intention of 'welding' the results of these investigations into a unity in which the
thoughts would "proceed from one subject to another in a natural order and without breaks." In
acknowledgedly having failed to achieve this goal, Wittgenstein finds instead that his "thoughts
172
were soon crippled" if he tried to force them in any "single direction against their natural
inclination", leading to the conclusion that this result "was of course, connected with the very
nature of the investigation." It is at this crucial point, where the "very nature of the investigation"
comes into contact with the method of that investigation that Wittgenstein's writing turns to
analogy and metaphor, where he begins speaking of landscapes and sketches.
The analogies do more than provide a useful metaphor, they spatialize the process of
philosophical investigation to allow what began with an attempted linear ordering of subject
matter and concern for potential disruptions in the unity of thought, to end with the construction
of an extended horizontal network of investigation thereby restructuring the text and providing a
new model of meaning. Through this spatial framework, Wittgenstein replaced the linear, serial,
vertical, fixed and hierarchical Tractatus with a complex and interwoven network of thought,
language, meaning, images and practices.
Wittgenstein's declaration of the necessity to move through the landscape in this manner marks
the ultimate break with the rigidly defined structure of the Tractatus. As a result, the
philosophical remarks that compose the text cannot remain the simple compilation of more or
less traditional philosophical subjects : the concepts of meaning, understanding and so on that
Wittgenstein lists at the beginning of the preface. Instead, they are constituted by the way in
which they define the extended surface of language through which these same subjects are
defined and via which they will be repeatedly studied and located throughout the text. The
surface, or landscape of language, thus provides both the content and ground for the "long and
involved journeys" by providing the means for self-examination. As Wittgenstein reiterates
throughout the text, language as landscape is both the object and means of study.
As both form and content, the investigation of language in the Investigations undertakes a series
of observations manifested in, not just recorded by, the sketches of the landscape made at various
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places and times. The sketches define the surface that they study rather than simply observe it
from a distance, and as such, necessarily and equally become their own source of investigation.
Where as the Tractatus' thinking had proceeded along a series of predetermined and more or
less discrete topics, the construction and understanding according to the logic of surface disallows
the Tractatus'hierarchical structure, implementing in its place a redefined nature and method of
approach. Topics become sites on the surface, accessible through their spatial locating and visual
depiction. This method of working, the traversing and surveying of the landscape, destroys the
clarity and singularity of the view from above or map produced by the Tractatus. The
Investigations, incapable of offering the clarity and completeness of a well defined and ordered
language, undertakes a search for connections between the many sketches that the collection, in
producing an album, is meant to facilitate.
The multiplicity of views in the Investigations brings with it choice, beginning with the preface's
initial possibility of movement, and in direct opposition to the preset and confined frames of the
Tractatus. Because the Tractatus had only been able to develop in accordance with its one strictly
correct method, it effectively offered not method but correctness, the blind following of a rule.
However, in the Investigations, Wittgenstein's explicit concern is with method emphasized through
its suggestion of multiple possible ones that emerge from the diverse journeys and methods of
constructing and arranging the sketched depictions of the journey.
In the shifts from remarks to sketches and back, the preface readily offers or moves from what
seems to be purely linguistic or verbal issues of understanding language, to the understanding
that language has visual and spatial components that also require study. Understanding language
for Wittgenstein becomes the process of coordinating our movements through space with our
visual processing and depictions of those processes. The philosophical remarks that result from
this travel are the landscape sketches that attempt to depict the journey or parts of it.
Approaching the same places from new directions redefines (and redepicts) the landscape into a
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series sketches that together produce an album. The album in how it was produced and the role
it plays in determining the method of investigation, exists in contrast to a pre-existing map.
The goal of the Investigations journey, to give (or get) a picture of the landscape lies in contrast
to the construction of a map, or its use, in navigating that landscape. Wittgenstein uses this
metaphor for two main reasons: to show that we go awry when we try to construct a map
(overview) of the geography, and that we go wrong, when as philosophers, we offer a map to
others as a way to save others the problem of thinking for themselves. Instead Wittgenstein
constructs the Investigations as a series of sketches or an album of reminders and images which
act as sites to encounter or recall issues of language, meaning, understanding and so on.
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Family Resemblance
There are several terms readily associated with the Philosophical Investigations - ordinary
language, family resemblance, language-games, practice, the private language argument and rule
following. There are also a series of images associated with the Investigations, although they are
not often discussed as such.2 A number of these images - the overlapping fibres that form the
thread of family resemblance, the depiction of an immobilized Wittgenstein stuck out on an
extended plane of frozen ice, the delicate spider's web that the philosopher's crude fingers are
incapable of repairing, the crystalline purity of the structure of logic and the endlessly criss-
crossing labyrinthine paths used to describe both language and our engagement with it - form
what I call "images of entanglement".
Images of entanglement are what might be seen as a specific series of landscape sketches sites in
which the enmeshment of associations that Wittgenstein brings together in the Investigations
coalesce into a specific image. They are spatial configurations manifested through the processes
of philosophical investigation that define the reconceived spaces, practices, methods, structure
and content of the Investigations. Beginning with their proto-formation in Wittgenstein's 1929
lecture on ethics, and developed extensively in the Investigations. Wittgenstein repeatedly posits
this structure to describe and construct both the meaning and image of language.
Entanglement emerges in the Philosophical Investigations most succinctly in two inter-related
passages: the assertion in 91125 that: "This entanglement in our rules is what we want to
understand (i.e. get a clear view of)." and the statement, a page earlier, in 91122 where
Wittgenstein outlines the conditions for such a clear view: "A main source of our failure to
understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. - Our grammar is
2 Derek Jarman's film, Wittgenstein (1993), uses these images as central to his depiction of Wittgenstein.
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lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding
which consists in 'seeing connexions'."
Together the two passages call for the construction of clear images of entanglement, or rather
more precisely, clear constructions or views of the entanglement with our own rules. The
unexpected union of clarity and entanglement developed in these passages is definitive of the
work of the Philosophical Investigations in its aim to describe the functioning of language by
depicting the complex surface of language.
The first suggestion of an image of entanglement occurred in an untitled 1929 lecture on ethics.
The lecture was delivered to a popular society known as 'the heretics' shortly after Wittgenstein's
return to Cambridge. In it, Wittgenstein presented an early version of his yet un-named idea of
family resemblance using the Sir Francis Galton's experiments employing photography as his
example. The Investigations Wittgenstein develops this construct into a fundamental model for
the functioning of language in practice.
I will now begin. My subject, as you know is Ethics and I will adopt the explanation of that term
which Professor Moore has given in his book Principia Ethica. He says: "Ethics is the general
enquiry into what is good." Now I am going to use the term Ethics in a slightly wider sense, in a
sense in fact which includes what I believe to be the most essential part of what is generally called
Aesthetics. And to make you see as clearly as possible what I take to be the subject matter of
Ethics I will put before you a number of more or less synonymous expressions each of which
could be substituted for the above definition, and by enumerating them I want to produce the
same sort of effect which Galton produced when he took a number of photos of different faces
on the same photographic plate in order to get the picture of the typical features they all had in
common. And as by showing to you such a collective photo I could make you see what is the
typical - say - Chinese face; so if you look through the row of synonyms which I will put before
you, you will, I hope, be able to see the characteristic features of Ethics. Now instead of saying
"Ethics is the enquiry into what is good" I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into what is
valuable, or into what is really important, or I could have said Ethics is the enquiry into the
meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living. I believe if
you look at all these phrases you will get a rough idea as to what it is that Ethics is concerned
with. ... 3
3Ludwig Wittgenstein, "(Untitled) "A Lecture on Ethics" Philosophical Review, Ithaca, New York: Cornell, Vol. LXXIV
1965. This lecture was prepared by Wittgenstein sometime between September 1929 and December 1930. It was
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The lecture takes the example of Galton's composite photographs and uses then as a model for
the re-examination of Moore's definitive statement that "Ethics is the general enquiry into what is
good". The example works by setting up a comparison between the ability of a single
photograph of a Chinese person's face to be an example of a "typical" Chinese face, and the
ability of a singular expression to account for the range of what is called 'Ethics'. This opening
discussion of Galton's photographs achieves more, however, than a widening of Moore's
explanation of "ethics". Rather, the example opens up entirely new possibilities for both ethics
and language by allowing the image of these composite photographs to become the basis for the
transformation of Wittgenstein's philosophy.
Galton's aim had been to construct a series of composite photographs of given 'types' of people in
order to produce essentialist physiognomies of race, class, religion, disease and criminality. His
method involved taking successive exposures on one photographic plate of the individuals in the
sample group. Each exposure time was the inverse of the total number of exposures so that if
there were nine total images combined on one plate, each exposure would receive one-ninth of
the total exposure time. The result of this process was to emphasize the features in common
through more combined exposure time and to de-emphasize or even drop out more unusual or
idiosyncratic characteristics.
Wittgenstein's employing a visual practice as the basis for redefining a philosophical/verbal
undertaking is in many ways the flip side to the Tractatus'attempt to define the scope of sensible
language. The Tractatus was about ethics to the extent that it was setting limits "to what cannot
be thought by working outwards through what can be thought." Wittgenstein united ethics and
aesthetics in the Tractatus, not because they shared subject matter, but by virtue of the method
given to the Cambridge society 'The Heretics" and is the only popular lecture ever composed or delivered by
Wittgenstein.
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through which they were constituted in language, or more precisely, by their being outside of
sensible language in contrast to the model he constructed of facts in the Tractatus, where he
wrote:
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)
In the lecture on ethics Wittgenstein seemingly remains in the quandary of language, boundaries,
facts, nonsense and ethics that he did in the Tractatus - but there are several important
distinctions between the Tractatus and the 1929 lecture, not the least of these is Wittgenstein's
having given the lecture on the topic of ethics at all.
Wittgenstein concludes the lecture on ethics by saying that:
. . . I see now that these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet
found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I
wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant
language. My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or
talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the
walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say
something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no
science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a
tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not
for my life ridicule it.
Something is amiss, however, in the example: Galton's search for something essential - biologically
so, in a given group of people, through the super-imposition of photographic images yields, not a
typical face, but a blurred or distorted one. Using this process Galton tried to identify what was
essential to each group. The process, however, began with multiple samples and ended with one,
while Wittgenstein's expansion of Moore's expression does quite the opposite. The model Galton
offers Wittgenstein is thus not one of method. Wittgenstein, instead, tells us that he wanted to
achieve the same sort of effect as Galton through the substitution of multiple expressions for
Moore's single one.
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That effect could not be essence, or at least not the essence of the type from the Tractatus
because of the ultimate blurring of even the most emphasized of features. And this is part of
what Wittgenstein claims in the lecture regarding ethics - that despite its appearance of producing
definitive statements, or facts which defined the world of the Tractatus. Statements of ethics in
producing and expressing values that appear as facts, as with Moore's definition, are nonsensical.
The blur then becomes of interest in its suggestion, not of essence, but of the non-absolute realm
of values. And Wittgenstein's use of the image as a model, coupled with the series of
substitutions he offers, imply the ability to do with words exactly what he says cannot be done by
seeing the definition as a composite rather than singular expression.
These distinctions, coupled with the introduction of the proto-concept of family resemblance at
the opening of the talk, form a significant movement beyond the idealized thinking of the
Tractatus that had previously barred such an extended discussion of the topic of ethics, but could
only explain why it was unspeakable. As is the case in the Tractatus, despite some of what
Wittgenstein himself says, his interest in presenting a lecture on ethics to a popular audience
immediately after his return to philosophy following his practice of architecture, says something
he could find no way to talk about directly in the Tractatus. It forms the beginning of the
remaking of the boundaries of the Tractatus and it opens up a new realm of philosophical
enquiry for Wittgenstein into the concept, not of clarity, but of entanglement by acknowledging
the inseparability of the discussions of ethics, vision and spatiality and the philosophy of language.
Wittgenstein's reliance on Galton's composite photographs as a model of the functioning of
language serves to inscribe both aesthetics and ethics at the core of his philosophy. Rather than
exiling ethics as had happened in the Tractatus, the lecture on ethics uses the Tractatus'
positioning of "ethics" within language and within philosophy to begin the study. Galton's
photographs combined with ethics and its multiple and unplaceable meanings become the root
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of Wittgenstein's later understanding of language. Through the lecture on ethics, Wittgenstein
thus began to redefine that which had been marginalized and even evicted from the sphere of
sensible language in the Tractatus, resurrecting it as the unacknowledged core of linguistic
expansion in the Investigations.
The second aspect which enables the transformation of the role and understanding of ethics in
philosophy to occur is offered in the closing remarks of the lecture that refer to the boundaries of
language, philosophy, sense, ethics, etc. (lecture summary and quote) It is here that Wittgenstein
offers the key element by which ethics/aesthetics become a model for the functioning of
language in the Investigations The spatial concept of boundary lies at the center of this
reconceptualization of language. These remade boundaries now allow for a perspicuous
entanglement in a way previously impossible in the Tractatus'rigid structure.
The Investigations' expansion of the use and importance of the ideas of association in Galton's
photographs, take what had been initially presented as a model for understanding "ethics" to
become, in the Investigations, the model for the overlapping of not just expressions, but of
practices, and the constitution of meaning. To this last, Wittgenstein gives the name 'family
resemblance' recalling and reassociating genetic associations in a more limited and more
reasonable extent than Galton.
Family resemblance is the name that Wittgenstein employs in the Investigations to characterize
the relationship between the various meanings and uses of a word, or the various kinds of words
that comprise language. The idea of family resemblance is introduced and summarized in
sections 66 and 67. The description begins with an act of vision, by looking at the various
practices understood as "games". Wittgenstein leads of the reader, through a variety of everyday
practices of games rather than considering the term in an isolated way traditionally associated
with philosophy. His concern is that we should not accept what we assume to be the associations
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between the different uses of a word, assuming for instance that they all share a common
essence or element, but that, instead, we need to survey the uses as they appear in everyday
practices.
66. Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-
games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? ---- Don't say: "There
must be something common, or they would not all be called 'games' - but look and see whether
there is anything common to all. - For if you look at them you will not see something that is
common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't
think, but look! -- Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now
pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common
features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball games, much that is common is
retained, but much is lost. -Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is
there always winning and losing or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball
games there is winning and losing but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it
again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the
difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses;
here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared!
And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way: can see how
similarities crop up and disappear.
And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping
and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.
67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family
resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family, build, features, color
of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. --- And I shall say:
'games' form a family.
And for instance, the kinds of number form a family in the same way. Why do we call something
a 'number'? Well, perhaps because it has a - direct - relationship with several things that have
hitherto been called number; and this can be said to give it an indirect relationship to other things
we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist
fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs
through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.
But if someone wished to say : "There is something common to all these constructions -- namely
the disjunction of all their common properties" --- I should reply : Now you are only playing with
words. One might as well say : "Something runs through the whole thread --- namely the
continuous overlapping of those fibres".
The example Wittgenstein uses of games is telling, both in its obviously being a practice, and in its
association with the other fundamental appearance of "game" in the Investigations - the concept
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of language-game as first introduced by the builder's language. Wittgenstein uses these language-
games, he tells us, to serve as models or examples of how we use language. The importance of
this activity cannot be overstressed, as it is the fundamental philosophical method Wittgenstein
advances in the Investigations, describing it as the main way in which we learn and explain the
meanings of words and concepts.
Wittgenstein employs the concept of family resemblance, not simply to explain the multiple
meanings of a given word or expression, but to describe how the 'whole' of language can be
understood without having to posit any single aspect common to all of it. That is, he uses it to
explain how language functions without an essence and therefore why the search for the general
form of propositions in the Tractatus was literally misguided.
65. Here we come up against the great question that lies behind all these considerations. ----For
someone might object against me: 'You take the easy way out! You talk about all sorts of
language-games, but have nowhere said what the essence of a language-game, and hence of
language, is: what is common to all these activities, and what makes them into language or parts
of language. So you let yourself off the very part of the investigation that once gave you yourself
most headache, the part about the general form of propositions and of language."
And this is true. -- Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am
saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word
for all, - but that they are relatedto one another in many different ways. And it is because of this
relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all 'language'.
Family resemblance forms an image of entanglement through the entwining of multiple and
inseparable meanings of a word, the entwining of meaning with practice, and in the image of the
fibres of the twine itself. It is the most defined and far reaching of the images of entanglement
Wittgenstein produces. Where as the others arise within specific discussions, family resemblance,
initially the result of observation, quickly becomes its guiding principle. Throughout the
Investigations Wittgenstein employs the idea of family resemblance in discussions of the practices
of reading, calculating, rule following, agreement, boundaries and the image of entanglement
itself. Beginning with the example of "games", which quickly becomes an example for all of
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language, Wittgenstein offers a series of examples of family resemblance throughout the text.
The concept also serves to associate the meaning of one word to another, such as the interwoven
practices of "agreement" and "rule".
224. The word "agreement" and the word "rule" are related to one another, they are cousins. If
I teach anyone the use of the one word, he learns the use of the other with it.
225. The use of the word "rule" and the use of the word "same" are interwoven. (As are the
use of "proposition" and the use of "true".)
A paradigmatic example is Wittgenstein's discussion of the experience of being guided in diverse
cases. The example intimately associates family resemblance with the landscape of language the
diverse situations of which seemingly act out the variants of the criss-crossing of the landscape, as
if to emphasize how no one aspect is common to all manners of traversing it.
172. Let us consider the experience of being guided, and ask ourselves: what does this
experience consist in when for instance our course is guided? ---- Imagine the following cases:
You are in a playing field with your eyes bandaged, and someone leads you by the hand,
sometimes left, sometimes right; you have constantly to be ready for the tug of his hand, and must
also take care not to stumble when he gives an unexpected tug.
Or again: someone leads you by the hand where you are unwilling to go, by force.
Or: you are guided by a partner in a dance; you make yourself as receptive as possible, in order
to guess his intention and obey the slightest pressure.
Or: someone takes you for a walk; you are having a conversation; you go wherever he does.
Or: you walk along a field-track, simply following it.
All these situations are similar to one another but what is common to all the experiences?
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Images of entanglement
There are two types of images of entanglement that emerge in the Investigations. Each defines a
specific relation between philosophy and language. The first form of entanglement arises with
the view from without constructed by the Tractatus. This image tends towards associations with
fixity, or repetitiveness of problems and situations emerging as images of nets, spider webs and
immobility The second form of entanglement is produced in association with the view from
within. In opposition to the fixity of the first form, they develop in the movement through space
as acts of spatial location and dislocation, manifesting as images of mazes, paths and roads. The
first type of entanglement, although only developed as such in the Investigations, is reiterative of
the thought of the Tractatus. The second type of entanglement makes its first appearance in the
preface to the Investigations in the criss-cross movement across the surface of language. That
action sets up the spatial production of images of entanglement that had been disallowed by the
neatly defined and hierarchically distributed levels of language in the Tractatus, only to emerge in
the Investigations as definitive of the text's structure
Nets and webs
In 91106 of the Investigations Wittgenstein portrays a primary example of the first kind of
entanglement. The example depicts the Tractatus' search for absolute clarity of expression as the
confrontation with a spider's web, in the face of which, the subject is removed and helpless.
106. Here it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up, -- to see that we must stick to the
subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe
extreme subtleties, which in turn we are after all quite unable to describe with the means at our
disposal. We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider's web with our fingers.
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The spider's web is an image constructed by the view from without. Confronted with the torn
web, the attempt or compulsion is to try and repair it. That compulsion threatens to draw the
reader into the web: "it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up". The web threatens to
entangle the reader by seemingly demanding the reader to intervene at its level of intricacy and
scale without the tools necessary to make that feasible. The threat produced by our attempted
engagement with the web is, as it were, a spatial illusion, a trick of scale. The problem as
presented is that we are too large, our hands too crude in their functioning, to engage with the
web, not that it can engulf us, yet that threat remains. It is a spatial fear that disallows any room
for movement, or any space in which to succeed as the reader is at once too large to enter the
web, but as the fear of being pulled in suggests, too small to withstand its attraction. It is as if
the exactness demanded by the criterion of logic, the need "to describe extreme subtleties" leaves
no space in which the reader may act. Given this threat, the view from without developed in the
Tractatus can now be understood as an attempt to evade the image of entanglement presented
by the surface of language, in response to which the Tractatus pulls back in order to view it from
above, rather than to engage with its misleading and conflicting appearance.
In another section of the Investigations Wittgenstein again relies on the association of an image
of entanglement with the view from without in order to examine the Tractatus' insistence on the
one-to-one correlation of thought and meaning. Here Wittgenstein sets up a similar problem to
that of the spider's web, only it is not the surface of everyday language, but our own capacity to
think that takes on a sense of estrangement.
428. "This queer thing, thought" ---- but it does not strike us as queer when we are thinking.
Thought does not strike us as mysterious while we are thinking, but only when we say, as it were
retrospectively: "How was thought possible?" How was it possible for thought to deal with the very
object itself? We feel as if by means of it we had caught reality in a net.
The image of thought attempting to capture reality in a net refers to the Tractatus'correlation of
thought and reality - here presented as if the two, having lost the determinate, a priori connection
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of the Tractatus, are disconnected. This sense leaves language continually searching for a way to
hook onto or entrap the world to which it refers. The net becomes the means by which language
connects to some otherwise amorphous world, as if it were catching butterflies in the air, or fish
in the ocean. Although the net here is in our control, as opposed to the spider's web that had
threatened to engulf us, the two have more in common than not. In each passage the image
arises with a discussion that compares everyday thinking to some unreachable ideal in whose
light the everyday seems clumsy and ineffectual. In 1106 the idealized and intricate structure of
the spider's web cannot be engaged with the tools we have at hand, our fingers, revealing the
ineffectuality of responding to entanglement from without. This inability produces a gap or
estrangement between us and the literal task at hand, implying that our everyday language or
thinking is too crude to be able to engage the extreme subtleties of the spider's web, or by
extension, the ability to describe extreme subtleties, with an imprecise language.
The image of the net constructs a similar situation to that of the web, despite the fact that the
image initially seems reversed. In 91106 we had been unable to engage with the web, in 91428
Wittgenstein acts out this scenario from a different viewpoint, offering the image as estrangement
itself, in its absurdity. With it, again our everyday thinking is examined for the gap between it
and some "reality beyond", as if the connection between the two now were missing. The search
for a connection or correlation of language and the world provides no certainty, and so posits in
its place a missing connector in the form of a net. The net, as the web, is offered in place of the
lost or hidden connection that logic and a transparent language had previously provided, and
now obscured by language's ambiguous and opaque surface. The net emerges as the
embodiment of the persistent doubt of language's ability to function without an exact correlation
of word and meaning.
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Crystalline purity
An example that arises immediately following the image of the web in 9106, is the ice of 9107,
where again, a fixed view, constructed to be in our control, ends up controlling us. Through this
example Wittgenstein directly confronts the thought of the Tractatus by explicitly introducing the
crystalline purity of logic itself as the express image of what Wittgenstein has called "the
entanglement with our own rules". Yet the image itself of a crystalline structure - compounded by
the addition of purity and the association with logic - initially suggests quite the opposite.
The discussion of the crystalline purity of logic imposed upon language in the Tractatus, shows,
however, that the attempts at a completely clarified form of expression produce what would
seem to be the furthest thing away - entanglement, here arising in the form of a fixity akin to the
frozen position of the view from without.
107. The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between
it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of
investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable: the requirement is now in
danger of becoming empty. --- We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in
a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We
want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!
The image of crystalline purity, as presented, creates a very similar situation to the spider's web in
the previous section in that each image is of a latticework of interwoven strands and segments,
despite the fact that crystalline structures are typically offered as articulate, and webs as
confusing.
Wittgenstein uses this duality of crystalline structures to allow for an important development in
the text from an image of fixity (web, immobility) - to one of movement and spatial dislocation.
The Investigation's persistent demands for movement provide the necessary impetus to transform
the image of entanglement from without to one from within, as required to journey across the
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landscape of language. The spatial crisis of these sections requires that the
subject/philosopher/reader successfully work to define ways to engage entanglement rather
than to be immobilized by it. It is a similar crisis to that at the end of the Tractatus which forced
the transgression of its limits. And, it similarly demands transgression, literally in the form of
movement which transforms the image of entanglement into something that can be inhabited.
The image of the crystalline purity of the ice, once posited, becomes explicitly associated with the
scope, limits, and demands of logic, through its depiction of an extended and idealized plane.
Offered at the onset as complete clarity, in its entrapment of Wittgenstein on the ice, it becomes
yet another image of entanglement, as if the act of depicting the image had transformed it. The
immobility enforced by the ideality of the surface of the ice acts here, to entrap anyone who steps
onto it. The narrowness of the scope or frame of examination fostered by the crystalline structure
of logic once understood as the essence of language, is thus shown to produce not ultimate clarity
as hoped for, but intolerable conflict in the form of a fixity that results in the inability to move, a
failure akin to the inability to repair the torn spider's web with our fingers. The transformation
occurs when the ice does not yield the expected ideal results. The shock of the resultant
suspended movement, in revealing the ice's true nature, acted as if to shatter the illusion that the
ice could fulfill the desire for frictionless motion.
The desire to move ultimately wins out, making it necessary to disentangle oneself from the
ideality of crystalline purity. This is accomplished by first recognizing that the criterion of
crystalline purity imposed on language is itself a form of entanglement, however ideal the
structure. Extrication from the crystalline image/structure involves redefining the aims of
philosophy, and specifically of the philosophical study of language. The aim to construct a
completely clarified form of expression, once depicted, is clearly seen to conflict with the desire to
walk because the requirement leaves no room in which to move. But, by exactly correlating
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meaning and language, the crystalline structure of logic had equally specified place, thereby
disallowing movement by turning any possible movement into transgression.
The desire to move forces Wittgenstein to venture onto the rough ground of the landscape of
language described in the preface, bringing the reader halfway to the second image of
entanglement, that from within. Associating language and the landscape collapses the distance
between the subject and language to construct a subject who inhabits everyday language,
entangled, opaque and ambiguous as it appears, rather than one who remains helplessly
removed when confronted with the image of entanglement.
Labyrinths and mazes
The second form of images of entanglement, those from within, unlike the first, are not produced
solely by vision, but by the continuous dislocation of vision produced by moving through space, as
found in the spatial field of language. That movement disrupts any one to one correlation of an
image and a place so that the image no longer appears as a whole, but is continually constructed
in the association of the subject and language. From within a spatial understanding of language
Wittgenstein can finally begin to engage philosophical problems in a way unavailable in the
Tractatus.
It is only following this production of images of entanglement from within that Wittgenstein is
able to explicitly proclaim the spatiality and temporality of language against the ideality of logic:
"We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-
spatial, non-temporal phantasm." (9108) And following that newly defined space of language
Wittgenstein can, finally, fully confront the image of language as the image of entanglement,
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concluding in 9109 that: "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by
means of language."
The Investigations in revealing the inseparability of the visual, verbal and spatial, undertakes
philosophical problems in ways that engage all three. These problems include Wittgenstein's
quest to define the scope, limits and functioning of language. They hinge on such central issues
as the defining of boundaries and the correspondence of word and meaning integral to
philosophy. The Tractatus had instead tried to draw clear demarcations in these relations with its
picture theory, show-say distinction, one correct method and sharp categories of sense and
nonsense. Engagement of philosophical problems and the understanding of language thus results
in the Investigations from the spatial confusion produced by the inability to completely
understand a three dimensional space from a single image or place of viewing, ultimately forcing
Wittgenstein to search for a new criterion of clarity and meaning to replace that of logic.
Throughout the text, Wittgenstein continues to discuss language in its spatial configurations. In
identical parenthetical comments at the ends of passages 525 and 534, each of which discuss
the importance of context in understanding language, Wittgenstein writes: "A multitude of
familiar paths lead off from these words in every direction." And, in 91426 Wittgenstein explicitly
compares the view from without, the complete view, with the occluded view. The inhabiting of
language in all of its ambiguities, incapable of yielding the clarity of the view from above, thus
produces sketches of the landscape as images of entanglement .
The multiple meanings of many concepts and contradictions, or ways of viewing, in the
Investigations suggests that the work of philosophy is not for philosophy simply to find its place
within these sets of polarities, but to reconsider the polarity of our thinking. That is, to reconsider
the limits within which we place and define our concepts. The multiplicity of methods in the
Investigations additionally works toward defining new forms of clarity that result from redefined
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limits and boundaries of relations and expressions. To this end, the visual- spatial metaphor of
the sketch serves a purpose other than analogy and description: in constructing and imagining
new forms of clarity that provide perspicuity in a manner not previously thought possible,
Wittgenstein shows that the clarity we once thought necessary, may not even be possible.
9426: A picture is conjured up which seems to fix the sense unambiguously. The actual use,
compared with that suggested by the picture, seems like something muddied. Here again we get
the same thing as in set theory: the form of expression we use seems to have been designed for a
god, who knows what we cannot know; he sees the whole of each of those infinite series and he
sees into human consciousness. For us, of course, these forms of expression are like pontificals
which we may put on, but cannot do much with, since we lack the effective power that would give
these vestments meaning and purpose.
In the actual use of expressions we make detours, we go by side-roads. We see the straight
highway before us, but of course we cannot use it, because it is permanently closed.
The philosophical problem
The image of philosophical problems and of the surface of language completely collapse around
the image of entanglement in the Investigations to produce nearly identical definitions:
123. A philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about".
203. Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about:
you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about.
The images of entanglement produced in the Philosophical Investigations thus function
simultaneously as a description of the surface of language and of the philosophical problems that
develop from the misreadings of that surface. Philosophical problems for Wittgenstein are not
produced by this entanglement with our own rules, but are that entanglement itself. As with
other images of entanglement, they arise in passages that search for relations between language
and meaning and compare the philosophical/logical solution to that found in everyday language.
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The image is posited in place of the (picture of) logic in the Tractatus. It is the image logic was
meant to repress or to efface.
If philosophical problems have a certain form, what of philosophical solutions? The implication
would be that the solution to not knowing one's way about is to find it. The defining relations of
entanglement, however, changes the Investigations. In 9125 Wittgenstein dispels the idea that
the response to a philosophical problem is search for a solution to it.
125. It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction by means of a mathematical
or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make it possible for us to get a clear view of the state of
mathematics that trouble us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved.. . . .
The Tractatus had treated language as if it were transparent, as if you could see clearly through
its surface to the meaning and logical form beneath and so it posited logic as the image of
language - believing it to be a faithful one. It was this transparency and non-materiality of
language in the Tractatus that seemed in need of a connection to its 'objects'. The situation in the
Investigations is quite different. Accepting the complexity and ambiguity of language, leaves
language no longer transparent. Language in the Investigations, as a spatial and temporal
phenomenon is always already part of the world and philosophy in the Investigations can no
longer deny or ignore the surface of language. Instead, it must now try to explain it and
philosophy's entanglement with language and with logic.
125. . . . The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique for a game, and that
then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore
as it were entangled in our own rules.
This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of).
It throws light on our concept of meaning something. For in those cases things turn out otherwise
than we had meant, foreseen. That is just what we say when, for example, a contradiction
appears: "I didn't mean it like that." . . .
193
This image of entanglement recalls the landscape and our paths across it even as it associates that
image with the construction of philosophical problems. Wittgenstein's stress on the role of the
subject - "we lay down rule", "we follow the rules", "we are ... entangled in our own rules" - in
the creation of philosophical problems emphasizes the importance of considering the position of
the subject in the response to these problems - "we want to understand", 'That is just what we
say". The role of the self, rather than being denied, is central to the understanding that we
position ourselves within philosophical issues. Not realizing our own role in the creation of
philosophical problems leads us to think that we are outside of the problem and thus, as with the
web, incapable of affecting it, when, in reality, we are already entangled in our rules.
The discussion of entanglement immediately calls the criterion of clarity into question in the
constructing defining and judging of the clarity of the views created. Clear views, however, need
to be distinguished from the ability to obtain a complete view. The view from within in the
Investigations supports no such illusion of completeness or clarity. The preface was the first site
to consider the relation between clarity and completeness by considering how the sketches give or
allow us to get "a picture of the landscape". That is, it raised the question of how a series of not
necessarily complete or all inclusive sketches can, satisfactorily, depict an equally undefined yet
extensive landscape. The uncertainty created between what is meant by sketch and landscape,
whether there are one or many, fundamentally disturbs even any initial attempt at defining a
new basis for clarity of vision. The question as to what extent the clarity of the view is contingent
upon seeing the complete view becomes exacerbated by the potential for many views of many
landscapes. The Tractatus had erred both in the attempt to produce a clear view and in the
belief that such a view was necessary in order to understand language and respond to
philosophical problems. To do that it constructed the view from without which created the
illusion that a complete view was somehow available. But as with the example of the spider's
web, the Investigations denies that the view from without leaves us capable of interacting at all
meaningfully with what is viewed.
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Albums
Wittgenstein's proclamation that the Philosophical Investigations "is only an album", made at the
conclusion to his discussion of the landscape sketches, suggests that the book is, at least
metaphorically, a sketch album. And in many ways, that is the intention of the Investigations, to
construct, edit, select, assemble and collect depictions of the landscape of language.
Collecting and assembling are not, however, neutral activities, but involve a great deal of work on
what is collected, as Wittgenstein acknowledged in the preface. In addition to how the
collections are made, selected, edited, arranged and assembled, there remains the important
question of what types or categories of things are being collected. Beyond the landscape
sketches, the idea of an album couples with Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblance and its
origin in Galton's work to also suggest a family photo album.
Galton's photographs had resulted from overlaying multiple images to produce a composite
surface that constituted a complex network of facial structures and familial associations. While
these could be connected to form an album, each photographic image, is on its own, a collection
or album of sorts. The collection and production of these complex images transforms the typical
idea of an album as a serial, chronological cataloguing of examples, into a coincident network of
multiple images that focuses, not just on the distinct images collected, but on the network of
associations between images emerging within a singular photograph. Each photograph acts as in
this way as a model of family resemblance.
The album thus produces images of entanglement in the depiction of the relationships between
the landscape and the sketches similarly to that between the specific features of individuals and
those that come together to produce a family resemblance. As with Galton's superimposed
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images, the album is the collective construction of images of language. It brings together, onto
one extended surface, the diverse elements that are language along with the (some of the )
various practices and meanings that constitute a word or expression.
But, there are also a number of other types of things that the Philosophical Investigations
collects, and other ways that it is an album. To begin with, the idea of an album suggests either a
book with blank pages used for making a collection, or the collection itself. The idea that a
philosophy book is only an album substantially challenges its status by suggesting that it is only a
collection or set of blank pages waiting for, or conveying, some outside content. This idea
reiterates Wittgenstein's view of philosophy as both lacking its own subject matter and as
incapable of supplying a foundation for any other discourse. Philosophy's role instead becomes
limited to that of collecting and assembling. Wittgenstein's claim in 9127 upholds this view by
specifying what is being collected: 'The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders
for a particular purpose."
The philosopher is portrayed here as an assembler or constructor, potentially not unlike the
builders who in assembling the building stones are assembling the reminders of their language.
The Investigations collects and arranges the everyday practices of language we encounter to
produce a series of reminders of the multitude of ways and places in which we encounter
language in contrast to the Tractatus'singular picture. The series of examples of various uses of
language and the language games of the Investigations are reminders of these practices. But,
they are less definitive reminders of what language is, than directives for the reader to examine
or recall certain practices in which a given word or expression is used. In the example of games,
for instance, it is suggested that the reader search not solely her/his memory but her/his
environment as well. The reminders, supporting the idea of a photographic album, are often
visual reminders and the assembling and arraying of those reminders are spatial practices.
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Many of the reminders that Wittgenstein assembles are specifically aimed at the practice of
philosophy. A common one is that it is a mistake to think that in doing philosophy something is
hidden (in language) that is of relevance to the work. Section 126 envisions a philosophy of
collecting by asking that philosophy simply put "everything before us" without explaining or
deducing anything. Wittgenstein adds to this point that "one might also give the name
'philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." The series of
examples that Wittgenstein puts forth and the reminders that he assembles reiterate this
understanding. Wittgenstein places the burden of vision on the viewer rather than on the
availability of the 'object' to vision, emphasizing the activity of collecting. Modified by the
awareness that what is visible is not fixed by the object alone, it becomes clear that our practices
of vision and our movement through space affect what becomes included in the album.
One example of the way in which Wittgenstein makes visible reminders is in his use of a sign
post. The signpost in the landscape serves to recall the landscape sketches even as it questions
the role and functioning of reminders, dispelling the view that there is a self-interpreting sign.
The repeated image of the sign post points to the way topics, examples, doubts, questions,
compulsions, and reminders are repeated throughout the text. Repetition serves an important
purpose in the Investigations, by reinforcing Wittgenstein's view of philosophy as offering
"reminders" of what we, by virtue of our being language users, already know. Philosophy. as
such, becomes the process of presenting and revisiting everyday practices of language in contrast
to the idea of philosophy as offering information, being revelatory or overseeing those practices
to comment on them.. The Investigations'concern is consequently to construct a method of
philosophy that functions by reminding the reader of these practices as they occur in the everyday
use of language, not as they occur in, a removed and isolated practice of metaphysics.
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In 91140 while discussing the various uses of a given word, Wittgenstein offers an example of
how reminders function within the philosophy of language, here with the practices of picturing a
three dimensional geometrical object projected onto a two-dimensional plane.
140. Then what sort of mistake did I make; was it what we should like to express by saying: I
should have thought the picture forced a particular use on me? How could I think that? What
did I think? Is there such a thing as a picture, or something like a picture, that forces a
particular application on us: so that my mistake lay in confusing one picture with another? -- For
we might also be inclined to express ourselves like this: we are at most under a psychological, not
a logical, compulsion. And now it looks quite as if we knew of two kinds of case.
What was the effect of my argument? It called our attention to (reminded us of) the fact that
there are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should sometimes
be prepared to call "applying the picture of a cube". So our 'belief that the picture forced a
particular application upon us' consisted in the fact that only the one case and no other occurred
to us. "There is another solution as well" means: there is something else that I am also prepared
to call a "solution" to which I am prepared to apply such-and -such a picture, such-and-such an
analogy, and so on.
What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our minds when we hear the
word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall
say not.
Understanding philosophy as a collection or assembly of reminders explains in part Wittgenstein's
declaration that the Investigations is "only an album." As with a (family) photo album, the
Investigations is meant not to show us something unfamiliar, but to remind us of that which is
familiar. It is a look at ourselves, our pasts, our practices, our language and "forms of life" rather
than to attempt to isolate the work of philosophy, or to use it to look at and comment on other
practices from a foundational or (literally) superior position.
Importantly, the reminders in the Investigations also differ from a family photo album, in that
they are based in uses of language and assembled from the public memory. These everyday uses
of language, even when not familiar in their specific form, remind the reader of similar events
and uses of language s/he may have encountered or can envision. The idea of memory once
again recalls the opening of the Investigations with Augustine's memory of the acquisition of
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language and Wittgenstein's added memory of the practice of building as manifested in the
primitive language of the builders.
The idea of album suggests as well the construction of a sort of history. History in the
Investigations becomes part of the method of the Investigations, for example, in the inseparability
of its 'theory' from its writing. History arises in Wittgenstein's recalling his intellectual history of
the Tractatus as well as his response to the history of philosophy in its formation of philosophical
propositions and problems. This recalling of history is reiterated in the process of considering a
philosophical problem, in emphasizing how it came about: turning the investigation not on where
it leads - to some 'solution' but on how it arose, from its initial misconception and misdirection.
The act of reminding thus has a double role. The reminders are not always about what we need
to remember, to do, to think, but about where certain ways of thinking lead - say down the
wrong path to the construction of 'pseudo' problems.
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Rearrangement as a surface practice
In the Investigations, Wittgenstein repeatedly demands that the reader maintain his or her focus
on what is visible on the surface of language. The production of the album was based on a series
of surface practices, including those stated in the preface: rearrangement, editing and cropping.
These processes by which the album was constructed from the sketches divide into two primary
forms - those that alter the sketches themselves by such means as cropping and editing, and those
that act upon the sketches as a whole, such as rejecting, repositioning, rearranging or regrouping.
The surface practices of editing and rearrangement in the Investigations are offered in direct
contrast to the Tractatus'attempts to get beneath the surface of language to the hidden "essence"
of language.
The importance of surface for Wittgenstein cannot be overemphasized. Words and meaning
together form the surface of language so that meaning is itself a function of surface and
meaning, as language, can be seen to not only reside in, but to produce an external, public space.
The insistence on the surface of language alters the implied correspondence of word and
meaning as found in the Tractatus by disrupting the inner/essence - outer/surface dichotomy to,
in effect, spread meaning across the surface of language rather than connect points through the
surface.
The desire for essence is discussed in the Investigations as a search for a state of complete
exactness. That search replaces the, at once more direct, yet elusive surveying of the surface of
language by claiming that something not readily available to vision is the real goal of
investigation. The surface practices of the Investigations denies any essence that succeeds by
positing what could not be found through everyday vision and surface practices of
rearrangement. Focusing on the surface of language discovers images of entanglement that
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Wittgenstein had tried to evade in the Tractatus. In so doing, the surface formed by the everyday
use of language was effaced, and philosophy was placed, despite the claims of the Tractatus, in
the privileged position of accessing that structure - for where else could such a logical analysis
occur. Wittgenstein's claim that this was necessary in order to clarify philosophical problems does
not entirely mitigate that privilege. The Investigation's responded to the eradication of everyday
vision by re-emphasizing it to focus the view back onto the visible surface of language to produce
everyday views of language assembled in the Investigations.
92. This [search for a state of complete exactness in language] finds expression in questions as to
the essence of language, of propositions, of thought. -- For if we too in these investigations are
trying to understand the essence of language --- its function, its structure, - yet this is not what
those questions have in view. For they see in the essence, not something that already lies open to
view and that becomes surveyable by a rearrangement, but something that lies beneath the
surface. Something that lies within, which we see when we look into the thing, and which an
analysis digs out.
The concept of assembly joins with that of reminders to define a space in which philosophy acts,
one that limits its effect on language and yet demands an intimate association between the two.
Philosophy as Wittgenstein tells us: "may in no way interfere with the actual use of language: it
can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It leaves everything as
it is." (9124) This enjoinder effectively prohibits philosophy from redefining the core of
language as in the Tractatus, while at the same time it collapses the association of philosophy and
language. It is in that collapse that philosophy is redefined in relation to everyday language. By
no longer aiming to uncover the purity and essence of language embedded within it, philosophy
is forced to describe the surface of language as it appears in practice.
In 9109 of the Investigations Wittgenstein explores the deep affiliation between philosophy and
language as one of arrangement. In this passage Wittgenstein explicitly associates what is
surveyed - the workings of language - with the production of bewitchment that belies
philosophical problems and estranges language.
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109. It was true to say that our considerations could not be scientific ones. It was not of any
possible interest to us to find out empirically 'that, contrary to our preconceived ideas, it is possible
to think such-and such" -- whatever that may mean. (The conception of thought as a gaseous
medium.) And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical
in our considerations. We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its
place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical
problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems they are solved, rather, by looking into
the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings: in
despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new
information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.
The battle Wittgenstein alludes to was first waged by him with the Tractatus in the attempt to
become unentangled from language and thereby attain a completely clear view of it and of
philosophy. Such a view was only obtainable by distancing oneself from language. This
disengaged view of the Tractatus insisted that language itself reflect that clarity of the prescribed
philosophical vision, the requirement that language be made over in the image of clarity, the
language of logic, an image that seemed as far from entanglement and bewitchment as possible.
The Investigations in reconsidering the Tractatus'attempt necessarily reconsiders the image and
criterion of clarity itself. Clarity arises in the Investigations not in opposition to, but along side the
image of entanglement. The Investigations' battle lies in the attempt to reconcile clarity and
entanglement, to produce clear views or sketches of our entanglement with language and of the
shared territory of language and philosophy.
Arrangement thus emerges as the fundamental practice of philosophy and the study of language
for Wittgenstein as a result of the fact that the philosopher always has to work within language
and with words. This inescapability of language defines the view from within that allows for the
inhabitation of language. Rearrangement produces and defines Wittgenstein's reconceived views
on meaning, language and method in the Investigations as surface practices, inseparable from
words themselves. The necessity to stay on the surface of language reinforces Wittgenstein's
emphasis on everyday language in our actual use of words.
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120. When I talk about language (words, sentences, etc.) I must speak the language of
every day. Is this language somehow too coarse and material for what we want to say?
Then how is another one to be constructed?-- And how strange that we should be able to
do anything at all with the one we have!
In giving explanations I already have to use language full-blown ( not some sort of
preparatory, provisional one); this by itself shews that I can adduce only exterior facts
about language.
Yes, but then how can these explanations satisfy us? -- Well, your very questions were
framed in this language; they had to be expressed in this language, if there was to be
anything to ask!
And your scruples are misunderstandings.
Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words.
You say: the point isn't the word, but its meaning, and you think of the meaning as a thing of the
same kind as the word, though also different from the word. Here the word, there the meaning.
The money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But contrast: money, and its use.)
Wittgenstein outlines a series of distinctions in this passage - that between the interior and
exterior of words, between words and meanings, and most curiously- less a distinction than a
relation - between scruples and misunderstandings. What initially seem like a series of obvious
distinctions, (for the first two in the list at least) becomes when carefully examined, more and
more difficult to maintain. The point is that traditional philosophy has through its search for the
connection between the two, suggested that words and meanings are essentially different. The
split between the two, as Wittgenstein points out, is, however, no more nebulous, than its
connection.
"Your questions refer to words; so I have to talk about words." Words along with meaning as the
surface of language, each becomes equally available to vision. Scruples enter the picture here
referring to the seemingly ethical underpinning of the demand for absolute clarity, and in so
doing, reassociating the ethical and philosophical ( philosophy of language, logic, epistemology)
that were divided in the Tractatus. But "scruples" is an interesting choice of word in its suggestion
of an ethical consideration or principle that inhibits action or a reluctance on grounds of
conscience. As this refers to ethics, it also recalls Wittgenstein's image of the idling engine and the
view that philosophy is not productive work.
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The suggestion that the 'ethical principles' overriding the Tractatus were themselves problematic
is shown in the paradoxical demands for the absolute exactness and correlation of language and
logical meaning while at the same time unable to make room for ethical propositions. By
understanding ethics in the Investigations to be beyond scruples, beyond the hesitations to act on
some unmentioned grounds of conscience, Wittgenstein allows for practice, ethics, etc. to enter
into a general philosophy of language and theory of meaning. That is, the remaking of the
model of meaning on the ethical/aesthetic, in relation to, rather than in contrast to a wider
understanding of language and philosophy results from the new ability or the new impossibility
of fully separating word and meaning, inner and outer, ethics and logic.
The assembly, arrangement, cutting down and dropping out of various sketches, constructs a
description of what now can be understood for what it is - both an image of entanglement and
one of perspicuity. The act of arranging thus continues to be a method for achieving clarity, but
the view has changed. As such, these images produced in surveying and depicting that surface
are no longer the clearly defined series of boundaries and limits defining the Tractatus, but are
images of entanglement.
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Boundaries
Wittgenstein's discussion of boundaries arises in the Investigations on the heels of his introduction
of the concept of family resemblance. It begins in the Investigations as might be expected with
consideration of how the concept of "game" is bounded. The multitude of practices comprising
games suggests that the word "game" has neither a closed nor an absolute boundary. As a result,
by observing the ways in which "game" or Wittgenstein's other example of "number" function in
everyday practices of language, the concept of boundary itself comes to be reconsidered.
68. "All right: the concept of number is defined for you as the logical sum of these individual
interrelated concepts: cardinal numbers, rational numbers, real numbers, etc.; and in the same
way the concept of a game as the logical sum of a corresponding set of sub-concepts." -- It need
not be so. For I can give the concept 'number' rigid limits in this way, that is, use the word
"number" for a rigidly limited concept, but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is
not closed by a frontier. And this is how we do use the word "game". For how is the concept of a
game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the
boundary? No. You can draw one; for none has so far been drawn. (But that never troubled you
before when you used the word "game".)
"But then the use of the word is unregulated, the 'game' we play with it is unregulated." - It is
not everywhere circumscribed by rules; but no more are there any rules of how high one throws
the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all that and has rules too.
In the passage immediately following, the discussion of the boundaries of a word, concept or
practice evolves into an explicit discussion of spatial limits and practices such as those involved in
the practices of architectural drawings, measurement and building construction.
69. How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that we should describe
games to him, and we might add: "This and similar things are called 'games'. And do we know
any more about it ourselves? Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly what a game is?
-- But this is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To
repeat, we can draw a boundary -- for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept
usable? Not at all! (Except for that special purpose.) No more than it took the definition I
pace - 75 cm. to make the measure of length 'one pace' usable. And if you want to say "But still,
before that it wasn't an exact measure", then I reply: very well, it was an inexact one. --- Though
you still owe me a definition of exactness.
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The suggestion that we often operate without having exactly defined, and even more specifically,
drawn boundaries, leads to the discussion of boundaries that are themselves not sharply defined,
such as fuzzy pictures and roughly indicated places in order to test how indistinct boundaries
function in everyday practices.
71. One might say that the concept 'game' is a concept with blurred edges. - "But is a blurred
concept a concept at all?" -- Is an indistinct photograph a picture of a person at all? Is it even
always an advantage to replace an indistinct picture by a sharp one? Isn't the indistinct one often
exactly what we need?
Frege compares a concept to an area and says that an area with vague boundaries cannot be
called an area at all. This presumably means that we cannot do anything with it. --- But is it
senseless to say "Stand roughly there"? Suppose that I were standing with someone in a city
square and said that. As I say it I do not draw any kind of boundary, but perhaps point with my
hand - as if I were indicating a particular spot. Ands this is just how one might explain to
someone what a game is. One gives examples and intends them to be taken in a particular way. -
I do not, however, mean by this that he is supposed to see in those examples that common thing
which I - for some reason -- was unable to express; but that he is now to employ those examples
in a particular way. Here giving examples is not an indirect means of explaining - in default of a
better. For any general definition can be misunderstood too. The point is that this is how we play
the game. (I mean the language-game with the word "game".)
The realization of undemarcated boundaries defining games raises the question of the nature of
that and similar boundaries that separate word from word, concept from concept. Indistinct
boundaries challenge, not just the concept defined, but the concept of boundary itself. As
Wittgenstein draws no line between an abstracted concept of boundary and actual spatial and
physical boundaries we may encounter, the shift from the functioning of boundaries in our use of
language to a discussion of visual and spatial boundaries themselves is fluid. All uses of
boundary, as of game participate in our understanding of the concept of boundary - as the
concept of family resemblance assures us. Family resemblance can now be understood in terms
beyond the defining of Wittgenstein's understanding of language to emerge as a spatial practice.
In so doing, it reveals itself to be unthinkable without challenging the concept of boundary
central to the Tractatus, including its ability to sharply distinguish showing from saying.
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The breakdown of the show-say distinction lies in the suggestion that showing this way - the
pointing with the hand or the giving of or pointing to examples - is not about an inability to
express in a better or more precise manner. That is, showing does not start from the place at
which saying fails as the Tractatus suggested, nor is it an inferior method. Instead showing
focuses on practices, a focus that the Tractatus had denied. Practice in the Investigations prevails,
not because saying had failed in its inability to define essence, but because of the concrete
historical failure illustrated by the construction of philosophical theories, as compared with the
successes of everyday forms of communication. That failure now becomes clear: practice provides
a method of counteracting the hierarchy of saying over showing in philosophy that had produced
mistakes based on appearance which, importantly, philosophy, by largely excluding the visual, was
untrained in, and thus unable to, detect. As the Investigations claims, the ability to distinguish
between the appearance of words is central in doing philosophy. But, philosophy in overlooking
the visual/spatial/practical components of language had also overlooked those components
through which distinctions in appearance of language were revealed.
The boundaries in the Investigations define, not just the distance from their counterparts in the
Tractatus, but act to fundamentally reconfigure philosophy. The specific discussions of boundaries
within the Investigations based in, and resulting from, the spatial practices of design and
construction he encountered in the practice of architecture form the foundation of this thinking.
Where as the Tractatus discussed the limits of language, of philosophy, the subject etc. - the
nature and formation of the boundaries themselves were never discussed. Rather, as the
Investigations acknowledges, they were repeatedly reinscribed in accordance with the (non-
materialized ) order of logic and, in contrast to, the Investigations continuously evolving
construction of and challenge to, those same boundaries.
The question throughout the Investigations is one of context and function. What is the purpose
of the boundary in question? The question as to what is gained (or lost) by an unattainable
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criterion of exactitude echoes Wittgenstein's questioning of the requirement that language
conform to logic. Conversely, many of the challenges to logic take form in the Investigations as
spatial and physical measurement. The Investigations continually brings the concerns for spatial,
linguistic and philosophical boundaries together in order to overcome the problems created in
philosophy in its ignorance of these aspects of language.
Wittgenstein's remade boundaries of philosophy and language also act to redefine the idea of
sense and nonsense that arise around diverse types of boundaries - many of which function in
ways that could not, and more importantly, were not prescribed by the Tractatus. As it is the
purpose of the boundary that determines the nature of the boundary desired, and by which we
judge whether it has fulfilled its function; the nature or form of the boundary contributes to how
it may function and thus what purposes it may serve.
499. To say "This combination of words makes no sense" excludes it from the sphere of language
and thereby bounds the domain of language. But when one draws a boundary it may be for
various kinds of reason. If I surround an area with a fence or a line or otherwise, the purpose
may be to prevent someone from getting in or out; but it may also be part of a game and the
players be supposed, say, to jump over the boundary; or it may shew where the property of one
man ends and that of another begins; and so on. So if I draw a boundary line that is not yet to
say what I am drawing it for.
Spatial angst
Acknowledging the spatial and temporal nature of language changes what it means to transgress
or to inhabit language as its boundaries have been transformed. The transgression of the bounds
of sense possible in the Tractatus have to confront the actualized boundaries of the Investigations
that disallow the hypothetical transgression of language upon which the Tractatus was based.
This thinking supports Wittgenstein's demand in the Investigations that we can no longer
command a clear view in our use of words as our grammar is lacking in (that) sort of
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perspicuity. Clarity is dependent on a place from which one can command a 'clear view,' but
where can that be with language? Not from seeing the whole of language because there can be
no such position. Clarity and perspicuity arise from within, as any attempt to be from without is
unobtainable, i.e. lacking in our language. As with Wittgenstein's question as to what becomes of
logic now, this question becomes what becomes of clarity now? This raises a central problem
with such a spatial metaphor, the problematic (seemingly contradictory) implication of an
external standpoint. In that way, speaking of an inside is problematic to the extent that it implies
something inaccessible beyond.
This concern associated with the transgression or even defining of boundaries arises in
Wittgenstein's text as a certain amount of spatial angst associated with these remade, poorly
defined, and potentially ever shifting boundaries. Passage 84 begins with the realization that as
the meaning and use of a word "is not everywhere bounded by rules" the use of words
themselves is not an absolutely defined practice. Uncertainty immediately takes on a spatial
dimension, becoming a sort of inverse boundary in the landscape, one that emerges at the
juncture of landscape and building. It is this same boundary, the one separating indoors from
out, and moving us from looking at the landscape to being in it, which also forms the operative
shift between images of entanglement.
84. I said that the application of a word is not everywhere bounded by rules. But what does a
game look like that is everywhere bounded by rules? whose rules never let a doubt creep in, but
stop up all the cracks where it might ? - Can't we imagine a rule determining the application of a
rule, and a doubt which it removes -- and so on?
But that is not to say that we are in doubt because it is possible for us to imagine a doubt. I can
easily imagine someone always doubting before he opened his front door whether an abyss did
not yawn behind it, and making sure about it before he went through the door (and he might on
some occasion prove to be right) - but that does not make me doubt in the same case.
The suggestion that there is something beyond, which we cannot get to, arises along with the
declaration or implication of a boundary. This understanding in denying that there can be a
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purely external or internal standpoint destroys the thinking that supports a dichotomy between
the inner and the outer. The desire to be outside and be able to see the complete picture is no
longer a possibility. (The sketches were not merely preparatory for a final version.) This same
idea is reflected in Wittgenstein's understanding of philosophy's ability to discuss itself, in the
understanding that philosophy does not have to get outside itself to define its own bounds or in
order to "see" itself.
121. One might think: : if philosophy speaks of the use of "philosophy" there must be a second-
order philosophy. But it is not so : it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the
word "orthography" among others without then being second-order.
Wittgenstein's employment of the visual/spatial and family resemblance discussion of boundaries
also serves to reassess the emerging practice of philosophy and the association of its component
parts, including the practices of aesthetics and ethics. This produces the only time that
Wittgenstein specifically mentions aesthetics/ethics in the Investigations.4 It is not coincidental
that the concepts of aesthetics and ethics, the make up of the boundaries of philosophy, and the
realm of language and meaning as characterized by family resemblance should emerge together
at this point in the Investigations The juncture specifically ties together Wittgenstein's aim in the
Tractatus of defining the scope and limits of language/philosophy, with an understanding that
such a goal is a spatial practice - one remade with the new understanding of space, boundaries,
practice, correspondence, agreement, etc. The working out of spatial problems in this section
enters philosophy anew with the reference to aesthetics/ethics. These areas which had previously
for Wittgenstein been marked by their functioning outside of the bounds of sense, become in the
Investigations the site from which the new understanding of boundaries and meaning explicitly
enter the Investigations.
77. And if we carry this comparison still further it is clear that the degree to which the sharp
picture can resemble the blurred one depends on the latter's degree of vagueness. For imagine
having to sketch a sharply defined picture 'corresponding' to a blurred one. In the latter there is
a blurred red rectangle: for it you put down a sharply defined one. Of course --- several such
4 In the first and main part of the Investigations.
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sharply defined rectangles can be drawn to correspond to the indefinite one. - But if the colors in
the original merge without a hint of any outline won't it become a hopeless task to draw a sharp
picture corresponding to the blurred one? Won't you then have to say: "Here I might just as well
draw a circle or heart as a rectangle, for all the colors merge. Anything -- and nothing - is right."
-- And this is the position you are in if you look for definitions corresponding to our concepts in
aesthetic or ethics.
In such a difficulty always ask yourself: How did we learn the meaning of this word ("good" for
instance) ? From what sort of examples? in what language-games? Then it will be easier for you
to see that the word must have a family of meanings.
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Shared Territory
Through the incorporation of aesthetics and ethics, practice, etc., into the philosophy of language
Wittgenstein reconceived the functioning of language. The philosophy of language, i.e. the
ostensible work of the Investigations, is thus irreparably altered. Aesthetics, ethics, practice
epistemology, meaning, logic, etc are all entangled in the formation of the family resemblance of
philosophy. The thread of logic that ran through all parts of language and philosophy in the
Tractatus is no longer understood as the essence of language, hidden or otherwise. Instead, it
remains a fibre in the twine, but as with all of the others, it does not run through all of language
or philosophy, yet it remains a part of it. Equally, its placement is not obvious but is at times
obscured, and its length is indeterminate. Yet, it remains logic. Logic, thus, along with aesthetics,
ethics, and so on, forms the image of entanglement that emerges in the Investigations The
Investigations begins with that image and works to produce methods whereby it can be
examined rather than replaced with a "clearer" model of what is unseen. The crystalline structure
of language developed in the Tractatus itself becomes, when examined in the Investigations,
another form of entanglement, not despite of, but as a direct result of its goal of absolute clarity.
The development of family resemblance and its proximity and lead in to the discussion of the
breakdown of absolute boundaries culminated in the reference to ethics/aesthetics as if to
reaffirm how meaning in the Investigations came to be modeled on aesthetics/ethics and not on
logic. The breakdown of absolute boundaries brought with it the destruction of the one to one
correspondence of word and meaning in the Investigations' ultimate repudiation of the
requirement that sense be determinate. The discussion progresses so that it is not just about
vague and sharp boundaries, but about the boundary between vague and sharp, whether that
boundary be a wall, fence in a field or a delineation of concepts. With that, the Investigations
reveals itself as the view from the Tractatus, defined from across the boundary the Tractatus had
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attempted to draw. It is from there that Wittgenstein redraws the landscape. Aesthetics/ethics
in the shift from the Tractatus to the Investigations, has supplanted logic as the structuring order
of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. But exactly because of that, what it means to structure
language or philosophy is entirely changed.
Aesthetics and ethics reveal their importance by being the first site in which definitions and
depictions are understood to not necessarily became more useful when made more absolute.
This however does not remain solely the case for aesthetics and ethics. Rather as Wittgenstein's
primary examples of the word "game" and the concept of language itself, such functioning is far
more extensive. And as the discussion of boundaries in 177 reveals, there is no sharp line
between vagueness and sharpness itself, in contrast to the Tractatus which drew, or attempted to
draw, a sharp boundary between epistemology and ethics/aesthetics. They thus enter as a
defining practice of the later philosophy, in effect, becoming the model language-game that was
the original home, where this use of language was first learned. (116)
In the "Lecture on Ethics" Wittgenstein began a process that ultimately posited a collage,
photomontage, aesthetic practice, at the center of his philosophy by remaking the philosophy of
language in that image. Language becomes both knowable and understandable as family
resemblance through an image capable of incorporating inseparably, multiple images to create
new ones. The importance of the image of entanglement providing both the inspiration and
explanation for language in the Investigations, turns out to be the effect of method in
Wittgenstein's later philosophy. As the Investigations functions through a series of examples and
models the image of entanglement becomes the ultimate example, capable of revealing the
language-game to itself be one of entanglement.
The Tractatus maintained the method of defining the outer by the inner, the excluded by the
included. This left ethics/aesthetics/practice/showing paradoxically both privileged and
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marginalized. Aesthetics and ethics become the site of his renewed interest in philosophy initially
through the lecture on ethics and in the production of the Investigations. Although arguably still
underground in the Investigations when read traditionally as subject matter, aesthetics/ethics
comes to the forefront when read in accordance with the Investigations' emphasis on method
and example. The return to the everyday as the model for philosophy is the site of the aesthetic
and ethical. Wittgenstein, in the Investigations reincorporates aesthetics and ethics into
philosophy along with the everyday to serve as the corrective model for philosophy. This does not
limit aesthetics and the visual, spatial, the practices as art and architecture, to philosophy, but
yields an alternative to the emptying of philosophy in the Tractatus.
Aesthetic practices lie at the center of Wittgenstein's philosophy in the Investigations guiding the
methods and examples. This is so, not simply because Wittgenstein's practice of architecture, his
introduction of the builders, his placing a series of photographs as the first examples, or his
emphasis on the visual and the spatial, or even because of the construction of images of
entanglement, but rather because of the very functioning of language as entanglement. That
functioning allows for aesthetics, practice, logic, epistemology, facts and the natural sciences all to
be entwined in language, destroying the previously impermeable borders drawn with the
Tractatus. The Investigations thus begins from the boundaries of sense drawn by the Tractatus
and redefines the location and nature of that boundary, redefining the relations of philosophy,
sense, language, practice, showing and saying in the process
In placing ethics and aesthetics at the center of his understanding of his later philosophy the
Investigations thus moves outside of the self imposed bounds of the Tractatus to incorporate
what previously could only be defined from without. Aesthetics and ethics thus replace, in one
way, the role logic played in the Tractatus. Their inclusion of aesthetics/ethics provides more
than just the ability to dismantle traditional philosophy, but creates the basis for building a
philosophy. Logic as Wittgenstein tells us remains intact in the Investigations, but serves a
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different more limited function, becoming a topic of investigation rather than maintaining its
privileged role as the method of investigation. This reversal of modes of investigation show how
changes in tools, media and approaches produce different understandings of reality, philosophy
and language, supporting a main theme of the Investigations that methods, form, processes - i.e.
the ways that we do philosophy - are a crucial part of philosophy.
The emphasis on and the multiplicity of methods in the later philosophy can be seen in
Wittgenstein's work within architecture which introduced a multitude of new practices, methods
and approaches to problems, as well as creating the field in which he could experiment and see
the results of these experiments with methods of design, construction and thought. The practice
of architecture that might have shored up Wittgenstein's view of the definitive nature of
boundaries in the walls of a building, instead, led, him to see how diverse boundaries may be.
These distinctions served to clearly differentiate boundaries from the limits of the Tractatus.
Boundaries developed from practice in the Investigations where their specific qualities were
determined by their required uses. In his practice of architecture, boundaries had emerged in a
multitude of forms, as walls, windows, doors, openings, elevational changes, stairs, lines in the
floor, and as solid, transparent, translucent and implied. In the later philosophy, this same
thinking produces a use and context dependent structure for language and philosophy that is
permeable at times, more definitive at others, allowing boundaries that had previously been
solely exclusionary, re-emerge to produce a shared territory of philosophy and language, showing
and saying, vision and space.
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